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Abstract 
 
This study analyses the British and Turkish policies on the Cyprus issue from 1967 
to 1980 and investigates whether there was any cooperation between the British and 
Turkish governments, as had previously occurred in the 1950s. The thesis shows that 
while Britain saw Turkey as an ally in its struggle to retain control of the island, and 
Anglo-Turkish relations were strong because their policies on Cyprus were very 
similar in the 1950s, this Anglo-Turkish cooperation diminished because of the 
divergence in their interests in the Cyprus problem within this timeframe. 
The thesis also demonstrates that there were different phases in Anglo-Turkish 
relations concerning the Cyprus problem between 1967 and 1980. In particular, 
relations between Britain and Turkey were extremely tense in 1974 because of the 
Turkish government’s decision to launch a military operation in Cyprus. The British 
and Turkish perspectives on the events in the Cyprus issue then diverged 
significantly. This situation also continued in the later period of the Cyprus problem 
which had a negative effect on the diplomatic relations between Britain and Turkey.  
The thesis also broadly analyses the Cyprus dispute between the years of 1967-1980. 
The policies of other important international actors, such as the United Nations and 
the United States, are also examined, because British and Turkish reactions to the 
policies of other actors upon the Cyprus issue also had an effect on Anglo-Turkish 
relations. In particular, the American position at the time of the major crises on the 
island, such as occurred in 1967 and 1974, had a significant impact on the British 
approach towards the Turkish policy on the Cyprus problem, and this is also 
examined in this study. 
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Introduction 
 
Historically, the Cyprus problem has not simply been a local issue between the 
Greek and Turkish communities on the island. Cyprus, in the past, has faced many 
events which have had a significant impact on the international arena and been 
widely reported. In particular, the Cyprus problem has had a significant impact on 
diplomatic relations between Britain, Greece, Turkey and the United States. This 
work will examine British and Turkish policies on Cyprus between 1967 and 1980.  
By concentrating on these crucial years and the important events in both international 
and local arenas, the thesis will also analyse the effect of both British and Turkish 
policies upon Anglo-Turkish relations. 
First of all, it should be pointed out that one of the most important factors in 
choosing 1967 as a starting point for this study was the large amount of research that 
has already been undertaken into British and Turkish involvement in the Cyprus 
dispute up to this period. Despite the fact that most of this research was not 
specifically entitled ‘Anglo-Turkish relations and the Cyprus question', this work 
offers a useful quantity of complementary sources and ideas on this topic. In this 
respect, research mainly indicates that British and Turkish ‘collaboration’ against the 
Greek demand for Enosis (i.e. unification of Cyprus with Greece) did exist in the 
1950s. Essentially, this is an important topic because formerly in the struggles 
between Greeks and Turks, Britain tended to favour the Greeks. As the historian 
Andreas Constandinos stated, because of ‘Britain’s contribution to the emergence of 
an independent Greek state in the early 19th century’,1 there was sympathy towards 
Britain extant among the Greek Cypriots.  However, by that time, the strategic 
importance of the island for the British caused trouble between the two ‘natural 
allies’.  
Firstly, it is essential to look at the previous British and Turkish policies on Cyprus, 
in order to broadly understand the shift in their approach to the Cyprus question by 
1967. The British historian, Perry Anderson, stated that after the Greek campaign for 
Enosis intensified in the 1950s, Britain started planning to use the Turkish 
community on the island as ‘counterweight’ to the Greek Cypriots.2 The significance 
                                                     
1
 Andreas Constandinos, America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974: Calculated Conspiracy or 
Foreign Policy Failure?, (Central Milton Keynes: Author House, 2009), p. 21. 
2
 Perry Anderson, The New Old World, (London: Verso Books, 2011), p. 361. 
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of the British going to such lengths to stop the Greeks lay in the island’s strategic 
importance to them. The historians Faruk Sönmezoğlu and Cihat Göktepe have 
underlined the fact that after signing the agreement with Egypt in 1954 concerning 
the evacuation of British forces from Egypt,
3
 Cyprus became a more important 
military base for the British.
4
 In 1955, the British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, 
emphasised the strategic importance of the island for Britain: ‘No Cyprus, no certain 
facilities to protect our supply of oil. No oil, unemployment and hunger in Britain. It 
is simple as that.’5 
Furthermore, in his book, Britain and Decolonisation: the Retreat from Empire in the 
Post-War World, the British historian, John Darwin, indicated what the island’s 
strategic location meant to Britain. He expressed the opinion that Cyprus was ‘to 
play an active role in any operations related to the Suez Canal and other British 
interests in the oil-rich region.’6 Therefore, it was deemed essential to develop the 
existing military facilities in Cyprus.
7
 For this purpose, ‘Britain established base 
facilities for the RAF and land forces and installed data gathering equipment. The 
new development in Cyprus would cost Britain £40-50 million in the five years from 
1954 to 1959.’8 As a result of this situation, Britain warned the Greeks many times 
that the island would not be permitted to unite with Greece. In this context, in a 
private discussion on 22 September 1953, the British Secretary State for Foreign 
Affairs, Anthony Eden, told the Greek Prime Minister Alexander Papagos about the 
negative attitude of the British Government towards Enosis.
9
 Furthermore, the 
Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, Henry Hopkinson, used the word “never” as a 
response to the question of the independence of the island, on 28 July 1954.
10
 
However, Britain knew that their efforts alone would not be enough to thwart the 
                                                     
3
 Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Tarafların Tutumları ve Tezleri Açısından Kıbrıs Sorunu, (İstanbul: İ.Ü. 
Basımevi ve Film Merkezi, 1991), p. 18., Cihat Göktepe, British Foreign Policy towards Turkey 
1959-1965, (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 94.  
4
 John Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation the Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World, 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Education 1988), p. 216., Also see: Ronald Hyam (ed.), Series A, Vol. II, 
Part III: ‘The Labour government and the End of Empire 1945-51’, published by HMSO for the 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies in London, 1992, document no: 246, p 117. 
5
 John Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus: the British Connection, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
1986), p. 11. 
6
 Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, p. 94. 
7
 Michael Carver, Tightrope Walking: British Defence Policy since 1945, (London: Hutchinson 1992), 
p. 29. 
8
 Darwin, op. cit., p. 95. 
9
 PRO: FCO 51/47, ‘the Turkish Attitude to Cyprus 1945-1967’, Foreign and Commonwealth Affair’s 
Research Department Memorandum, 4 December 1968. 
10
 Ibid., Sönmezoğlu, Tarafların Tutumları, p. 18. 
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Greeks’ ambitions. Clearly, as the historian Robert Holland stated in the beginning of 
the 1950s, the British Government was already planning to use the Turks against the 
Greeks. He indicates that in London in 1950, the British ambassador to Turkey 
advised the British Government thus: ‘the Turkish card is a tricky one, but useful in 
the pass to which we have come.’11 
The British strategy of dragging the Turks into the Cyprus conflict would eventually 
succeed. Initially, however, at the beginning of the 1950s, the Turkish Government 
was reluctant to become involved in the Cyprus question at all. The Turkish 
historian, Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, pointed out that Turkish foreign policy was in favour of 
British administration continuing on the island.
12
 In this respect, The Turkish Foreign 
Minister, Necmettin Sadak, stated on 25 January 1950:   
There is no such problem as a Cyprus problem. I also told this to a journalist quite 
explicitly before. Currently, Cyprus is under the control of Britain, and we think that 
Britain does not have any intention to hand over the island.  Therefore, there are no 
grounds for our young people’s excitement about the island.13  
 
However, Perry Anderson argued that the policy of the Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff, Field Marshal Sir John Harding, who had been sent by London to restore order 
on the island, actually increased the tension between the two communities there. 
Anderson states that although the Greek leader General Grivas, who was the founder 
of EOKA, (‘National Organisation of Cypriot Struggle’),14 strictly ordered EOKA 
members not to attack Turks, whom he had no wish to provoke, Harding’s 
replacement of the Greeks in the police service by recruiting Turks, helped augment 
the rising level of hostilities between the two communities. Oliver Richmond also 
emphasizes that ‘Turkish Cypriot nationalism became more prominent as a result of 
British policy to counter the Enosis movement.’15 Anderson points out that after the 
news of the bombing of Atatürk’s former house in Thessaloniki (Selanik) in 
September 1955, the anti-Greek feeling escalated in Turkey and the Greek minority 
                                                     
11
 Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 41. 
12
 Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, ‘Turco-British Relations Since the 1920s’, in William Hale and Ali İhsan Bağış 
(eds)., For Centuries of Turco-British Relations: studies in diplomatic economic and cultural affairs, 
(Beverley: The Eothen Press 1984), p. 96. 
13
 Mehmet Hasgüler, Kıbrıs’ta Enosis ve Taksim Politikalarını Sonu, 5th editions, (İstanbul: Alfa 
Yayınları, 2007), p. 40. 
14
 Joseph S. Joseph, Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics from Independence to the 
Threshold of the European Union, (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997), pp. 19-20. 
15
 Oliver P. Richmond, ‘Decolonisation and Post-Independence Causes of Conflict: Mapping the Case 
of Cyprus’, in H. Faustmann & N. Peristianis (eds.), Britain in Cyprus: Colonialism and Post-
Colonialism, 1878-2006, (Mannheim und Möhnesee: Peleus, Studien zur Archaeologie und 
Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns, Band 19, Bibliopolis, 2006), p. 546. 
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was targeted in Istanbul.
16
 William Mallinson also highlights the fact that that this 
event worsened the relationship between Turkey and Greece.
17
 In the end, Ankara 
found itself taking an active part in the Cyprus problem and working together with 
Britain to prevent the Greek Cypriots’ demand for Enosis. Thereafter, the Turkish 
Cypriots took action against Enosis, and the Turkish Resistance Organisation (Türk 
Mukavemet Teşkilatı TMT) was established to struggle against EOKA. Also, a 
partition (Taksim) policy, which meant division of the island between Greeks and 
Turks,
 18
  started to be advocated by Ankara. Tozun Bahcheli argues that this policy 
was first suggested by the British Colonial Secretary in 1956 in order to deflect the 
campaign for Enosis.’19 
 
Table shows the effect of the Greek Cypriots’ boycott on the British trade on the island. 
Source: PRO: FCO 141/3362, ‘Cyprus: passive resistance; boycotting of UK goods’. 
 
In the later period, the Greek Cypriots increased their efforts in the struggle and, by 
1958; EOKA launched a ‘passive resistance’ campaign on the island.20 According to 
this campaign, EOKA members called on the Greek Cypriots to boycott British 
                                                     
16
 Anderson, The New Old World, p. 362. 
17
 William Mallinson, Britain and Cyprus: Key Themes and Documents Since World War II, (London: 
I.B.Tauris, 2011), p. 5. 
18
 Ronald J. Fisher, ‘Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based 
Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, No. 3, Special Issue on 
Conflict Resolution in Identity-Based Disputes (May, 2001), p. 310. 
19
 Tozun Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955, (London: Westview Press, 1990), p. 40. 
20
 Foley Charles (ed.), The Memoirs of General Grivas, (London: Longmans, 1964), p. 133. 
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goods in Cyprus.
21
  Meanwhile, negotiations were being made between Britain, 
Greece and Turkey to find a solution to the dispute. 
In the end, as indicated by historian Christianne Gates, a Cypriot state came into 
existence on 16 August 1960, although it was not as a result of British strategies 
conceived from the negotiations.
 22
 Britain, Greece and Turkey were the guarantor 
powers of the agreement and British presence on the island also continued through 
the creation of two Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) at Akrotiri and Dhekelia.
23
 Gates 
underlines the fact that separate negotiations between the Greeks and Turks also 
contributed to this result. From this perspective, the Greek Prime Minister Konstantin 
Karamanlis’ official visit to Turkey in May 1959 on the invitation of the Turkish 
Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes can be regarded as an important occasion.
24
 During 
this visit, the two Prime Minister ‘reaffirmed their devotion to the application of the 
agreements reached for the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus.’25 
After the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, there was a relatively 
peaceful environment on the island which did not affect the relations between Britain 
and Turkey. However, after Cyprus’ constitutional crisis at the end of 1963, 
Kürkçüoğlu states that ‘Turco-British cooperation on the Cyprus question went 
through a critical phase.’26 Turkey realised that British and Turkish interests on the 
island were now different from what they had been in the 1950s. It was true that the 
Anglo-Turkish relationship went from one of mutual understanding and support, in 
relation to the Cyprus problem, to one of diverging interests. This was because 
Britain and Turkey did not share the same interests any more, as they had in the 
1950s. This meant that the Greeks were no longer their common ‘enemy’. Also, after 
the 1963 crisis, Britain’s main concern was to protect its military bases on the island, 
while the Turks focused primarily upon protecting the Turkish Cypriots’ rights. 
                                                     
21
 PRO: FCO 141/3362, ‘Cyprus: passive resistance; boycotting of UK goods’, secret telegram from 
Governor of Cyprus to Colonial Office, no: 1489, 2 February 1958. 
22
 See: Christianne Deborah Gates, ‘Britain, Turkey and Cyprus, 1950-1959’, Ph.D. Thesis, 
(University of East Anglia: 2012)., Necati Münir Ertekün, Inter-Communal Talks and The Cyprus 
Problem, (Nicosia: Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, 1977), pp. 10-11., Peter Dietz, The British in 
the Mediterranean, (Washington DC: Brassey's, 1994), p. 182. 
23
 Klearchos A. Kyriakides, ‘The Sovereign Base Areas and British Defence Policy since 1960’ in H. 
Faustmann & N. Peristianis (eds.), Britain in Cyprus: Colonialism and Post-Colonialism, 1878-2006. 
(Mannheim und Möhnesee: Peleus, Studien zur Archaeologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und 
Zyperns, Band 19, Bibliopolis, 2006), p. 512. 
24
 PRO: PREM 11/2630, telegram from the British Ambassador in Ankara, Sir Bernard Burrows to 
Foreign Office, no: 737, 11 May 1959. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Kürkçüoğlu, ‘Turco-British Relations, p. 97. 
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Consequently, the Turks applied a more aggressive policy compared to the British 
one. Indeed, the protection of the rights of the Turkish community on the island was 
one of the most important elements in the Turkey’s Cyprus policy. Furthermore, the 
Turkish public was closely following the Turkish Cypriots’ situation. As a result, 
there was a heavy public pressure on the Turkish government to defend the Turkish 
Cypriots rights. This pressure led the Turkish government to respond more 
aggressively to the events in Cyprus, as in the crisis of 1967 and 1974. Furthermore, 
as the Turkish Foreign Minister, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, stated in the Turkish 
National Assembly in 1967; if the Turkish Cypriots had a strong position on the 
island, Turkey’s hand would be strengthened in the international arena and it would 
be able put forward its own solutions to the problem more strongly.
27
 This statement 
also shows another motivation behind Turkey’s policy of protecting the Turkish 
Cypriots. 
The strategic importance of the island was one of the significant elements in 
Ankara’s Cyprus policy. Evidently, and as stated in the British Foreign Office 
document, Turkey did not want the island to be controlled by the Greeks.
28
 Turkey 
was concerned that the annexation of Cyprus from Greece would become a fait 
accompli. Turkey’s past experiences provided further important reasons for Turkish 
concern because in former similar struggles, the Aegean islands of Rhodes and Crete 
had been too easily lost by the Turks; so Turkey did not want the same end for 
Cyprus. This situation increased Turkish interest in the Cyprus issue and put public 
pressure to the Turkish government to take military action in the time of crisis. 
Clearly, public opinion played an important role in the shaping of the Turkeys’ 
Cyprus policy based on the historical problem with the Greeks. On the other hand, 
when the Turks were ready to use military action to solve the problem, the British 
avoided worsening their relations with the Greeks by supporting such an action by 
Ankara instead. This is a significant factor which widened the gap between the 
British and Turkish policies on Cyprus. 
This study, therefore, examines the ‘new’ British and Turkish approaches towards 
the Cyprus issue by 1967, and the impact of these approaches on their diplomatic 
                                                     
27
 Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, (Official Records of the Turkish National Assembly) term: 2, 
session: 2, vol. 11, 4 January 1967, pp. 7-8. 
28
 PRO: FCO 51/47, ‘the Turkish Attitude to Cyprus 1945-1967’, Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affair’s Research Department Memorandum, 4 December 1968. 
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relationship. This thesis aims to make an original contribution to the existing work 
on the Cyprus question because, as stated, while existing research generally 
concentrates on the evaluation of the Anglo-Turkish involvement in the Cyprus 
dispute in 1950s, little research has been undertaken regarding the effect of the 
Cyprus dispute on Anglo-Turkish relations after 1967. Because of increasing 
American influence upon the Cyprus issue, the work of Turkish scholars mainly 
focuses on the examination of the effects of American and Turkish policies on their 
mutual relations. The most important reason for this increasing American influence 
on the Cyprus issue was the growing danger, by 1967, of war between the two 
NATO allies Greece and Turkey, which would have been an undesirable 
development for America because of the danger of Soviet influence in the region. 
Therefore, American intervention at the time of the crisis made the US one of the 
most significant players in the Cyprus question. In this context, Nasuh Uslu’s work 
The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a 
Distinctive Alliance, and  Süha Bölükbaşı’s book  Superpowers and the Third world: 
Turkish American Relations and Cyprus provide much information on this topic.   
Furthermore, Necati Ertekün’s book The Cyprus Dispute and the Birth of the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus and Rauf Denktash’s work The Cyprus Triangle also 
have significant information on the Turkish approach to the Cyprus issue, but they 
tend to look at the events from only the Turkish perspective. As Faruk Sönmezoğlu 
points out, the general Turkish opinion on the British handling the Cyprus issue after 
1974 was that Britain opposed Turkish attempts to assist the Turkish Cypriots on the 
island, 
29
 which had a negative effect on Anglo-Turkish relations. 
The works relating to British involvement in the Cyprus question after the mid-
1960’s generally present the argument that Britain was becoming less active in the 
problem. While describing the British policy on Cyprus, Claude Nicolet used the 
word ‘passivity’. She argued that Britain’s response to the November crisis in 1967 
was not strong, and merely supported American efforts to resolve the crisis.
30
 On the 
other hand, Klearchos Kyriakides, points out that the British Government’s 
confrontation with severe economic difficulties at home by the second half of the 
                                                     
29
 Sönmezoğlu, Tarafların Tutumları, p. 100. 
30
 Claude Nicolet, ‘Lack of Concern, Will and Power: British Policy towards Cyprus, 1961-1974’ in 
H. Faustmann & N. Peristianis (eds.), Britain in Cyprus: Colonialism and Post-Colonialism, 1878-
2006, (Mannheim und Möhnesee: Peleus, Studien zur Archaeologie und Geschichte Griechenlands 
und Zyperns, Band 19, Bibliopolis, 2006), p. 500. 
14 
 
1960s affected its policy on Cyprus.
31
 This is a valid point, because during the crisis 
in Cyprus of November 1967, the British Government also had to deal with the 
devaluation of sterling. 
Another discussion on British policy on Cyprus was over its position on the events of 
1974.  Keith Kyle mentions that there was some criticism of the British decision not 
to use its power as one of the guarantor powers to stop the Turks at the time.
 32
 
However, Brendan O’Malley argues that America did not want to take military 
action against the Turks and ‘the British did not have enough firepower for military 
action to be effective without American support.’33 Mallinson also recognises that 
the United States had an important influence on Britain’s attitude towards Turkish 
military operations on the island in 1974. He argued that ‘British foreign policy – or 
at least military policy – had become increasingly integrated with that of the US.’34 
In general, as can be seen, the studies concentrate more on the evolution of the 
British and Turkish policies on the Cyprus question and deal with them separately. 
This thesis provides a comparison between the two policies on Cyprus by 1967 and 
investigates the mutual impact of their policies.  
The archival sources are an important part of this study. Consultation with the 
Turkish documents was affected to some extent by the limits of the availability of 
Turkish archives. This limitation problem can also be seen in some Turkish scholar’s 
works. However, other Turkish primary sources such as Cumhuriyet Senatosu 
Tutanak Degisi (Official Records of the Turkish Senate of the Republic Records, 
Millet Meclisi Tutanak Degisi (Official Records of the Turkish National Assembly) 
were consulted in this study. British Foreign Office documents in particular provide 
important material resources. The reports sent from the British embassy in Ankara to 
London provide significant evidence of the Turkish approach in Cyprus through the 
eyes of the British. Also, the correspondence between the British High Commission 
                                                     
31
 Kyriakides, ‘The Sovereign Base Areas’, p. 522. 
32
 Keith Kyle, ‘British Policy on Cyprus 1974-2004’ in H. Faustmann & N. Peristianis (eds.), Britain 
in Cyprus: Colonialism and Post-Colonialism, 1878-2006, (Mannheim und Möhnesee: Peleus, 
Studien zur Archaeologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns, Band 19, Bibliopolis, 2006), p. 
584. 
33
 Brendan O’Malley, ‘The Impact of British Strategic Interest on the Cyprus problem’ in H. 
Faustmann & N. Peristianis (eds.), Britain in Cyprus: Colonialism and Post-Colonialism, 1878-2006, 
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on the island and London gives us vital information for understanding the British 
High commissioner’s approach towards the Turkish Cypriot community on the 
island. These reports were important because they had a substantial influence both 
upon the shaping of British policy towards Cyprus and the Turkish attitude to the 
Cyprus dispute. Furthermore, discussion minutes from inside the Foreign and 
Commonwealth office about the Cyprus problem were also useful material for 
learning how much attention was given by the British government to the Cyprus 
question. 
From this point of view, although studies suggest that British interest in Cyprus was 
declining, Britain had not completely lost interest in the Cyprus issue. Foreign Office 
documents indicate that Cyprus still held an important place in British foreign policy 
in 1967. The Foreign Office explains the reasons why Cyprus was important for 
Britain: 
Cyprus is important to the United Kingdom for three reasons. She is a member of 
Commonwealth. The Cyprus dispute affects relations with Turkey and Greece. Our 
sovereign Base Areas in the island play a large part in our CENTO and other 
commitments and provide the jumping-off point for the CENTO air route through 
Turkey and Iran to the Persian Gulf and Far East.’35 
 
Also, according to the Foreign Office documents, one of the British interests in 
Cyprus was ‘to maintain the political stability of the south-east flank of NATO by 
preventing serious friction or war between Turkey and Greece.’36 Although Turkey 
was a member of NATO, it is difficult to say that NATO’s interest in the region had 
played a leading role in shaping Ankara’s Cyprus policy. There were times when the 
two NATO members, Greece and Turkey, came to the brink of war. On the other 
hand, when compared with the Greeks and Turks, Britain was much more concerned 
about NATO’s position in the region. A dispute between Turkey and Greece over 
Cyprus would harm NATO’s interests. In other words, conflict between these two 
NATO allies could strengthen Russia’s hand, which was totally unacceptable to the 
Americans and the British. Therefore, by 1967, Britain was still following political 
developments pertaining to the island quite closely.  
Another vital connection for Britain with the island was its military bases there. 
There is actually some criticism from scholars that Britain gave more importance to 
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protecting its bases in Cyprus than it did to actively taking part in finding a solution 
to the Cyprus dispute.  Describing the British policy towards its Sovereign Base 
Areas (SBAs) in 1970s, Mallinson even used the phrase ‘navel-gazing’37. It is true 
that Britain concentrated hard on its bases on the island, and even more so by the 
mid-1960’s. American intervention in the Cyprus dispute made the British role in 
mediation even less important, giving the impression that Britain’s Cyprus policy 
was only based on a continuation of the British presence on the island through 
military bases, thus completely absenting itself from the political scene in Cyprus. 
However, British concern for their bases ensured they could not be completely 
passive in their policy. Indeed, it forced them to shape new policies. The bases had a 
marked effect on British policy towards Turkey. In a Foreign Office report in 1967, it 
was stated that one of the British interests in Cyprus was ‘to preserve the over-flying 
facilities granted Britain by Turkey since without these, the Sovereign Base Areas in 
Cyprus would be of little use.’38 This indicates the importance of Cyprus for Britain 
because the island was still affecting its relations with other nations. In this sense, the 
military bases would also cause a small-scale crisis between Turkey and Britain 
when Turkish military operations commenced in 1974. Therefore, this study shows 
that the Cyprus issue still had an impact on Anglo-Turkish relation in 1967, though 
their approaches then were different from those of the 1950’s.  
The period from 1967-1980 was also the part of the Cold War era. As a result of this, 
apart from the developments in the Cyprus problems, the events in this Cold War era 
also played a role in shaping of British and Turkish foreign policies. Although it is 
difficult to say that the Cold War had any significant direct impact on Anglo-Turkish 
relations in the period of 1967-1980, the international developments and the 
geopolitical environment in this time period had effects upon British and Turkish 
policies towards each other.  In particular, when Turkey stared to improve its 
relations with the Soviet Union,
39
 (after the American decision to remove its missiles 
from Turkey following the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and American President 
Johnson’s threatening letter of 1964 aimed at preventing the Turkish Government 
from launching a military operation in Cyprus) Britain became cautious over its 
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policy with Turkey in 1967 because of the danger of a possible Soviet influence on 
Ankara which would weaken the Southern flank of NATO.  
There were other important developments in this year, such as the Arab-Israeli 
conflict which increased the Soviet threat in the region. As a result of this, Britain 
also saw communism as an increasing threat within Cyprus. So the British Foreign 
Office tried to keep Cyprus dominated by the Western World.’40 The Foreign Office 
also clearly stated that they ‘certainly did not want to see Cyprus under Soviet or 
U.A.R. (United Arab Republic) domination.’41  According to British Foreign Office 
assessment, ‘maintaining good relations with Turkey (the major power in the area 
and a comparatively stable one)’42 was essential to achieve these aims. Therefore, the 
developments in the Cold War era of 1967 did not have negative effects on Anglo-
Turkish relations. On the contrary, it gave Britain an incentive to keep its relations 
with Turkey at a good level. The Arab-Israeli war of 1973, and then the Oil Crisis in 
the same year also had no important direct impact on British-Turkish relations. 
However, the British plan to stop Turkish military intervention in Cyprus showed 
that the effects of the Cold War on British policy towards Turkey had started to 
decline. In the later period, after the Helsinki Accords in 1975, which helped to 
reduce the Cold War tension considerably,
 43
 the Cold War atmosphere lost its impact 
on Anglo-Turkish relations significantly. This situation contributed to the British 
making open criticisms of Turkey’s policies in Cyprus after 1975. 
Finally, there is another reason for taking 1967 as a starting point for this study 
which should be pointed out. The important developments of this year, such as the 
meeting of the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers in September, and the November 
crisis, give us an opportunity to make a broad comparison between the British and 
Turkish policies on these events.  
Starting from this perspective, the thesis consists of six chapters. The first chapter 
examines the British and Turkish reaction to the important events and developments 
on the island by 1967. There was no common British and Turkish interest on the 
island and both sides were trying to implement their own policies.  The second 
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chapter shows the British position at the time of the crisis between Turkey and 
Greece. This chapter continues by illustrating the British approach towards Ankara’s 
plans to conduct military operations in Cyprus. Chapter Three looks at the general 
British reaction to Ankara’s move in the Cyprus question. By 1968, there was an 
intensive dialogue between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots running, to settle the 
problem. Therefore, this chapter evaluates whether the British attitude towards the 
Turkish arguments in the negotiations process had an effect on Anglo-Turkish 
relations. Chapter Four presents how the divergence in their respective Cyprus 
policies caused a crisis between Britain and Turkey in which Ankara launched a 
military operation in July 1974 and Britain refused Turkish requests for assistance in 
their military action. Britain even planned a military counter-intervention to oppose 
the Turks. Each harboured a distrust of the other’s Cyprus policy. As result of this, a 
harsh verbal discussion took place between the Turkish and British Foreign Ministers 
in the second Geneva conference, convened in August 1974; Chapter Five focuses on 
this situation. Ankara came to believe that it would be difficult to reach a solution 
using British mediation because of the British Foreign Secretary’s negative attitude 
towards Turkish arguments. Chapter Six examines Anglo-Turkish relations over the 
talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island. There was no 
subsequent Anglo-Turkish relations crisis as there had been in 1974, but there was a 
negative stability: the negotiations did not produce a permanent solution for the 
problem. Mallinson argued that the Turkish ‘intransigence’ was the main cause of the 
unresolved Cyprus issue, also asserting that Britain’s silent support the Turks was the 
reason for the Turkish attitude.
44
 However, Britain did not support the Turkish 
position on the Cyprus issue by 1975, and the British government even protested 
about the Declaration of a ‘Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’. Furthermore, the 
Cyprus British High Commissioner’s report generally tended to blame the Turks for 
the continuation of the problem. This strengthened Ankara’s belief that the British 
favoured the Greeks. Turkish officials would complain about the British policy 
whenever they came together with their British counterparts. Likewise, the British 
Embassy’s report in Ankara demonstrated that the Turks were unhappy with their 
attitude towards them. Chapter Six argues that the Turks believed that the British 
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approach towards the Cyprus dispute had negative effect on Anglo-Turkish relations 
by 1980. 
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1) The Cyprus Problem in 1967: Britain and Turkey 
Adopting New Policies 
 
Introduction 
 
In the first chapter the evaluation of the Anglo-Turkish relations is based on their 
reactions towards the developments and events on the island. This method is a 
significant part of the whole thesis which enables the reader to see of the similarities 
and differences in Britain’s and Turkey’s Cyprus policy and its impact on their 
mutual relations.  
In this context, firstly, the Czechoslovak arms dispute is examined.  This was a 
significant development on the island by 1967 and led to tensions in the relations 
between Athens and Ankara. This issue has not been broadly looked at by the 
scholars. In particular, there was no sufficient information about British policy on 
this small scale crisis on the island. In the light new research on archival documents, 
the British position at this time has been presented which can help the reader make a 
meaningful comparison with Ankara’s reaction.  Turkish scholars, such as Fahir 
Armaoğlu, generally demonstrated that Turkey showed a strong reaction to the 
decision by Greek Cypriot leader Makarios’ to import guns from Czechoslovakia. It 
was true that Turkey applied an aggressive policy to prevent the importation of arms. 
The question is therefore how much Britain was concerned about  arms importation 
to the island by the Greek Cypriots and what reaction Britain showed towards the 
Greek move and, in turn, did its reaction cause some trouble with Ankara? These 
questions are investigated in the first section.  
In the second part of the chapter, the efforts at dialogue for a solution of the problem 
between Greece and Turkey are examined which were considered as an important 
development in 1967. The Turkish attitude towards the Cyprus issue while 
negotiating with the Greeks is also elucidated. Britain was not a part of this process 
of dialogue, but being one of the guarantor power of the Cyprus state, it was 
automatically interested in the negotiations between the Greeks and Turks. In 
particular, Britain’s evaluation of the Turkish attitude in this process is shown by 
using archival resources. In this sense, the reports from the British embassy in 
Ankara are utilised to see both the attitudes of the Turkish government and 
21 
 
opposition parties within Turkey. Also, the discussions between the British and 
Turkish officials on the subject of the Greek-Turkish dialogue is one of the 
significant points in the second part of the chapter and should help to elucidate  the 
approach of both powers towards the Cyprus question.  
The talks between Athens and Ankara resulted in meetings between the Greek and 
Turkish prime ministers in September 1967. This was an important occasion because 
at the former period of time, the meeting of the Greek, British and Turkish prime 
ministers had played a vital role in the establishment of the Cypriot State. However, 
this time, the British prime minister was not at the table and the Greek and Turkish 
sides were trying to find a compromise with each other. However, the meetings 
ended with failure and both sides accused each other. Therefore, the third part of the 
first chapter looks at the discussion at these meetings.  It also investigates the British 
assessment of these meetings and explains how the Turkish argument was regarded 
by Britain. 
The Cyprus Problem at the Beginning of 1967: The Czechoslovak 
Arms Dispute and the Turkish-British reaction 
 
The Cyprus problem was still unresolved in 1967. As a result of this, tension was at a 
high level on the island. Even small actions by Turkish or Greek Cypriots were 
enough to bring the two communities to edge of conflict with each other. Therefore, 
it is essential to look at the events which made the atmosphere on the island tense 
and evaluate the Turkish and British positions in relation to these events at the 
beginning of 1967. 
The island entered 1967 in an uneasy atmosphere because of the crisis over weapons 
imports which ‘started in December 1966 when the Turks learned about the 100 
rifles and another thousand machine guns Greek Cypriots purchased from 
Czechoslovakia.’45 This action by the Makarios government aroused deep concern in 
Turkey. It was thought that the guns, which were being imported from 
Czechoslovakia, would be used against the Turkish Cypriots. Turkey was probably 
led to think like this by bitter memories of the events of December 1963, a date on 
                                                     
45
 Fahir Armaoğlu, ‘Crisis the Cyprus Question Initiated in Turco-Greek Relations’, International 
Review of Military History, No: 67, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), p. 241. 
22 
 
which many Turkish Cypriots lost their lives.
46
 In the Turkish Assembly, deputies 
questioned the government about ‘Czech guns’ and showed concern over the 
situation of the Turkish Cypriots on the island. In his talk on 4 January 1967, the 
Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, informed the deputies 
about the actions the government took to stop the arms importation into the island.  
He also showed the danger of importing weapons into the island by referring to the 
past: 
As we know, after the 1963 December ‘events’, the Greek Cypriot Administration 
oppressed the Turkish community in Cyprus by increasing her military forces which 
are much higher than the level foreseen in the Constitution and equipped her army 
with various guns which were especially imported from Greece. In addition, from July 
of 1964 a Greek force of ten thousand people had come to the island with full 
equipment and, in March 1965, the heavy weapons, including tanks, were delivered to 
the Greek Cypriot Administration. As a result, the power of the Greek Cypriot Military 
Force increased far beyond the power of the Turkish fighters in the island. And yet, a 
secret arms deal with Czechoslovakia has been made by the Cyprus administration. In 
total a delivery of 150 tons of Machine-guns, rifles, cannons and mortars delivery 
came to the Island on November 27. Our government immediately took action as we 
learned about the importation of these weapons and appeals were made to the United 
Nations.
47
 
  
Indeed, the Czechoslovak guns were seen as a vital issue in Turkey. The public and 
the opposition parties were putting pressure on the government. According to their 
argument, it was unacceptable to remain silent on this issue. Therefore, the Turkish 
government had two main demands to prevent the importation of weapons of 
Czechoslovak origin: ‘First; suspension of the continued weapons consignment, 
secondly; ensuring the control of the weapons that had so far arrived from 
Czechoslovakia.’48 
The first demand of the Turkish government was successful. The Czechoslovak 
government agreed to stop the weapons delivery to the island. The Turkish Minister 
of the Interior, Faruk Sükan, reassured the Turkish Senate and said ‘Turkey has 
warned Czechoslovakia in a note that if the shipments were not stopped Turkey 
would have to “review relations”; he continued ‘the Czechoslovak government, 
expressing that it wanted to develop relations between our countries in every field 
today informed us officially that the second shipment of arms is not being sent and 
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will not be sent’49 The Turkish Senate of the Republic50 praised the government’s 
action in stopping weapons consignment  to the island. The member of Senate of the 
Republic, Fethi Tevetoğlu, stated that ‘we appreciated the government’s immediate 
action to warn the Czechoslovak government.’51 The second demand of the Turkish 
government was also successful. Initially, the Greek government insisted on placing 
the Czechoslovak weapons in the custody of the Greek Army, but this was 
unacceptable to the Turkish government because, from their perspective, the Greek 
government’s demand ‘was no more than to ask the mouse to look after the 
cheese.’52 Therefore, ‘the Turkish ambassador in Athens, Mr. Turan Tuluy, had on 
Dec. 12 1966 informed the Greek prime minister Stefanos Stephanopoulos about the 
Turkish government's demand that the first shipment of 150 tons of small arms, 
which had arrived in Cyprus, should be placed in the custody of UNFICYP.’53 
In another initiative by the Turkish government, Mr. Orhan Eralp, the Turkish 
delegate at the U.N., told the Secretary-General of the Turkish views that; 
These arms constituted a threat to the Turkish Cypriots and should be placed under 
the direct control of UNFICYP. Early in February 1967  the Turkish government gave 
formal notice that unless the arms, said to consist of 1,000 rifles and 1,000 machine-
guns, were surrendered to U.N. custody, Turkey would send a similar consignment of 
arms to the Turkish Cypriots.
54
 
  
As a result of intensive efforts by the Turkish government, ‘Turkey’s demand was 
soon granted.’55 However, until the agreement between Turkey and Greece at the end 
of 1967, Turkey was always concerned about the security of the Czech weapons’ 
control. The import of weapons to the island by the Makarios government evidently 
provoked deep concern in Turkey and the Turkish government made attempts to stop 
the importation. After looking at the Turkish reaction as one of the important actors 
in the Cyprus, the British reaction to the crisis will also be examined to investigate 
the differences and similarities when compared with Turkish policy.  
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The Czechoslovak arms crisis was monitored closely by the British especially given 
the sensitivity of arms coming from a Warsaw Pact country during the Cold War. 
Before the meeting on 25 Jan 1967 with the Greek Cypriot High Commissioner, the 
British Foreign Secretary prepared to tell the Commissioner that ‘we, ourselves, as 
contributors to UN Force in Cyprus and as a country with a contingent in it, have 
been concerned at the increase in tension which has resulted from the importation of 
Czechoslovak arms into Cyprus by your government.’56  
The Czechoslovak weapons issue was also discussed in the British cabinet. The 
Foreign Secretary informed the cabinet about the issue: 
The President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, had recently arranged to import into 
Cyprus several consignments of both light and heavy arms from Czechoslovakia. This 
action had probably been taken without the knowledge of the Greek government; and 
the nature of the consignments was clearly incompatible with the Archbishop's claim 
that the arms were required only to re-equip the local police force. Action already 
taken had in fact prevented the export of the second consignment; and we were now 
engaged in trying to prevent the distribution of the first consignment, which had 
arrived in Cyprus. The best means of ensuring this would be to secure agreement that 
the arms in question should be put under United Nations control. If, however, this 
proved unacceptable to Archbishop Makarios and the weapons were in fact 
distributed, we must at least try to ensure that they would be inspected at frequent and 
regular intervals by United Nations representatives in order to prevent any attempt to 
misappropriate them.
57
 
  
As the Foreign Secretary indicated in the Cabinet, the British opinion about the 
weapons importation into Cyprus was essentially the same as Turkey’s. From the 
Turkish and British perspectives, Makarios’ claim that the guns were bought for the 
police force was not convincing. As a result, the importation was prevented. As 
another issue, as mentioned in the passage, at first, the Makarios also did not inform 
the Greek government about the Czechoslovak guns. Resembling the Turkish 
reaction, this also angered Greece but in the end, the Greek and Makarios 
governments reached agreement that the weapons would be placed in the Custody of 
the Greek Army.
58
 At this stage, Turkey objected to the Greek demand and wanted 
the guns to be placed in the Custody of the UN. 
In his meeting with the Greek Cyprus High Commissioner, the British Foreign 
Secretary also underlined this issue;  
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We do not dispute your government’s rights to import arms, but it cannot be denied 
that they have had the effect of increasing tension in the island, as is indicated by the 
strong international concern that has been shown. As your Excellency will be aware, 
the British High Commissioner in Cyprus has already expressed our concern to 
President Makarios. I am glad that he has been able to give an undertaking to the 
Secretary General of the United Nations not to distribute the Czechoslovak arms for 
an indefinite period and has invited General Martols (Commander of UN Force in 
Cyprus) to inspect the crates periodically on behalf of  UN.
59
 
 
There was a tense situation in Cyprus at the outset of 1967. The Czech weapon 
importation crisis once again showed that confidence between the two communities 
was at very low levels. Even a minor action by one party was enough to bring the 
two communities to the edge of conflict.  
From the perspective of Anglo-Turkish relations, there were no big differences 
between the Turkish and British policies on the Czechoslovak arms dispute. 
Therefore, the crisis did not cause any fundamental problems between the two 
countries. The British, who played a mediating role, approached the crisis more 
calmly than did Turkey. However, Turkey’s reaction was understandable given their 
experience of past events on the island, such as the events of December 1963 on 
which many Turkish Cypriots were killed by Greek Cypriot attacks.  It was this 
historical context that led Turkey to act more aggressively when the crisis came. 
Apart from the arms importation crisis, the talks between the Greeks and Turks for 
settlement of the problem was another important development in the Cyprus problem 
in 1967. Therefore, the second section analysed this process the British and Turkish 
policy on it. 
Efforts to find a Solution without Britain: Turkish-Greek Dialogue on 
the Cyprus Problem and its Representation in British Sources 
 
The dialogue between Turkey and Greece on the Cyprus issue is a significant point 
to analyse if we are to understand the events which led to the Cyprus Crisis in 1967. 
The decision to establish an independent Republic of Cyprus was taken by Britain, 
Greece and Turkey and the Turkish and Greek Cypriots did not have an active role in 
this agreement. By the constitutional crisis in late 1963, inter-communal strife had 
restarted on the island. After the failure of the US and UN mediation attempt to solve 
the problem, the Turkish and Greek governments started bilateral talks to find a 
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solution for the Cyprus issue. The US also promoted
60
 the talks because the US 
mainly did not want any problem between two important NATO members.  The 
point here is that it was believed at the time that the solution of the problem could be 
primarily found through Turkish and Greek dialogue. Therefore, Turkish and Greek 
Cypriots did not take place in the dialogue. However, after the unsuccessful Turk-
Greek negotiations that were terminated by the 1967 Cyprus crisis, the two 
communities on the island would start inter-communal talks with each other for the 
solution of the problem. 
‘The bilateral Turkish-Greek talks, without the participation of the Turkish and 
Greek Cypriots, were initiated in late 1965.’61 A change in government Turkey after 
the 1965 election had an important effect on starting the talks with the Greece 
government. ‘Süleyman Demirel, who came to power in November 1965 in a 
landslide election victory, seemed intent on making a fresh start with a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict.’62 The new Turkish government believed that the solution 
to the Cyprus problem could be found in Turkish-Greek dialogue. The Turkish Prime 
Minister, Süleyman Demirel, also underlined this issue in the National Assembly: ‘In 
the end, Greece accepted our opinion that the Cyprus problem is a matter between 
the Turks and the Greeks and agreed to make negotiations with us on the Cyprus 
issue rather than searching for a solution in the UN.’63 
Although the idea of commencing bilateral Turkish-Greek talks had emerged in late 
1965, the talks started in June 1966. Both sides tried to understand one another’s 
approach towards the problem and to find a solution in accordance with their own 
views. The Turkish Foreign Minister also mentioned this issue in one of his speeches 
in the National Assembly. He said that: ‘We did not start the talks immediately. We 
waited to see promising developments on the Greek government’s attitudes towards 
the Cyprus issue. After that, we agreed to undertake the negotiations.’64 
Before starting the talks with Greece, the Turkish government determined four 
important points as vital in dealing with the Greece government. Accordingly, 
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‘1- Cyprus should not be annexed unilaterally by either Greece or Turkey, 2- neither 
Cypriot community should dominate the other, 3- the balance of power established by 
the Lausanne Treaty (1923) in the Mediterranean between Greece and Turkey should 
be preserved, 4- the 1959 Cyprus Treaties should not be revised unilaterally.’65 
 
First, the talks between Turkey and Greece were made by the respective ambassadors 
in secret. Süleyman Demirel gave details of the talks in a national Assembly speech. 
He announced that:  
The dialogue, which was initiated at the end of June 1966, with Greece over the 
Cyprus issue is still continuing. When our Foreign Minister was in Paris last week for 
the NATO Council Meeting he had a long meeting with the Greek Foreign Minister 
Tumbas. In this meeting, the outcome of the negotiations, which have been conducted 
so far in secret at the level of ambassadors, reviewed mutually and after that, it was 
decided to conduct the talks at the level of Foreign Ministers rather than 
ambassadors. The date of the next meeting will be decided subsequently together with 
the Greek government.
66
 
 
Although Demirel said that the talks would continue with Greece, after a short period 
of time ‘the confidential talks continued between the Greek and Turkish governments 
from June to December 1966, were interrupted by the fall of the Stephanopoulos 
government in Greece on December 21.’67  
The interruption of the Turkish-Greek dialogue threatened to adversely affect the 
Cyprus problem. ‘Mr. Ionnis Paraskevopoulos, the new Greek Prime Minister, 
proposed the resumption of the secret talks on Jan. 9, 1967, stating that he considered 
it advisable that they should be continued "with firmness and sincerity" on both 
sides’68 and then ‘he said that on 6 February that the Turkish-Greek dialogue would 
continue at ministerial level.’69 Although the New Greek Prime Minister’s statements 
were urging the resumption of the dialogue between Turkey and Greece, his 
government was a caretaker one and, therefore, according to the British assessment, 
the new government  in Athens was ‘less willing than its predecessor to take decisive 
action’70 in the Cyprus problem. Ankara’s response the Greek government’s call on 
revival of the talks was positive. The Turkish ambassador to Athens, Turan Tulay, 
stated that the Turkish government was ready to resume the dialogue but there were 
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some preconditions. Ankara demanded that the talks did not have to be started from 
the beginning and must be continued where it was left.
71
 Also, the Turkish 
government knew that the caretaker Greek government was not politically strong 
enough to make a definitive agreement on the Cyprus issue. Hence, it was demanded 
that ‘the dialogue could not be concluded until after the Greek elections and the 
formation of the new Greek government.’72 The Turkish Minster of Foreign Affairs, 
Çağlayangil, also announced that: ‘we have made known our views about the 
principles on which continuation of the talks depend. If agreement on these 
principles is obtained, the continuation of talks will naturally follow.’73 
However, while the discussion was resuming over the resumption of the negotiation 
process, the Greek army took over the government in Greece on 21 April 1967.
74
 As 
a result of this military coup, the Turkish-Greek talks could not be reactivated as 
planned. The military Junta established its own government. The policy of the new 
government of Greece would shape the fate of the Turkish-Greek dialogue on the 
Cyprus problem. After the coup in Greece, Turkey waited to see the new military 
government policy on the Cyprus issue before taking action.  
The Turkish-Greek dialogue was followed closely by Britain. In particular, the 
British Embassy in Ankara reported the debates in the Turkish National Assembly 
about the talks with Greece. According to the reports, the Turkish government’s 
decision to start the dialogue with Greece was criticised by the opposition parties. In 
one of the Embassy’s reports to London, it was written that: 
On the Cyprus issue, tone of opposition speech was more severe than in recent past. 
Mr. Erim (Republican People’s Party) criticised the government for pinning its hopes 
on bilateral talks, thereby losing valuable time, instead of working for improvement of 
the Turkish position on the island.
75
 
  
Actually, the report showed that the government policy on Cyprus had not gained 
full support from the opposition parties in Turkey. Talks with Greece were regarded 
as wasting time. In particular, the government faced accusations of accepting Enosis 
as a solution to the Cyprus problem. In the National Assembly, the Turkish Foreign 
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Minister, Çağlayangil, responded to these accusations and argued that the 
government did not accept any solution which provided for Enosis. This issue also 
featured in the British Embassy’s report to London which mentioned the Turkish 
Foreign Minister’s speech:  
On bilateral talks, the minister denied they had ever been conducted on the basis of 
Enosis; The Cyprus problem would be solved not by optimistic speeches in Athens, but 
according to actual situation between Turkey and Greece. The government had never 
entertained false hopes about bilateral talks, but time was no longer working against 
Turkey and the government had thought that talks could not harm Turkey’s Interest.
76
 
  
The Turkish government denied that they had accepted Enosis. However, after the 
talks ceased at the end of 1966, there were some rumours that Turkey had agreed to 
their resumption on the basis of Enosis in return for a NATO base on the island in 
which Turkey would deploy its own soldiers. This issue also attracted British 
attention. When Zeki Kuneralp, the Secretary of Turkish Foreign Minister Affairs, 
visited to Cyprus in March, 1967; the British High Commissioner on the island had 
an interview with him and asked questions about Turkey’s opinion about the 
resumption of talks. Kuneralp’s reply to the Commissioner’s question was 
summarised in the British official document which was sent to London: 
He (Mr. Kuneralp) said he thought that the Turkish government would probably agree 
to the resumption of the dialogue, but it was apparent that discussions had not been as 
was alleged on the basis of Enosis with compensations for Turkey. Enosis was just not 
acceptable to Turkey and he also disparaged the NATO base idea. He said there had 
been some suggestions of compensation for Turkey in Thrace, but the Greeks were not 
able to agree to this. The dialogue so far had shown that there was no real prospect of 
finding a basis of agreement between Turkey and Greece for an overall solution of 
Cyprus problem.
77
 
  
The Greek Cypriots were also opposed to the idea of giving military bases to Turkey 
for the solution of the problem. According to them, Enosis had to be achieved 
without preconditions. The Greek Cypriot leader Clerides, President House of 
Representatives, said that: ‘we shall never accept solution resulting in cession of 
Cyprus soil to Turkey… we shall not consent to establishment of Turkish bases on 
island under any form.’78  The Foreign Minister Mr. Kyprianou in the Greek Cypriot 
administration also indicated that ‘Cyprus was prepared to union with Greece but 
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would never accept partition nor a Turkish base’79 on the island. The statements of 
the Turkish official were indicating that Turkey was against any solution which 
allowed Enosis. However, the Greek side insisted on Enosis. This was the significant 
reason that the talks did not provide any solution. In fact, the Greek side knew that 
the dialogue with Turkey on Cyprus issue would not bring a solution which based on 
Enosis. Georgios Papandreou, the former Prime Minister of Greece, told the British 
ambassador to Athens, Murray, that he did not think that the Cyprus problem would 
be solved in the near future and he added that there was ‘certainly no hope obtaining 
Enosis as a result of dialogue.’80 Papandreou stated that the reason for the resumption 
of the dialogue with Ankara was to ‘avoid exacerbation of relations between Greece 
and Turkey.’81 The explanation of Clerides was also similar to Papandreou’s. He said 
that: ‘if we continue to expect that through the method of Greco-Turkish negotiations 
we shall achieve Enosis, we are completely outside of reality…’82 After the Greek 
military coup, there was a New Greek government in Athens and its policy on 
Cyprus issue would be decisive in the course of the Greece’s dialogue with Turkey 
for the solution of the problem. In this context, the Greek prime minister’s demand to 
meet his Turkish counterpart Süleyman Demirel to settle the Cyprus dispute was 
another significant development in the Cyprus problem in 1967 which investigated in 
the next chapter.  
The Meeting of the Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers and the 
British Assessment 
 
When the military regime came to power on 21 April 1967 in Greece, a first 
impression might suggest that its policy on the Cyprus problem was aggressive and 
to orientate towards creating Enosis quickly rather than continuing a long-term 
dialogue with Turkey for the solution of the problem. By uniting Cyprus with Greece 
immediately, the junta could then show its success in foreign policy to gain popular 
support in Greece.
83
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The new military government’s approach to the Cyprus issue also affected its 
relations with Makarios. ‘The relations between both sides were less than warm from 
the start.’84 There was a power conflict between the military regime and Makarios. 
The junta wanted to control Makarios. However, he wanted to be free in his actions 
rather than being dependent on the military regime. This power struggle would 
become more evident over time.
85
 In fact, since the coup in Athens on 21 April, there 
were some rumours that the junta was planning to stage a coup against Makarios
86
 to 
replace him with someone more loyal to their way of thinking. As stated by 
Makarios, these rumours were damaging relations between the Greek Cypriots and 
Greece.
87
 
The Greek military government's approach to the Cyprus problem was causing worry 
on the island. Particularly, the possibility of a Greek junta intervention in Cyprus was 
increasing these concerns. The British Foreign Office was monitoring the situation 
on the island closely and collecting information about developments. According to 
this:  
Ever since the Army coup in Greece there have been repeated rumours of an attempt 
to extend the military regime through the Greek regular officers in Cyprus, in such a 
way as to bring about Enosis quickly by encouraging the right-wing elements in 
Cyprus and if necessary displacing President Makarios. The move would probably, 
though not necessarily, be made through General Grivas on orders from Athens. It 
appears from these that the intention is that this weekend the Greek regular forces in 
Cyprus, with or without Grivas, and National Guard, will make some move against the 
communist(AKEL), probably by arresting their leaders and placing restrictions on the 
remainder. 
88
 
 
After assessing the situation, the British ambassador in Athens was instructed by 
London to inform the new Greek government that the British Foreign Secretary 
‘would take a very serious view of any attempt to spread the Greek coup to 
Cyprus.’89 Additionally, the Soviet Union was also concerned about the new Greek 
military regime.  The Soviets were concerned that the new government in Greece 
was fiercely anti-communist in part because of a right wing nationalist legacy from 
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the Greek Civil War in the late 1940s when local Communists were defeated. From 
the USSR’s perspective, through unification of Cyprus with Greece, the island would 
turn into a NATO base.  This was unacceptable to Moscow. The Soviet ambassador 
to the United Kingdom, Mikhail Smirnovsky, underlined this issue: 
The military government in Greece has in effect decided on a policy to unite Cyprus to 
Greece by force. Frankly, we have the impression that behind the backs of those who 
want to resolve the “Cyprus problem” to detriment of the interest of the Cypriot 
people, there stand certain circles of NATO. The Soviet Union is against any plans for 
dismembering and at turning the island into a NATO military base.
90
 
  
While these rumours were continuing, Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos, one of the 
strong men of the Greek junta visited Cyprus from 9 to 12 August 1967.
91
 According 
to Sir Michael Stewart, the British ambassador in Athens, by making this visit, the 
junta was actually trying to lessen the tension with Makarios. Stewart also mentioned 
that in this visit, it was said to Makarios that if Greece reached any agreement on the 
Cyprus dispute through dialogue with Turkey, Makarios himself would be given a 
proper chance to examine it.
92
 Therefore, Makarios did not feel that he was 
completely eliminated from any resolution of the Cyprus problem. According to the 
British High Commissioner, Sir Norman Costar, although the visit made some 
positive progress in terms of the relations between the Archbishop and the Greek 
junta, he said ‘there was clearly much room for future dispute’93 because Makarios 
seemed not to be ‘content with a subordinate role over the solution of the Cyprus 
problem.’94 
In fact, although there were some rumours about the Greek junta’s policy on Cyprus, 
it was not an easy task for them to speedily unite the island with Greece. An 
aggressive policy from the Greek junta towards Cyprus would cause problems with 
Turkey, which in turn would weaken the southern flank of NATO. This could not be 
approved by the US. In addition, international support was important for the new 
Greek government. However, like the Soviet Union, ‘international reaction to the 
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military takeover in Greece was immediate and adverse’.95 It was difficult for an 
anti-democratic regime to gain the support of other countries. Therefore, ‘at this 
juncture the increasingly isolated Greek junta took the initiative and Prime Minister 
Konstantinos Kollias invited his Turkish counterpart Süleyman Demirel to hold talks 
on bilateral issues’96 which were mainly about the Cyprus problem. In his statement 
on 2 September, Kollias also said that the Greek government wanted to solve its 
problem with Turkey.
97
 ‘On the Turkish side, Çağlayangil, the Turkish Foreign 
Minister, persuaded Prime Minister Demirel’98 to meet with his Greek counterpart. 
On 6 September, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a statement and 
announced that the Greek and Turkish government agreed to have a meeting to 
review all relations between the two countries including the Cyprus problem.
99
 
Therefore, ‘two Prime Ministers heading their respective delegations met on 
September 9 and 10, 1967, on the Turco-Greek border, first in Keşan in Turkey, and 
on the next day on Alexandroupolis (Dedeağaç) in Greece.’100 This was an important 
event in terms of Greek-Turkish relations. Both countries’ Prime Ministers took their 
own initiative to meet each other to discuss the problems between the both countries 
without urge or intervention of the UN.  
The first meeting in Keşan on September 9 did not produce any solution for the 
Cyprus problem. The main dispute between the two sides was on the issue of Enosis. 
The Greeks believed that the Turks would accept Enosis in return for giving 
‘minority guarantees for Turkish Cypriots and territorial adjustment on the Greco-
Turkish border in favour of Turkey’101. However, it remained unacceptable to Turkey 
to sign any agreement which led to Enosis. Therefore, ‘the Turks rejected Enosis102 
and demanded either a return to the 1959 status quo or to double Enosis’103 (division 
the island between Turkey and Greece). Zeki Kuneralp, who was the Secretary of 
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Turkish Foreign Minister Affairs and attended the meetings with Demirel, stated the 
situation at the first meeting:  
The Greek Prime Minister Kollias started the discussions as the initiator of the talks. 
He demanded Enosis (attachment to Greece) for Cyprus and asked for the London-
Zurich Agreements to be repudiated. He argued that this would be to the benefit of all 
countries concerned. Demirel at once rejected Kollias’ argumentation and 
unequivocally stated Turkey’s position: Adherence to the London-Zurich agreements 
only could provide grounds for a solution of the problem.
104
  
 
 
Soldiers saluting the Turkish Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel, in Keşan. 
Source: Milliyet, 9 September 1967. 
 
According to the Greek argument, ‘Enosis was also good for the Turks. Seeing a 
Greek flag flying over the island south of the coast of Turkey would be assurance 
that the island was in allied hands and therefore safe. Otherwise, there was a great 
danger that Cyprus would go communist.’105 The Greek side tried to show the 
necessity of Enosis. However, their argument could not manage to change the 
Turkish government attitude towards Enosis. Therefore, ‘the Turkish reply, which 
Kollias later explained took him greatly by surprise, was to say flatly that Enosis was 
no solution.’106 The point is that before the meetings on 9 and 10 September, the 
Turkish and Greek Foreign ministers met in Luxemburg in June and talked about the 
Cyprus issue. After the meeting, the Greek side mistakenly thought that the Turks 
were ready to accept Enosis as a solution, but the Turkish side had actually rejected 
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this argument. This misunderstanding between the parties adversely affected the 
frontier meetings on September 9 and 10.
 107
 
A subsequent meeting was held on the next day on Alexandroupolis (Dedeağaç) in 
Greece. However, this talk also did not produce any solution because both sides 
continued to disagree.
108
 Later, on 13 September, the Greek Prime Minister, Kollias, 
defended their position in the meetings with the Turkish government and also 
expressed the view that he could not accept any solution which would damage Greek 
national interest.
109
 In a press conference, the Turkish Prime Minister, Demirel, said 
that the Greek rejection of acceptance any solution apart from unifying the island 
with its mainland was the important reason for the fact that the Cyprus problem was 
still unresolved.
110
 The Turkish Cypriot leader, Dr Fazıl Küçük, also said that Turkey 
and Turkish Cypriots would never accept unification of Cyprus with Greece but 
partition of the island between Turkey and Greece was an acceptable solution for the 
Turks.
111
 By the end of the frontier meetings, the Turkish-Greek dialogue, ongoing 
since June 1966 was effectively over without having produced any solution to the 
problem.  However, it was thought that the talks could provide a peaceful solution on 
which both sides agreed but it is a reality that there were big differences between the 
approaches of the two sides towards the Cyprus issue which became more clear as a 
result of the Keşan and Alexandroupolis (Dedeağaç) meetings.  
The failure of these talks adversely affected the Cyprus problem in subsequent 
decades and cast a shadow over future attempts to create a working solution. ‘The rift 
between Turkey and Greece grew wider’112 and this led to the second major crisis on 
the island in November during which two NATO allies, Turkey and Greece, almost 
went to war with each other. The frontier meetings between Demirel and Kollias 
were also considered to be an important development by Britain. The meeting 
features prominently in British documents. In particular, there were significant 
evaluations of the failure of the talks.  
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According to one of British assessments of why the Demirel/Kollias talks failed: 
There was a considerable element of genuine misunderstanding. The Greek 
government clearly thought that the Turks would be prepared to negotiate on a basis 
of compensated Enosis. The Greeks may have thought that when they turned down the 
offer made during the meeting between the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers at 
Luxemburg (in June) of Enosis plus a leased base it was the amount of compensation 
rather than principle of Enosis which made offer unacceptable. But the Turks made it 
clear when they turned down the proposal put to them at Luxemburg that it was the 
principle of Enosis to which they objected.
113
 
  
The British assessment of the failure of the talks also underlined the 
misunderstanding between both sides. Although the Turkish Foreign Ministers 
rejected Enosis in the meeting in June, the Greek side did not understand how the 
Turks had been serious about it. Therefore, in the frontier meetings, the Greek side 
came to offer Enosis while the Turks came to prevent it. This incommensurability 
was the main problem. After the frontier meetings, Britain reviewed its approach 
towards the Turkish-Greek dialogue: 
Should we urge the Greek and Turks to go on talking?  
We know that State Department took prompt action after the Kollias/Demirel talks to 
urge the Greek and Turkish governments not to be discouraged and to go on talking. 
We thought that this was the right line to take and we believe that it is important that 
the Greeks and Turks should remain in regular touch over Cyprus even if whatever 
kind of dialogue they keep up is unlikely to produce any real progress towards a new 
settlement.
114
 
 
As can be seen, Britain decided to continue to support the dialogue between Turkey 
and Greece. Britain knew that stopping negotiations between the two sides would 
adversely affect the Cyprus problem. However, as previously mentioned, both sides 
approach towards the problem made the resumption of the negotiations almost 
impossible. As a result, the emergence of a new crisis on the island seemed to be 
inevitable. 
Conclusion 
 
In general, the first chapter showed that Ankara and London were not pursuing the 
same policy by 1967 and there was no indication of Anglo-Turkish cooperation 
against the Greeks. However, it is difficult to say that Britain’s Cyprus policy 
completely turned against the Turkish approach on the island. The British 
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government tried to give an impression that it was impartial in its Cyprus policy 
because it did not want to have poor relations with either Turkey or Greece. From 
this point of view, although the British reaction against the decision by Makarios to 
import guns from Czechoslovakia was not as strong as Turkey’s, they essentially 
agreed with Ankara that the Greek move could have worsened the situation on the 
island. Therefore, British official statements were in the same line with Turkey, but 
they were more cautious and tried to explain to the Greeks why Britain did not 
support the Greek action. From the Ankara’s perspective, the British position in the 
crisis was satisfactory and it did not have a negative effect on their mutual relations. 
Following the end of the arms dispute, Athens and Ankara tried to accelerate the 
negotiation process in order to settle the Cyprus dispute. Although Britain was not 
directly involved in the talks, its support of one side’s argument for the solution 
could have had an effect on the course the negotiation. In this sense, while 
negotiating with the Greeks, Turkey would have been pleased to have received 
British support for its arguments because, as the Turkish foreign minister, İhsan 
Sabri Çağlayangil stated, one of the important points in the Turkish Government’s 
policy of Cyprus in 1967 was to gain maximum support for Turkey's attitude to the 
Cyprus issue in the international arena.
115
 As the Turkish scholar, Ahmet Sözen 
stated, Turkey was in favour of a bi-communal federation for the solution of the 
Cyprus problem.
116
 From the British perspective, while the Greeks and Turks were 
negotiating with each other, Britain tried to fully understand the Turkish approach to 
Enosis. If the Turks were ready to accept it in return for compensation, Britain could 
revise its own policy on Enosis and openly express that it would not be against a 
solution that led to it. However, as an important outcome of the beginning of the 
Greek-Turkish dialogue and after the discussions with Turkish officials, Britain 
clearly understood that the Turks would never agree to Enosis. As the British 
ambassador to Turkey, Sir Roger Allen stated that the result of the two Prime 
Minister’s meeting made Britain pretty sure about the idea that the Turks would not 
accept any declaration of Enosis or any fait accompli in Cyprus.
117
  As a result of 
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this, Britain avoided any public mention of Enosis as an option not to damage Anglo-
Turkish relations. 
The failure of the meetings between the Greek and Turkish prime ministers in 
September 1967 also proved that Britain’s assessment of the Turkish attitude towards 
Enosis was accurate. The Greek side offered the Turks a solution based on the 
unification of the island with Greece which was rejected by Ankara. After the 
meetings, the Greek side stated that the Turkish attitude towards the situation was 
responsible for the failure. However, Britain did not think that the Turkish attitude 
was the only reason for the breakdown of the meetings. According to the British, the 
Greeks thought that the Turks could accept Enosis, which had an important effect on 
the result of the meetings. Therefore, the British did not criticise Ankara’s attitude 
which made a contribution to reducing possible international criticism on Turkey. 
From this perspective, the disagreement between Athens and Ankara did not have a 
negative effect on the Anglo-Turkish relations, but the November crisis on the island, 
which is examined in the second chapter, would test the impact of the Cyprus 
problem on bilateral relations between Britain and Turkey in 1967 one more time. 
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2) The Cyprus Crisis of 1967: The Different British and 
Turkish Approaches 
 
Introduction 
 
The second chapter analyses the British and Turkish positions on policy at the time 
of the November crisis in 1967 which was started by the attack by Greek forces 
against two villages, Ayios Theodhoros and Kophinou in Cyprus.  This was 
considered as an important event in the history of the Cyprus problem because of the 
possible danger of a war between Greece and Turkey.  
The first section of this chapter looks at the significant developments prior to the 
event and the way the Turkish government handled the crisis. This is a substantial 
point which enabled the author to make a comparison between the policy of Britain 
and Turkey. Proceeding from this point of view, the second section also concentrates 
on the British reaction to the crisis in the light of the archival documents. 
Furthermore, the assessment of the British government on the Turkish government’s 
attitude towards the crisis is also presented at this point. In particular, the evaluation 
of the British ambassador in Ankara on this issue is evaluated. Also, the discussions 
inside the British cabinet to prevent a possible Turkish military action on the island 
have also been investigated. 
The increasing American influence on the Cyprus problem by the time of the 
November crisis is also the subject of the third section. This is a significant issue 
because Britain was criticised in that it did not make sufficient effort to end the 
crisis, and this situation effectively forced America to play more active role in the 
Cyprus question. In this sense, Mallinson also expressed that the view that the 
increase in US influence was the result of the low British profile.
118
 Therefore, this 
section looks at America’s negotiations with Athens and Ankara to reach a solution 
of the crisis and the British approach to the American diplomatic actions in this 
process.  
The last part of the second chapter looks at the British and Turkish assessments after 
the end of 1967. According to the British, the crisis ended with Turkish victory over 
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the Greeks, but there were some criticisms of the Turkish government’s policy in 
Turkey which are shown in this part. 
Turkey’s second Attempt to intervene on the Island 
 
The unsuccessful attempt of Turkey and Greece to solve the Cyprus issue made the 
situation worse on the island. In particular, the tough living conditions of the Turkish 
Cypriots
119
 were still a major problem and Turkey’s negotiations with Greece had 
not made any positive contribution to their life. From the Greek Cypriot perspective, 
the failure of the Turkish-Greek dialogue did not affect their situation on the island. 
Actually, the Greek Cypriots had not been happy with negotiations between Turkey 
and Greece. According to their general opinion, Turkey and Greece should not have 
been overly involved in the Cyprus issue. The Cypriot Foreign Minister Mr. 
Kyprianou stated that ‘the Cyprus government had always felt that the problem of 
Cyprus was not essentially one between Greece and Turkey, but one for the people of 
Cyprus to decide.’120 According to the British Foreign Office’s assessment, after the 
unsuccessful meeting between the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers in September, 
the Greek Cypriots leadership was trying to gain British support for the idea that the 
Greek-Turkish dialogue for the solution for the problem was ‘completely dead.’121  
In this connection, Makarios had also told the British High Commissioner in Cyprus, 
Sir Norman Costar, that the dialogue between Ankara and Athens on the Cyprus 
dispute ‘was dead and should not be revived.’122 According to the Greek Cypriots, 
they ‘could not approve the continuation of discussion of vital concern to them from 
which they were excluded.’123  In fact, rather than Greece, the Greek Cypriots 
considered Turkey’s involvement in the Cyprus issue as a major problem because 
Turkey had closely followed the events in Cyprus and threatened to carry out 
military operations on the island. According to the Greek Cypriot High 
Commissioner, Mr. Ashiotis, ‘the Greek Cypriot government had never expected any 
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result, but had had to contest- albeit with some reluctance- to the discussions being 
held.’124  
Therefore, the Greek Cypriot government seemed to be pleased with the 
unsuccessful meetings between Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers. The British 
Foreign Office Central Department’s memorandum in 1967 stated that the Greek 
Cypriot side’s ‘main concern at present is probably to gain currency for the idea that 
the dialogue, which they have never liked, is over.’125 Also, according to another 
British Foreign Office’s assessment; ‘Makarios was clearly delighted at the 
breakdown of the Greek-Turkish dialogue. This fitted in well with his policy of 
paying lip services to Enosis.’126 
Britain did not give support to the ideas of the Greek Cypriot side and made its 
policy over the Cyprus issue clear: ‘Our position is that we hope that the Greek and 
Turkish governments will have further talks. We should certainly not give the Cyprus 
government ground for supposing that we share their view that the dialogue should 
not be resumed.’127 However, the events on the island would not develop as Britain 
hoped and Turkey once again would prepare to launch an attack against the island in 
the Mediterranean. 
The first crisis occurred October 31, 1967, when Rauf Denktash, a Turkish Cypriot 
communal leader ‘exiled from Cyprus since 1966’128, was arrested by Greek Cypriot 
forces while trying to enter the island secretly. Since he was a charismatic leader 
among the Turkish Cypriots, his intentions were to increase the Turkish Cypriot 
community’s resistance against the Greek Cypriots’ demands for Enosis.129 The 
situation on the island became tense again. The Greek Cypriots accused Turkey of 
being responsible for the attempt of Denktash to come back, but Turkey rejected this 
accusation.
130
 According to the Turkish Prime Minister Demirel’s statement, the 
Turkish government did not have any knowledge of Denktash’s action.131 Turkey’s 
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ambassador on the island, Ercüment Yavuzalp, was also shocked when he was 
informed about Denktash’s arrest. He said that:  
After having my dinner at home, I started to watch Greek Cypriot channel on TV 
which was the only channel we could watch on the island. Then, I saw picture of 
Denktash on TV. Because of I could not speak Greek; I did not understand the 
situation at first. Then, after translation, I understood that Denktash had been 
arrested by the Greek Cypriot forces. It was a big surprise for me. I immediately 
informed Ankara but they also did not have any information about Denktash’s 
action.
132
 
  
The situation was also difficult for Makarios. There were demonstrations on the 
island in support of Denktash by the Turkish Cypriots. Putting Denktash on trial and 
sending him to prison could make the situation worse on the island. Therefore, 
Makarios was reluctant to take any action against him. Eventually, the crisis was 
solved after intensive negotiations. Denktash gave an assurance that he would not try 
to enter the island illegally again and returned to Turkey November 12, 1967.
133
 
This crisis had an important impact on Turkey’s Cyprus policy. When Denktash was 
arrested, the public pressure on the Turkish government to carry out a military 
operation on the island increased. In particular, the Turkish Cypriots accused the 
Turkish government of not helping them and, in a demonstration, they even attacked 
Turkey’s Embassy building on the island.134 Turkey was being forced to make a 
military operation in Cyprus. When the Denktash crisis started the President of 
Turkey, Cevdet Sunay, was in Britain for the official visit. He gave a speech in 
London on 5 November at the organisation which was arranged by the Turkish 
Cypriot community in Britain. He said that Turkey was working to solve the Cyprus 
problem in a peaceful way and added that ‘we hope, as a last choice, we would not 
have to apply the other option for the solution.’135 The comment of Sunay implied 
that the Turks were ready to use the military option in the Cyprus issue. 
Shortly after the solution of the Denktash issue, Cyprus faced another dispute which 
would turn into a major international problem. The crisis started in the region west of 
Larnaca when Turkish Cypriots of the village of Ayios Theodhoros (Boğaziçi) had 
not allowed passage to Greek Cypriot police patrols through the Turkish part of the 
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village.
136
 Actually, the Greek Cypriot police was able to patrol once a week on this 
road without having any problem but ‘after two serious outbreaks of shouting during 
July in 1967 the Greek Cypriot police suspended the weekly visit.’137 By November, 
the Greek Cypriots wanted to resume patrolling in this road. In a meeting with 
Makarios and Greek General Grivas, UN Special Representative Bibiano Fernández 
Osorio y Tafall and UNFICYP Commander Armas-Eino Martola had strongly 
advised them to not take any action and postpone a resumption of their demands to 
patrol until an acceptable solution by all sides could be reached.
138
 However, they 
replied that we ‘might not be in a position to wait any longer.’139  
The first reaction of Ankara to the Greek Cypriot request was negative. The Turkish 
Cypriot Leadership also demanded the removal all other Greek Cypriot blockades on 
the island in return for allowing the Greek police passage through Ayios Theodhoros 
(Boğaziçi) but this argument was rejected by the Greek side.140 Turkey’s ambassador 
on the island, Ercüment Yavuzalp, saw no harm in opening road for the Greek police 
patrolling. He also sent a telegram to Ankara about this issue but his argument was 
rejected. However, Yavuzalp sent another telegraph to Ankara November 13, 1967, 
and strongly advised them to allow resumption of patrolling. Afterwards, Ankara 
replied to Yavuzalp that ‘his suggestion about the issue was under consideration and 
they would send the last decision of Ankara to him soon.’141 Turkey seemed to 
concede to the idea of opening Ayios Theodhoros (Boğaziçi) for Greek Cypriot 
patrolling. However, the Greek Cypriots did not wait for the end of the negotiation 
and, ‘despite UNFICYP’s disclosure that a settlement was in sight and that 
confirmation was expected very shortly that Turkey had accepted the status quo’142, 
they started patrolling by armoured cars in Ayios Theodhoros (Boğaziçi) on 14 
November ‘without the U.N. escort which usually accompanied the forces of the 
“government” within the Turkish controlled areas’143. 
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Contrary to expectations, Turkish Cypriots did not take any action against the Greek 
Cypriot police force. However, it was too early to think that the crisis was over 
because on the same day and the following day heavily armed Greek Cypriot forces 
continued their patrolling, which turned into a show of strength. Chief of Staff of the 
UNFICYP Michael Harbottle criticised this action of the Greek side and accused 
General Grivas:  
There seems little doubt that General Grivas was determined to provoke the Turks into 
a fight, for even UN Special Representative Osorio-Tafall and UNFICYP Commander 
Martola were making strong representations to the “government” to stop this 
provocative action, Grivas ordered yet another patrol into the village in the early 
afternoon of the 15
th
.
144
 
  
The clash in Ayios Theodhoros started on 15 November.
145
 According to the Greek 
side, when their heavily armed convoy entered the village, Turkish Cypriots opened 
fire.
146
 After the several hours of battle, the Greeks completely took the control of 
Ayios Theodhoros. Then, on the same day, the Greek Cypriot forces attacked another 
Turkish village Kophinou (Geçitkale) which was not linked to the original patrol 
issue.
147
 At the end of the day, ‘22 Turks had been killed; many of them civilians 
lying in the ruins of their homes, and 9 more had been wounded.’148 When Ankara 
heard about the Greek Cypriot attack against the two villages, the Turkish Security 
Council (NSC) gathered and Turkey sharply warned the Greek government and 
Makarios
149
 on 16 November 1967 that the Turkish Air Force would bomb the Greek 
Cypriot targets if they continued to occupy the two villages. After Ankara’s warning, 
on the same day, the Greek side agreed to withdraw their forces from Ayios 
Theodhoros and Kophinou.
150
  
However, Turkey was still frustrated by the Greek action. The Turkish government 
was in an especially difficult situation because the government had already been 
strongly criticised in the Denktash crisis by the opposition parties and the public for 
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applying a passive policy against the Greek side. This time the situation was much 
more serious, twenty-two Turks were killed which provoked a change in the climate 
of Turkish public opinion.
151
 The Turkish government was expected to intervene on 
the island. The Turkish side considered the Greek attack against Ayios Theodhoros 
and Kophinou as a pre-planned action to achieve Enosis because the villages were 
strategically important Turkish ‘enclaves on the Nicosia-Limassol motorway and 
they were controlled by the self-established Turkish Cypriot administration.’152 The 
report of United Nations Secretary General U Thant on the incident also supported 
the Turkish argument: ‘The magnitude of the Ayios Theodhoros operation and the 
speed with which it was carried out clearly indicated that the National Guard had 
planned in advance to carry out this operation in the event of any show of opposition 
by the Turkish Cypriots.’153  
Actually, in the first stage, when the Greeks responded to Turkey’s demands 
positively and agreed to withdraw the Greek forces from the two enclaves, the 
Turkish government was relieved. The Turkish Foreign Minister, İhsan Sabri 
Çağlayangil, stated that ‘we could exchange congratulations that the crisis was 
past’154. Prime Minister Demirel also ‘pronounced in a press conference at 11 a.m. 
on November 16 that the crisis was over.’155 However, the pressures, even from the 
inside of the government, affected the Turkish government approach towards the 
1967 crisis. The U.S ambassador to Ankara, Parker T. Hart, describes the situation: 
‘There had been an intense battle of wills on the nights of the 15th and 16th in the 
Turkish cabinet between the hawks and doves. Later, I was to learn that the line-up 
was between Demirel, Çağlayangil and Defence Minister Ahmet Topaloğlu, who 
sought a peaceful solution, and other ministers who occupied secondary position.’156 
The opposition parties in the Turkish National Assembly also heavily criticised the 
policy of the government in Cyprus.  ‘The RPP representative Nihat Erim blamed 
Demirel for reacting slowly to the news of violence on 15 November 1967 and 
missing a good chance to teach Makarios a lesson.’157 The Turkish Cypriots also 
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were not happy with the Turkish government policy. Turkish Cypriot fighters stated 
that they no longer believed that Turkey would perform a military operation on the 
island.
158
 The pressures on the government led Prime Minister Demirel to apply a 
more rigid policy on the crisis.  
First, ‘On 17 November, the Turkish Grand National Assembly authorized the 
government to use the Turkish armed forces “outside Turkey”’.159 Then, on the same 
day, the government was to send a harsh note to Greece stating Turkey’s demands 
for calling off an intervention.
160
 These demands were:  
1- The recall of General Grivas. 2- The withdrawal of the all Greek troops stationed 
in Cyprus since 1964(12,000 by Turkish estimates and 6,000 by Greek estimates)
161
. 
3- The disbandment of the National Guard and, under UNFICYP supervision, 
collecting arms from unauthorised civilians and militants. 4- The removal the pressure 
from the Turkish community by ensuring freedom of movement. 5- Compensation for 
the victims and the damage caused to Turkish Cypriots at Ayios Theodhoros and 
Kophinou.
162
 
 
From Ankara’s perspective, there was no time to wait anymore and Greece had to 
give a response to Turkey’s demands immediately. However, there was no answer 
from the Greek side until 22 November. Only the recall of General Grivas to Athens 
on 19 November could be considered as an important Greek action. In its reply on 22 
November, Athens rejected Turkey’s requirements.163 After this reply, as UN the 
Secretary General U Thant reported rather starkly that, ‘Greece and Turkey are now 
on the brink of war’.164 According to the US intelligence report, Turkey would 
initiate a military action within twenty-four hours.
165
 The Turkish military 
preparations could be observed fairly easily. Turkish aircraft were being loaded with 
bombs and troop ships were being loaded for the naval landing.  In Greece, there 
were also counter preparations. At this point, the U.S. took an initiative and 
intervened in the crisis as had happened in 1964. President Lyndon B. Johnson 
announced that he was sending his personal representative, Cyrus Roberts Vance, to 
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Ankara then to Athens for ‘consultations in an effort to assist the governments of 
Greece, Turkey and Cyprus to discover a peaceful way out of the present tension and 
remove the danger of war from the eastern Mediterranean.’166 After the U.S. 
ambassador Hart informed Turkey about the Vance mission on 22 November, the 
Turkish government decided to wait and see what his actions would be before 
launching a military operation.
167
 As his first destination, Vance was on the way to 
Ankara to search a solution for the serious crisis that had developed between two 
NATO allies. 
Britain also worried monitored about the situation on the island. In particular, the 
British government was worried about the possibility of a Turkish military operation 
in Cyprus. Therefore, the next section explored the British position at the times of 
crisis and the British approach to the Turkish policy. 
The British Reaction to the Crisis 
 
The British position in the 1967 crisis was vital because they had a strong connection 
with the island. First of all, Britain was one of the guarantor powers in the Treaty of 
Establishment and held two important military bases on the island. It also had a 
significant role in UNFICYP. The situation was serious on the island. Turkey was 
threatening to make a military operation and Britain had to involve in the crisis to 
prevent a possible war between two NATO allies. Therefore, from the beginning, the 
Britain Foreign Office observed the crisis closely. The FCO’s Research Department 
memorandum described the situation:  
The crisis of November 1967 started with an attack led by General Grivas, who had 
returned to Cyprus in 1964 and become commander of the Defence of Cyprus, on the 
Turkish inhabitants of two villages and their houses. Over 20 Turkish-Cypriots were 
killed. Ankara’s reaction was immediate. If the Greek and Greek Cypriots’ forces had 
not been withdrawn (from the occupied villages) by dawn the next day, Turkish 
bombers would have gone to action.
168
  
 
After this information, a careful analysis was made of the Turkish demands for 
ending the crisis. Also, from the perspective of Britain, there was assessment of 
Turkish public opinion as regards to the crisis: 
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The withdrawal gave time for reflection, but by itself it was not enough to satisfy 
Turkey. Nor even was the prompt removal of General Grivas to Greece. True to their 
principles they put full responsibility on the Greek government, and demanded the 
removal of all illegal Greek forces from the island, otherwise Turkey would invade 
Cyprus. During a week of near war hysteria the Turkish government had  the 
overwhelming support of the army and the people, most of whom would have been 
glad to see an invasion which they thought, would settle the Cyprus problem once and 
for all.
169
 
 
The British ambassador to Ankara also provided useful information about the 
Turkish reaction to the crisis. In a secret message from the British Embassy in 
Ankara, he reported developments in Turkey and the preparations of the government 
for a military operation:  
The latest indications are that Turks declared intent on landing in Cyprus may well be 
to redress imbalance between illegal Greek troops and Turkish troops.  I still consider 
that the Turks will attempt to establish at least two beaches. Kyrenia possibly 
extending to the area Morphu bay and Famagusta bay area. As far as I know there is 
virtually no suitable beach head in Cyprus on which the Turks can land without the 
Greeks knowing. Whatever the Turkish intention I cannot see individual Greek units 
failing to oppose them.  If the Greeks fight, the Turks will attempt to annihilate all 
opposition in the immediate vicinity of the landing. Of course that will lead to full 
scale fighting. I believe that as a result of Kophinou military thinking was clear and 
decisive. The Cyprus problem has to be settled quickly once and for all by immediate 
negotiation or the Turkish forces must invade and protect the Turkish Cypriots 
themselves. They were ready to go.
170
 
 
Another insightful assessment by the British ambassador to Turkey about the Turkish 
feeling about the Cyprus problem showed the reason why the Turks were so eager to 
intervene on the island in 1967 crisis:  ‘Turkish troops will undoubtedly have 
thoughts of revenge but not only for Kophinou. My belief is that after years of 
frustrations they feel they have lost face. Their public image is damaged and they 
must do something drastic to restore it.’171 
Britain knew that a Turkish military operation in Cyprus would go beyond the island. 
According to British Cabinet’s opinion, ‘if Turkey invaded Cyprus it would probably 
invade Greece as well. The attack on Cyprus would not be against the Cyprus 
government but against the Greek forces on the island, of whom the Turks alleged 
that about 12,000 were there illegally.’172 Britain also considered the situation in 
terms of the British military bases on the island. In a discussion, ‘the Cabinet was 
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informed that if Turkey invaded Cyprus, the plan was to concentrate all United 
Kingdom nationals in the Sovereign Base Areas which were not expected to be 
involved in a Turkish invasion.’173 However, ‘the stress was so great that England 
transferred 2400 British citizens on the island to Dhekelia base.’174   
Although it seemed that there was no great danger for the British position on the 
island, Britain tried to find an answer the question, what is ‘position of United 
Kingdom government in international law in relation to the threatened Turkish action 
against Cyprus?’175 This issue was discussed by the Foreign Office Commonwealth 
Office Legal Adviser in a meeting on Friday 24 November 1967. ‘The law officers 
were asked to advise whether the United Kingdom government were under any 
obligation under the Treaty of Guarantee to take unilateral action in the current 
situation against the Turkish attack. The law officers were of the opinion that no such 
obligation was imposed by Treaty.’176 According to this opinion, British advocated 
that: 
Under Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee we are obliged to consult with Greece 
and Turkey, the other guarantor powers, if a breach of the Treaty occurs. The 
invasion of Cyprus would of course be such a breach. But as Turkey would have 
caused the breach we obviously could not have the kind of three power consultation 
envisaged in the Treaty, at least until the fighting had stopped.
177
 
 
Nevertheless, the British were aware that they had to do something to stop a possible 
war between the sides. At a meeting in the British cabinet, they discussed this issue: 
 We should bring all possible pressure to bear on Turkey, seek to involve the United 
Nations as deeply as possible and take political action at every level to stop the 
fighting. We should consider the possible reaction of the Soviet Union. It was also 
necessary to consider whether the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) could 
play a role in bringing to an end a war between two of its members. There was a 
danger that NATO intervention might lead to a breakup of the Alliance. It might 
therefore be preferable to act through the United Nations.
178
 
 
It was announced from Moscow that the Soviet government was carefully observing 
the development of events in Cyprus and it was indicated that the Soviet government 
was supporting the peaceful solution all questions of relations between the Greek and 
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Turkish population on Cyprus ‘without any interference from outside.’179  Britain 
wanted the crisis to be solved through negotiations. The UN and NATO were 
considered as important actors in this process. However, the assessment of the 
British policy makers about the danger of searching for a solution for the problem 
over NATO seemed to be correct. When the UK MILREP (Military Representative 
to NATO) informed London about the message of the Turkish General Staff to 
NATO, it was understood that if NATO tried to stop the Turks, this intervention 
could damage relations with Turkey because the Turkish government would be 
decisive in sorting out the problem at any cost: 
We do not wish to ask your advice. We are the most honoured defendants of peace. 
But we cannot tolerate cruelty against humankind. What we want from you is that you 
hinder those who burn and burden our people and destroy their homes, and prevent 
the cruelty of Greeks and Greek Cypriots who are seeking possession of international 
waters and airspace (…) It must be clearly understood that, unless the Greek division 
and Greek Cypriots soldiers equipped with Greek arms are withdrawn from the 
island, we will have to use our right of intervention granted to us through the 
agreements with the  purpose of safeguarding humankind...
180
 
 
All of the discussions which were made by the British Cabinet and Foreign Office 
were aimed at trying to find an appropriate reaction to the crisis.  Britain wanted to 
be cautious in its action. It was not happy with the Greek action which had caused 
death of twenty-two Turks, but it also did not want Turkey to launch a military attack 
to the island. However, there was no much time left to stop the conflict between the 
sides. Therefore, as had happened with the 1964 crisis, the U.S would take 
responsibility to put an end the crisis again. 
 The Increasing Impact of the USA in the Cyprus Problem 
 
After Greece refused to accept the Turkish demands, (that is according to Turkish 
government), there was no choice left for Turkey other than attack Cyprus. In 
particular, the Turks wanted Greece to withdraw its troops from Cyprus. In his press 
statement on 22 November Dr. Fazıl Küçük said that negotiating with the 
Archbishop Makarios for the solution of the crisis would be pointless unless the 
Greek troops who were deployed on the island returned to Greece.
181
  The British 
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Foreign Minister ‘had been in touch with the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr. 
Çağlayangil, and urged restraint. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, U 
Thant was also sending a special representative, the Guatemalan José Rolz Bennett, 
to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey’182 to prevent any conflict between the sides. 
However, there was heavy pressure on the government in Turkey and it seemed that 
the British effort alone was not enough to dissuade Turkey from its decision. 
Therefore, as mentioned before, on 22 November, ‘the President of the United States 
had decided to send to the area a special representative Cyrus Vance’183 ‘in order to 
prevent Turkish military intervention in Cyprus and avert the threat of a war between 
Greece and Turkey.’184 The U.S. President gave his full support to Vance and told 
him: ‘Do what is necessary to stop the war. If you need anything, let me know. Good 
luck.’185 
However, Vance’s mission seemed to be difficult because, from the Turkish 
perspective, it could be regarded as another American intervention which just aimed 
to stop Turkey. In the 1964 crisis, Johnson sent a threatening letter to Turkey to 
prevent a possible Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. This letter disappointed 
Turkey and resulted in it revising its relations with the U.S. Therefore, this time, 
President Johnson wanted to be cautious in his action and ‘he had evidently decided 
not repeat the mistake of issuing a blunt veto to the Turks, but to try mediation.’186 
This was a right approach for ending the crisis because when the U.S. ambassador to 
Turkey informed the Turkish government about Vance’s mission, Zeki Kuneralp, the 
secretary of the Turkish Foreign Minister Affairs, ‘took the position that Vance was a 
“living Johnson letter”(referring to the letter of June 5, 1964).’187 Therefore, the 
Turkish government seemed to be reluctant to accept an American intervention at 
this stage of the crisis. However, Vance had been already on the way to Ankara and 
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the government had to agree to listen to the envoy of the U.S. and give him a chance 
to persuade the Greeks.
188
 
On the other hand, the Turkish public did not want to accept the Vance’s mission, 
which was considered to be bringing another “Johnson letter” threatening Turkey.189 
There were anti-American demonstrations everywhere. As a result of these protests, 
when Vance arrived in Ankara on November 23, his plane landed at a military airport 
in Ankara rather than the civilian airport Esenboğa.190 Vance knew that the situation 
was serious. He was informed that ‘Turkish troops were already at the embarkation 
port and were expected, according to the U.S. intelligence, to invade Cyprus the next 
morning. This would mean war between Greece and Turkey.’191 In this respect, after 
he arrived in Ankara, he went without delay to see the Turkish Prime Minister 
Demirel to determine what kind of measures could be taken to end the crisis. When 
they met on 23 November, Demirel tried to give an image that Turkey was so 
determined to launch a military operation in Cyprus. He said the Turkish Cypriots’ 
oppression by ‘the Greek Cypriots and the mainland Greek forces had been going for 
years and had now reached the point at which it could no longer be endured.’192 The 
Turkish government was in the position that Greek side had to accept the Turkey’s 
demands for cancellation of the planned Turkish military operation. Otherwise, they 
would have to attack Cyprus. 
After listening to the Turkish demands, Cyrus Vance went to Greece on the same 
day. In contrast to Turkey, the atmosphere was calm in Athens. The reason for this 
might be that they did not believe that Turkey would perform a military operation in 
Cyprus. During the 1964 crisis, Turkey had threatened but nothing happened. 
Therefore, they thought it would be the same this time. As a result of this, when 
Vance met the Greek Foreign Minister Panagiotis Pipinelis, his reaction to the 
Turkish demands was at first very negative,
193
 but gradually Vance ‘persuaded the 
Greek junta to withdraw its troops from Cyprus by 25 November 1967.’194 However, 
they were reluctant to withdraw their force in such a short time.  They demanded 
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seven months to complete the recalling process. Turkey did not agree with this 
demand and ‘insisted on unconditional and immediate withdrawal.’195 Finally, on 30 
November, Greece accepted Turkey’s terms. Then a plan was agreed by the sides 
which included:  
-Withdrawal of Greek Troops from Cyprus within a fixed time frame. –Dismantling of 
Turkey’s war preparations. -Dissolution of the Greek-Cypriot National Guard and the 
handing over of all weapons (including the Czechoslovak arms) to the United Nations 
peace forces and its commander Grivas be recalled Greece. - A reaffirmation of the 
independence and integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.
196
 
  
Before reaching a full agreement, Vance went to Cyprus on 29 November to meet 
Makarios who also accepted the withdrawal of Greek mainland troops but he did not 
want to agree on the disbandment of the National Guard and ‘Vance was unable to 
persuade him otherwise.’197 However, on 3 December, the press reported that Turkey 
and Greece reached an agreement on a settlement.
198
 On the same day both countries 
stated that ‘they would abide by the appeal of the U.N. Secretary General who called 
for the withdrawal of foreign troops illegally introduced into Cyprus and 
disbandment of paramilitary forces on the island.’199 Vance also announced that his 
mission was completed. Thus, the second major crisis was over and the danger of a 
war between the two NATO allies was successfully averted. The Greek acceptance 
of most of the Turkish demands had a major role in this agreement. 
Some assessments suggested that the reasons for the Greek acceptance of the Turkish 
demands were:  
When the crisis broke out in Cyprus in November 1967, the Greek junta had only been in 
power for about half a year. It was weak and internationally unpopular. Also given its firm 
orientation toward NATO and the United States, the Greek regime was susceptible to 
American pressure to make concessions and avoid a war with Turkey.
200
  
 
Furthermore, ‘although Greece accepted the majority of the Turkish demands, this 
did not mark a complete victory for the Turks, since Makarios later refused to 
dismantle the National Guard.’201 This caused the Turkish government to be heavily 
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criticised in Turkey. From this point of view, it is important to look at the reactions 
to the settlement of the crisis from the point of both by British and Turkish sides. 
British and Turkish Assessments in the aftermath of 1967 crisis 
 
Britain was pleased that the crisis was ended without any major conflict between the 
sides.  According to British evaluation, the articles of the agreement showed that 
Turkey succeeded in imposing its demands on Greece. The Foreign Office called this 
situation as “Greece bows out” and said that ‘one result of the crisis of last 
November, when war between Turkey and Greece was narrowly averted, has been 
the evacuation of the “illegal” Greek troops who were in Cyprus and a sharp 
reduction in Greek involvement in the problem.’202 Immediately after the 1967 crisis, 
according to Foreign Office’ analysis, ‘Enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece) is not 
now being pursued by either the Greek government or the Cyprus government.’203 
This evaluation could be regarded as true for the short term because the agreement 
between Turkey and Greece had some heavy conditions for the Greeks. Therefore, 
they might have lost their motivation for Enosis. However, it did not mean that the 
policy of Enosis was completely relinquished by the Greeks. 
Britain also gave its own support to Vance and regarded his mission as 
“encouraging”.204 When Vance went to Cyprus to discuss support for the agreement, 
‘the British Prime Minister had also sent a message to President Makarios urging him 
to accept the proposals.’205 American involvement in the Cyprus issue was 
considered as an important element for the solution of the problem. Britain also took 
a lesson from the 1967 crisis and wanted to improve its Cyprus policy to prevent any 
future crisis on the island. As a result of this, in a discussion in the Cabinet the point 
was made that: ‘It was most important that we should, if necessary, be able to exert 
our proper influence in the event of a new crisis in Cyprus; and we could do so only 
if we had contacts with the Greek regime.’206 From this point of view, Britain wanted 
to improve its relations with the new Greek military regime.  
Another discussion was over UNFICYP which was responsible for maintaining 
peace on the island. However, in the November crisis, twenty two Turkish Cypriots 
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were killed and UNFICYP had failed to prevent this incident. As a result of this, the 
efficiency of the UN forces started to be questioned by Turkey. Britain was the most 
important supporter of this UN peace force in Cyprus and had a significant role in it. 
Chief of staff of this force was also a British General, Michael Harbottle. Therefore, 
Britain tried to support the necessity of UNFICYP. In his report to the Prime 
Minister, Foreign Secretary George Brown, advocated that: 
It is true that UNFICYP was unable to prevent the outbreak of heavy fighting at Ayios 
Theodoros on 15 November. But it is not within the existing terms of reference of the 
Force to oppose a deliberate and large scale assault by one side against the other, as 
happened there. Nevertheless, UNFICYP’s presence was essential for the establishing 
of a cease-fire and for the operations required to provide immediate succour for 
victims of the outbreak and to ensure that the embers of the fighting did not flare up 
again.
207
 
 
Overall, Britain welcomed the agreement between Turkey and Greece and thought 
that the Turks had gained a victory over the Greeks. However, from the Turkish 
perspective, it was difficult to say that they had the same feeling. In particular, 
Turkish public opinion seemed to be unhappy with the result. The Times’ report from 
Turkey described the Turkish reaction to the agreement. According to this report, 
‘although the Turks had successfully forced their plan for the settlement of the 
Cyprus issue upon Makarios, there were no sign of celebrations here, official or 
otherwise. There is no great feeling of elation among the Turks.’208 The Demirel 
government believed that it was a good agreement and tried to explain it to the 
public. However, there were sharp criticisms of the government especially, in the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly.  The Deputies of the opposition parties blamed 
the government for missing a good chance to intervene in Cyprus. 
The member of the right-wing Republican Peasants Nation Party, Alparslan Türkeş, 
was one of the Deputies in the parliament who heavily criticised the government 
action. He strongly accused the government of deceiving the Turkish Cypriots and 
called for a vote of confidence on the Demirel government. According to him, during 
the crisis, although the National Assembly gave the right of use the Turkish armed 
forces outside Turkey, the government did not have any real intention to intervene in 
Cyprus and was only bluffing. He also argued that the military preparations should 
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have been done secretly. However, the government failed to do so. Therefore, the 
international pressure on Turkey did not allow for an intervention on the island. He 
also said that the government committed a major offence by not intervening in 
Cyprus.
209
 From the same party, Deputy Reşat Özarda also criticised the result of the 
1967 crisis. He refused the argument that Turkey had won a victory over Greece and 
asked questions to the government about the Cyprus issue. According to his view, the 
agreement between Turkey and Greece did not provide a real improvement in the 
condition of the Turkish Cypriots situation on the island.
210
 The other opposition 
parties in the National Assembly did not support the argument of Alpaslan Türkeş of 
calling for a vote of confidence for the government. However, they also made 
criticisms on the government’s Cyprus policy. 
The Deputy of the Nation Party, Seyit Faruk Önder, said that instead of finding a 
permanent solution for the Cyprus issue, the government had only searched for a 
surface and temporary one. Therefore, the Cyprus problem still remained unresolved. 
However, he announced that they would reject the motion about the government.
211
 
Republican People’s Party’s speaker, Nihat Erim, also said that his party would not 
support a vote of confidence in the government. The leader of the Reliance Party, 
Turhan Feyzioğlu, stated that they would not take any negative or positive action 
about the motion. Rather than calling for a vote of confidence, he suggested calling 
for a general debate in the National Assembly about the Cyprus issue.
212
 The Turkish 
Foreign Minister, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, rejected the accusations against the 
government with regards to its Cyprus policy. He defended them arguing that the 
government had achieved a good result and managed the Turkey’s demands in a 
peaceful way. According to his view, it had to be understood that searching for the 
best solution for the 1967 crisis and finding a permanent settlement for the Cyprus 
issue were essentially quite different matters.
213
  
The result of the 1967 crisis was evidently also a disappointment for the Turkish 
Cypriots. They knew that the agreement between Turkey and Greece would not 
provide a real solution to the problem. On 30 November, the President of Turkish 
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Cypriot Administration, Dr. Küçük, told Vance that ‘Turkish Cypriots desired a 
permanent solution which would eliminate the condition of strife on the island’214 
and according to his opinion, ‘a federation … of two autonomous communal 
administrations’ was a realistic solution for the Cyprus problem.215 
Conclusion 
 
The November crisis indicated that there were major differences in the reactions 
showed by Britain and Turkey towards the events on the island. After the death of 
twenty two Turkish Cypriots, Ankara applied a more aggressive policy and was 
ready to launch a military intervention on the island. Britain was also aware of the 
seriousness of the situation. In this respect, they criticised the Greek Cypriot move. 
However, according to the British opinion, attacking Cyprus would not contribute to 
the solution of the problem. From this point of view, Turkey and Britain diverged 
sharply.  
Britain was in favour of putting international pressure on the Turkish government to 
discourage it to not to attack the island. However, Britain knew that this would be a 
difficult task to achieve alone. Therefore, the U.S. came to the aid of Britain.  An 
important result of the 1967 crisis was that Britain accepted the increasing role of 
America in the Cyprus issue. However, Britain knew that its position on the island 
was significant and in any possible future crisis, Britain would be expected to take 
the initiative to solve the problem. 
Britain was happy with the result that a possible Turkish military intervention in 
Cyprus was stopped. Also, the active American role in this process helped the British 
not to be seen in a difficult position, such as preventing the Turks from conducting a 
military operation. As a result of this, the November crisis did not cause trouble in 
Anglo-Turkish relations. However, Britain understood that Ankara was serious in its 
military threat. In particular, the public in Turkey was in favour of launching an 
attack to defend the Turkish Cypriots on the island.  Therefore, it was stated in a 
FCO Research Department memorandum that Ankara’s threats of military 
intervention to protect Turkish Cypriot rights ‘should never be interpreted as mere 
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bluff.’216 It also added that if any future crisis occurred on the island similar to that of 
November 1967, it would be difficult for a government in Turkey to remain in power 
without sending the Turkish troops into action.
217
 Thus, Britain believed that a 
permanent solution had to be found to prevent any future military crisis in the Cyprus 
dispute again. 
After the November crisis, the divergence in the British and Turkish policy on the 
Cyprus issue continued. There were new developments on the island such as the 
establishment of a separate Turkish administration which were not approved by 
Britain. Also, a negotiation process was started between the Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots on the island. Therefore, the next chapter examines this dialogue process 
and the British assessment on the Turkish approach to the Cyprus question in peace 
negotiations. 
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3)  The Cyprus Problem after the 1967 Crisis: The 
Increasing British Criticism on the Turkish Policy on the 
Cyprus Issue 
 
Introduction 
 
The chapter three looks at the developments in the Cyprus issue up until the Turkish 
military operation on the island in 1974 and evaluates British and Turkish policy in 
this time period. The first section investigates the Turkish Cypriot move to set up 
their own administration on the island and the arguments they used to justify their 
action. Also, the international reaction towards the Turkish move is analysed in this 
section. In particular, analyses of British opinion on the idea of a separate Turkish 
administration are examined, raising the question as to whether the Turkish move 
actually had British support or whether Britain was against it. 
The second part of the chapter three demonstrates the situation in Cyprus by 1968 
and British policy. There was no major crisis on the Cyprus problem until 1974 and 
negotiations took place between the Greeks and Turks for a settlement.  There was 
not a single event which significantly affected Anglo-Turkish relations. However, the 
British government’s assessments of Turkish policy within this process provide 
information which allow to see both sides view on possible solutions to the Cyprus 
problem. 
After the failure of the attempts by Athens and Ankara, the beginning of the direct 
talks between the local Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, Clerides and Denktash, 
was an important step in finding a permanent solution to the Cyprus issue. However, 
the talks were not productive and each side revealed attitudes which helped prolong 
the ongoing problems. Therefore, apart from evaluating the approaches by both 
sides, section three also looks at the British assessment of the unproductive talks. 
This gives the reader an idea about how the Turkish attitude in the talks was regarded 
by Britain.  In this context, the reports by British High Commissioner on the ongoing 
talks between the two communities on the island are used as primary sources. 
Furthermore, the British and Turkish fear of Soviet involvement in the Cyprus 
question is also investigated. 
60 
 
The next section looks at the suspension of the talks and the establishment of 
“EOKA-B”   a terrorist organisation established by the Greek leader Grivas.  Its 
establishment caused fear that inter-communal clashes were going to start again on 
the island. Therefore, the developments after the negotiation process produced only 
deadlock are investigated in this section. The final part of the chapter three looks at 
the Cyprus issue after the restoration of the talks in 1972 through initiatives by the 
United Nations and the British assessment of these talks. There is also an analysis of 
the Soviet approach towards the inter-communal talks in Cyprus. 
The Establishment of the “Turkish Cypriot Provisional 
Administration” and British Reaction 
 
The solution of the November crisis did not bring a real improvement to the relations 
between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The situation on the island was still fragile 
and it seemed that any small confrontation between the two communities could 
possibly turn into a major crisis again. It appeared that the 1967 crisis had an adverse 
effect on the hope that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots could find a possible way to 
unite and live under one flag like happened in 1960. Actually, at first, the 1964 
Cyprus crisis had played an important role in this separation process but the 
November crisis accelerated it.  
From the Turkish point of view, the establishment of a separate Turkish 
administration was necessary and unavoidable. The Turks demonstrated some 
reasons to justify their action.  Firstly, they argued that, after the December 1963 
crisis, the Turkish Cypriots were obliged to live in a very difficult condition both 
economically and socially. Moreover, they were not allowed to take part in the 
Cyprus government.
218
 Therefore, this situation on the island was a significant factor 
in making the rift wider between the two communities and leading the Turkish 
Cypriots to form their own administration. Secondly, there was a general Turkish 
opinion that the 1967 crisis one more time demonstrated that the Turkish Cypriots 
were unprotected and were significantly damaged by the event. As a result of this, 
establishing a separate government would provide better protection for the Turkish 
community on the island. Thirdly, the Turks wanted to unite all of the different 
Turkish Cypriots groups and gather them under the one administration.
219
 The main 
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motivations for this action were to prevent any conflict between these groups and 
make the Turkish position stronger.
220
 Overall, these were the general Turkish 
arguments to demonstrate the necessity of the new Turkish Cypriot Administration. 
However, the other actors in the Cyprus problem would not consent to this Turkish 
action of establishing a separate Turkish administration and would not show any 
support for it. 
As mentioned before, the Turks were not fully happy with the result of the 1967 
crisis. However, when compared to the Greek side, it seemed that the Turks gained 
more advantages from the agreement between Greece and Turkey. Moreover, the 
Greek public opinion felt that Greece accepted ‘humiliating conditions imposed by 
Turkey following the November 1967 Ayios Theodoros-Kophinou clashes in 
Cyprus’.221 Therefore, Turkish Cypriots decided that this atmosphere was the right 
time to setup their own management
222
 and they declared the establishment of 
‘Turkish Cypriot Provisional Administration’ on 28 December 1967.223  
Actually, since 1964, there had been a separate Turkish administration which had 
been called a ‘general Committee’224 but it was not fully organised. On the other 
hand, ‘the newly established administrative machinery was to a certain extent a 
formalization and extension of the ad hoc administration which had existed in the 
Turkish areas of Cyprus’225 since 1964. It ‘had total control over the Turkish enclaves 
covering 250 of the 9,251 square kilometres of the island's territory. The major 
Turkish Cypriot enclave was to the north of Nicosia and accounted for 40,000 Turks, 
or one-third of the Turkish population.’226 Dr. Küçük was chosen President, and 
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Denktash, Vice-President of this administration
227
, although he was living in exile at 
that time.  
The Turkish side knew that there would be some reaction to their action. Thus, they 
wanted to be cautious to minimise international criticism. By putting the phrase of 
the ‘provisional’ in front of the name of the new administration, the Turks tried to 
express the point that this was not a step towards partition of the island
228
 and it was 
announced that the Provisional Administration would operate until the provisions of 
the  1960 constitution  were applied.
229
 Despite all of these Turkish efforts, there 
were strong reaction to the new formation. In particular, the Greek side showed a 
harsh response. Makarios and Athens protested
230
 against the Turkish action and the 
Greek Cypriot government declared that the new Turkish Administration was 
unlawful and illegal on 29 December 1967.
231
 The Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister, 
Kyprianou, ‘also issued notes on 28 December 1967 to all embassies in Nicosia 
forbidding their ambassadors to have any contact with the Turkish Cypriot 
leadership’.232 The Greek side seemed to be surprised and frustrated. The basic law 
of this new Turkish administration also was an important factor in the Greek anxiety. 
It consisted of 19 provisions which authorized the new Administration to use the 
legislative, executive and juridical power in the Turkish areas on the island.
233
 
Athens also stated that the Turkish action was a partition attempt which ‘creates a 
very serious situation.’234 According to Athens’ opinion, ‘Greece and Turkey had 
agreed to settle the November crisis to disarm and create a better climate in which a 
permanent solution of the Cyprus problem would be possible. By their action the 
Turks evidently want to prejudice such a solution and impose their own.’235  
After the Greek reaction, the Turkish Foreign Minister Çağlayangil made a statement 
and underlined the point that ‘this new and provisional formation just aimed to give 
an end to disorder in the Turkish Cypriots affairs and organise the community to help 
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to find a solution for the Cyprus problem. He also stressed that this action should not 
be interpreted as a Turkish divergence from the pursuit of a peaceful solution to the 
Cyprus issue’.236 However, this explanation from the Turkish side was not enough to 
gain support for their action. Apart from the Greeks, Britain was also discontented 
with the new Turkish Cypriot Administration on the island. ‘First reaction in 
Whitehall was that the Turkish Cypriot move was an “unwelcome development”.237 
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Research Department’s assessment also 
showed the British attitude towards the Turkish action: 
Unfortunately, (after the 1967 crisis) the first political move by the Turkish-Cypriot 
community (and by Ankara) was a move backwards, by setting up a Turkish-Cypriot 
Provisional Administration in December 1967. The Turkish government denied that 
this meant the establishment of a separate government or Republic, but the Turkish-
Cypriot’s action produced serious objection from Archbishop Makarios, and his 
banning of official contacts between Head of Mission and Dr. Fazıl Küçük and his 
administration caused the Turkish and allied governments to make a great deal of 
diplomatic effort before the matter was resolved. 
238
 
 
In a discussion in the British Cabinet, it was also stated that ‘the situation in Cyprus 
had recently become more critical as a result of the decision of the Turkish Cypriot 
community to setup their own separate administration.’239 America also seemed to be 
surprised by the Turkish move. According to the U.S. ambassador Hart, ‘the articles 
of the basic law of the new Administration resembled a constitution and the move 
appeared to presage formation of a separate state and diminish the chances of 
reconciliation and unity.’240 He also protested vigorously about the notion of a 
‘Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration’ when he met the Turkish Foreign 
Minister Çağlayangil in Ankara.241 
The Turkish side again made an explanation and emphasized that ‘its purpose was 
not to create a Turkish Cypriot government, but to pull together discordant factions 
of the community who were at serious crossed purposes and to strengthen leadership 
in preparation for tough negotiations with the Greek Cypriot community toward 
pacification and inter-communal political cooperation.’242 Actually, the reactions to 
the Turkish move left Turkey in a difficult situation. Therefore, Ankara sent a note to 
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the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia and complained that the declaration of the new 
Administration should have been made silently.
243
 The broad statement attracted 
attention to the island and increased the international pressure on the Turkish 
government. In his report to the Security Council on the establishment of the Turkish 
administration on the island on 4 January, the UN Secretary-General, U Thant, also 
criticised the Turkish action and said ‘this move could damage my friendly initiative 
in the Cyprus problem.’244 As a reply to U Thant, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs stated that they did not share the same concern as him.
245
 The Vice-President 
of Cyprus, Dr. Küçük, also sent a letter to U Thant on 10 January in which he 
mentioned the difficult situation of the Turkish community on the island and tried to 
explain the necessity of such a move from the Turkish Cypriots.
246
 Meanwhile, the 
Greek Cypriot leader Makarios increased the amount of opposition to the new 
Turkish Administration. He ‘prevented any official or member of the Turkish 
Cypriot administration from entering or leaving the Turkish quarter of Nicosia’247. 
He later announced that his intention was ‘to restrain the activities of an unlawful 
administration which are calculated to undermine the unity of the “state”248. 
Britain also closely monitored the developments by getting information from the 
British High Commission on the island. According to this information:  
The restriction by Makarios covers all members of both committee of the new 
Administration: this means the eleven members of the Executive Committee and all 
Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives and of the Turkish 
Communal Chamber.  In addition, the Under-Secretary to the Vice-President, who has 
no connection with the T.C.P.A. (Turkish Cypriot Provisional Administration), is 
restricted. In explaining the inclusion of the Under-Secretary, the Greek Cypriot 
official said that, since Küçük was not Vice-President and had no public office except 
in the T.C.P.A., the Under-Secretary presumably served him in that capacity and must 
therefore be restricted!
249
 
 
The Turkish Cypriot judges were excluded from the restriction by the Makarios 
government. However, as stated in the British High Commission, ‘this is interpreted 
to mean that, if the Turkish Cypriots give effect to Articles 16-18 of the Basic 
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provision of the T.C.P.A. the judges will be restricted.’250 In particular, Article 17 
was allowing the new Turkish Administration to setup separate courts.
251
 Therefore, 
the Greek side wanted to prevent application of these Articles. According to the 
British assessment about the situation on the island, it was indicated that:  
We have no indication that the Turkish Cypriots intend to implement Articles 16-18 of 
the Basic Provisions shortly. Even if they do, as long as they act discreetly, carrying 
on the same sort of courts set-up that they have operated since 1964, it is unlike ly to 
give rise to trouble. But ostentatious implementation of Articles 16-18 would probably 
provoke a sharp reaction from the “Cyprus government” including the restriction of 
the judges to the Nicosia enclave.
252
 
 
On the other hand, the restriction from the Greek side increased the frustrations 
among the Turkish Cypriots on the island which could trigger another inter-
communal conflict between the both sides.  As reported by British officials,  
If the restriction were to be thus extended the Turkish Cypriots, who are already 
making an issue of the restriction, would in turn react badly. They are currently taking 
the line that “all illegal restrictions must be removed if any real progress is to be 
made towards a settlement.” This line is reflected in the Turkish Cypriot publications 
such as their daily news bulletin.
253
 
 
Makarios also seemed to understand the seriousness of the situation. Thus, it was 
announced that, except for the member of the T.C.P.A., ‘full freedom of movement 
would be restored throughout the island for all other members of the Turkish Cypriot 
community ‘by the abolition of all check-points and the lifting of all existing 
restrictions on the supply of various good.’254  However, according to the British 
High Commission’s assessment, ‘If and when Archbishop Makarios honours his 
undertaking to lift the economic restrictions on Nicosia after the Presidential 
election, the Turkish Cypriots will doubtlessly say that it does not really alter the 
situation since restriction on T.C.P.A. members is maintained.’255 
The Greek reaction to the Turkish Administration started to decrease in time. Their 
call for forbidding any contact with the Turkish Cypriot leadership did not get 
support from the Embassies in Nicosia.
256
 This call was also ‘protested vigorously by 
the United States and other governments as unrealistic and extreme. Consequently, 
                                                     
250
 Ibid. 
251
 Vatan, 29 December 1967. 
252
 PRO: FCO 9/85, op. cit. 
253
 Ibid. 
254
 The Times, 5 January 1968. 
255
 PRO: FCO 9/85, op. cit. 
256
 Yazuzalp, Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik, p. 130. 
66 
 
Washington decided to refuse the Greek Cypriots’ position’.257 As a result of this, the 
Greek Cypriots withdrew their opposition to the contact with the Turkish Cypriot 
Leadership in Nicosia.
258
 
After examining the Turkish decision to setup their own administration in Cyprus 
and the reactions towards this decision, the next section analysed the Cyprus problem 
by 1968 and the British approach to developments in the problem. 
The Situation in Cyprus by 1968 and British Policy 
 
In terms of the Cyprus problem, there were important events in the year of 1967 
which drew international attention to the island. First, the Czechoslovak Arm 
dispute, then, the meeting of the Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers, later, the 
November Crisis and finally, establishment of ‘Provisional Turkish Cypriot 
Administration’ on 28 December 1967. Nevertheless, there was no solution for the 
problem and the Cyprus dispute was still unresolved at the beginning of 1968. As a 
result of this, the danger of any future conflicts between the two communities 
continued to remain a serious concern.  
When compared to the last three months of the previous year, there was very little 
tension on the island by 1968. Although the Greek Cypriots still called the Turkish 
Cypriots move illegal, they adapted themselves to the new situation in Cyprus. The 
first important event on the island in 1968 was the Presidential election which 
Makarios announced would be held in Cyprus on 25 February.
259
 The Turkish 
Cypriot leadership felt uneasy with the decision of Makarios. According to the 
Article 39 of the 1960 constitution, the Presidential and Vice-Presidential election 
needed to be held on the same day. However, Makarios called the Turkish Cypriots 
leadership “rebels” and did not consult with them while deciding the election day.260 
As a result of this, the Turkish side planned to make a surprise move and the Turkish 
Cypriot leader Dr. Küçük announced that ‘there would be a Turkish election for 
Vice-President of the Republic on February 25, the same day as Greek Cypriots have 
been warned to be ready for polls to elect a President.’261 In addition, ‘Dr. Küçük 
said that the decision had been taken in accordance with the provisions of the 1960 
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constitution which stipulates that Greek Cypriots shall elect a President of the 
Republic and Turkish Cypriots a Vice-President.’262 The Turks thought that if they 
did not call for the election this would strengthen the Greek Cypriots’ hand to not 
recognise the status of a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President.
263
 However, from the Greek 
Cypriots’ perspective, ‘the Turkish decision was considered to be without a legal 
basis and the proposed election “could not have any validity.”264 It seemed that 
Cyprus was facing a new crisis. The trigger was usually a relatively trivial or 
mundane event which was then interpreted as an issue of status or prestige.  
Apart from the Greek Cypriot opposition, another problem for the Turkish side was 
the choice of the candidate for the Vice-Presidential election. A former Chief Justice 
of Cyprus, Mr. Zeka, was being shown among the possible candidate on the island.
265
 
He had good relations with the Greek side and his candidacy was also supported by 
the Greek Cypriots.
266
 However, Turkey wanted Dr. Küçük to be the Vice-President 
and was opposed to anyone other than him because, according to the Turkish 
government’s view, two candidates for the Vice-President position could harm the 
unity of the Turkish Cypriot community.
267
 Thus, the Turkish ambassador to Cyprus, 
Yavuzalp had a meeting with Zeka and explained to him the position of Turkey. 
Zeka decided not to be a candidate in the election. It was most likely that the most 
important factor in his this decision was that he did not want to have problem with 
Turkey. After the elimination of the possible applicants for the position of the Vice-
Presidency, the Turkish side did not see any necessity to wait for 25 February and 
went to the poll before that day on 15 February and Dr. Küçük was chosen as the 
Vice-President once again.
268
 
Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriots were preparing for the upcoming Presidential 
election. From Makarios’ perspective, this event was vital. He stated that ‘after the 
failure of the Greco-Turkish dialogue and withdrawal of the Greek military forces, 
the Cyprus problem had entered a critical stage.’269 He seemed to understand that his 
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role in finding a solution to the problem would increase because the military regime 
in Athens, by beginning to withdraw their troops after the November 1967 crisis, 
‘had lost much, but not all, of their influence over the Archbishop Makarios, leaving 
him more freedom’270 to pursue his own policies. For this reason, the election on 25 
February was a significant opportunity to reaffirm his power with the Greek Cypriots 
which would strengthen his hand to take more initiative and act more independently 
in the Cyprus issue. The result of the election was satisfactory for Makarios. He 
‘received an exceptionally strong mandate by winning 95 percent of the votes against 
Dr. Evdokas, who had campaigned on a platform based on Enosis’.271 After the 
election, as he declared before, Makarios started to apply the pacification policy on 
the island. In this context, he ‘lifted restriction on the Turkish Cypriot community on 
7 March 1968 and removed the barricades and roadblocks surrounding the Turkish 
areas.’272 This move was considered to be a significant step towards a 
“normalisation” process on the island. Britain also seemed to be happy with the 
developments.  The British assessment on 20 March 1968 showed the situation in 
Cyprus:  
During the past three months Cyprus has been quieter than for a long time. The 
Cyprus government have been progressively lifting the restrictions which they had 
imposed on the Turkish Cypriots. The process recently culminated in the removal of 
roadblocks and checkpoints in Nicosia itself.  This will make life considerably easier 
for the Turkish Cypriots. Their public reaction has been rather reserved so far, but 
what the Turkish Representative said during the debate in the Security Council 
suggests that these “normalisation” measures will improve the atmosphere 
considerably if no unfortunate incidents occur to raise tension again.
273
 
  
Despite all of these, there were still some problems. The UN urged the Turkish 
Cypriot Leadership to respond to the Greek’s move by opening the enclaves to Greek 
Cypriot travel but the Turkish side expressed their unwillingness to do so.
274
 
Similarly, Britain shared the same idea with the UN. The British Foreign Secretary 
tried to urge the Turkish Foreign Minister, Çağlayangil, to respond to the Greek 
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Cypriots’ pacification measures, which were welcomed by the British government.275 
However, the British ambassador to Turkey, Sir Roger Allen, indicated that the 
Turks considered “normalisation” ‘as no more than palliative.’276 As a result of this, 
he said, the Turks would not be likely to regard the notion that ‘normalisation would 
lead to a deal between themselves and Makarios.’277 This situation caused a Greek 
reaction and another discussion arose after the beginning of the “normalisation” 
process. In a meeting with the British Commonwealth Secretary, the Greek Cypriot 
side complained about ‘the strict control maintained by Turkish leadership.’278 They 
also stated that ‘the Turks must realise that the restrictions that they were maintaining 
were not a bargaining factor on their side; the real harm was only to themselves.’279 
The Greek Foreign Minister, Pipinellis, also stated that the Turkish Cypriots needed 
to respond to Makarios’ “normalisation” measures.280  
However, the Turkish Cypriots defended their position by explaining that ‘Turkish 
Cypriots who travelled on the roads would, in any case, have to submit to the Greek 
Cypriot police and military control.’281 Therefore, the same procedure would be 
applied to the Greek Cypriots when entering the Turkish Cypriot areas. While the 
discussion about the “normalisation” process continued, both sides seemed to be 
eager to make a fresh move for the solution of the problem. The UN was working 
assiduously to find a peaceful settlement for the Cyprus dispute. Hence, UN 
Secretary-General U Thant tried to arrange a contact between the Greek Cypriot and 
Turkish Cypriot Representative under the United Nations chairmanship.
282
 
According to the British, ‘the Turkish government was not objecting and it seemed 
likely that such talks would start soon.’283 
In the meantime, in a secret meeting between the Greek and Turkish Foreign 
ministers in Switzerland in February, ‘they decided that the course to make progress 
over the Cyprus issue would be to inspire the Canadian government to come forward 
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with a proposal for talks in which the Turkish and Greek governments and the Greek 
Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots would take part, probably under a Canadian 
chairmanship’284. However as the British Foreign Office report stated:  
The Canadians were rather slow to pursue this suggestion (partly because of their 
internal political difficulties and partly they were unwilling to go ahead without the 
blessing of U Thant, who was meanwhile working on his own proposal).  Therefore, 
the Greek and Turkish governments now evidently think that the Canadian initiative 
could most usefully be made when a deadlock develops in the talks between the two 
communities which the United Nations is to promote. We (British) agree.
285
 
  
Actually, the situation on the island was conducive to starting a talk between the two 
communities. After the election and the withdrawal of the Greek forces from the 
island, Makarios gained more political power. Turkey was also ready to accept the 
negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. As a result of this, Britain 
became positive about the future of the Cyprus issue, although there were still some 
concerns. According to the British evaluation:  
The prospects of progress towards a new settlement in Cyprus are now rather better 
than they have been for some time, and much better than would have seemed at the 
time of the crisis last November. But it will be a long haul and the situation is still 
potentially dangerous. We do not think that the Cyprus government fully realised how 
perilous their situation was last November. They may well be over-confident about 
their ability to outmanoeuvre the Turks and to avoid further threat of a Turkish 
invasion. In Turkey, on the other hand, there is a widespread feeling that if would 
have been much better if Turkey had invaded Cyprus last year and settled the matter. 
Given all this, and the fact that the position of Turkish and Cypriot governments are 
still very far apart as regards the lines of the future settlement, there is a clearly a risk 
that if the discussion now proposed end in deadlock and if there is a recurrence of 
serious incidents on the island we will once again have a very tense situation in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. And we shall have to do our best to see that the discussion do 
not end in deadlock. But there is no immediate requirement for intervention by H.M.G 
in pursuance of our present policy over the dispute.
286  
 
After these important developments on the island, Britain wanted to review its policy 
over the Cyprus issue. As a result of this, in a meeting in the Commonwealth Office 
at the end of January, British Head of Missions from Nicosia, Ankara and Athens 
discussed the Cyprus policy and outcome of this meeting was also approved by the 
Foreign Secretary and the Commonwealth Secretary. According to this, Britain 
decided that: 
In close consultation with our allies, especially the United State and Canada, we 
should: 
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a) Plan on the basis of an independent Cyprus in the Commonwealth for the 
foreseeable future; 
b) Do everything in our power to keep Cyprus westward-looking and prevent the 
Soviet Union from increasing its influence on the island; 
c) Support the efforts of the U.N. Secretary-General. 
d) Exert our influence on Archbishop Makarios to persuade him to adopt a 
conciliatory policy towards the Turkish Cypriots; 
e) encourage the Turkish government to allow the Turkish Cypriots to make a positive 
response to any conciliatory moves made by the Greek Cypriots; and in the long term 
once adequate constitutional arrangements have been made for the Turkish Cypriots, 
to disengage themselves from the internal affair of Cyprus; 
f)  Encourage the Greek government in the short term to continue the realistic policy 
which they adopted in November and in the long term to give up Enosis altogether; 
e) Ensure that no agreement contains any provision that might adversely affect the 
position of the Sovereign Base Areas and our related rights in Cyprus while we still 
need them.
287
 
  
Britain understood that the dialogue, which was going to start soon, between the 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots communities, would have a significant role in solving 
the problem. Therefore, Britain was in favour of supporting and encouraging such an 
initiative while giving importance to protecting and maintaining its rights on the 
island. 
 The Beginning of the Inter-Communal Talks 
 
After becoming a stage for years of struggles between the two communities, Cyprus 
seemed to be ready to start a fresh beginning. The inter-communal talks were a 
significant measure of the Cyprus question and were ambitious efforts which also 
gained the international support. From this angle, an analysis of this process has a 
vital importance while investigating the Cyprus issue. Certainly, it was not easy to 
attempt to bring the two communities to the negotiating table. The first matter which 
needed to be tackled was the question of how both sides would negotiate with each 
other. The Turkish and Greek Cypriot representatives had a chance to talk about the 
direction of inter-communal talks in the UN Security Council meeting in New York 
in March 1968.  
The Greeks did not demand any precondition to begin the dialogue, but they were 
reluctant to directly contact the Turkish Cypriot leadership and they wanted a 
mediator to conduct the negotiations. However, the Turks were in favour of the direct 
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talks with the Greek.
288
 It seemed that the reason for this Greek Cypriot request was 
to show that they did not recognise the Turkish Cypriot leadership and by demanding 
a mediator they tried to avoid giving any chance to the Turkish Cypriot Leadership to 
legitimise itself internationally. Nevertheless, the Greek concern was unnecessary 
because when the Turks announced the ‘Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration’ 
on 28 December 1967, this Turkish move did not manage to get support from the 
international arena. In the end, the Greek Cypriots accepted to begin direct talks with 
the Turkish Cypriot Leadership. 
289
  
It should also be noted that other factors played important role in the initiation of the 
talks between the two communities. As mentioned before, one of them was the 
meeting of the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers. According to a British 
evaluation, ‘the first move forward came in this secret meeting between Pipinelis and 
Çağlayangil in Switzerland. Pipinelis persuaded Çağlayangil to allow, and indeed 
encourage, talks between representatives of the two Communities, mainly on the 
constitutional question.’290 
Meantime, the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, who lived in exile in Ankara, 
officially returned the island on 13 April 1968
291
 and took the Vice-President 
position in the Turkish Cypriot Administration. At a press conference, Denktash 
expressed the view that the Turkish Cypriots were ready to negotiate until they could 
find a mutual solution.
292
 He also added that he believed that it was still possible for 
two communities on the island to live together in an independent Cypriot state.
293
 
The UN Special Representative in Cyprus, the Mexican Bibiano Fernández Osorio y 
Tafall, helped the planning for the basis for the talks. The Turkish Cypriot chose 
Denktash as their representative and the Greeks selected Glafkos Clerides as their 
negotiator.
294
  
It was a fact that although, at that time, Denktash seemed to be second man within 
the Turkish Cypriot Community after Vice-President Küçük, he was broadly 
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regarded by most Turkish Cypriots as a strong defender of their rights and the 
community’s most active leader.295 He would also be an important actor through the 
inter-communal talks between the two communities. 
The first formal contact between the both sides for a procedural discussion took place 
secretly in Nicosia on 23 May 1968.
296
 It was a significant event in terms of shaping 
the course of the negotiations. Eventually, Clerides and Denktash met again in Beirut 
in early June.
297
 This was their first official contact publicly.
298
 The communities on 
the island were going to discuss for a solution for the problem. Until this time, two 
major powers, Greece and Turkey had tried to solve this issue, but the attempts were 
unsuccessful and sometimes brought more problems than they solved. In particular, 
Turkey had seemed to be ready to involve in the problem in any crisis on the island. 
Therefore, the question was that how would Turkey look at the inter-communal talks 
on the island? 
From Turkey’s angle, as stated before, the initiation of the direct the talks between 
the two communities did not bother it. After the beginning of the negotiations, the 
Turkish Foreign Minister Çağlayangil stated that ‘the Turkish government insists on 
solving problem by maintaining the necessary dialogue.’299 Also, according to the 
Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister Kyprionou, in a meeting between the Turkish 
Foreign Minister Çağlayangil, it was confirmed that ‘the Turkish government was 
fully in favour of local talks’, but Çağlayangil had also added that ‘they (local talks) 
were only a first stage towards settlement; at a second stage results must be put to the 
other governments concerned.’300 It seemed that while giving support to the talks and 
encouraging them, Turkey did not want to fully disconnect from the Cyprus issue. 
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Glafcos Clerides; the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, Osorio y 
Tafall, and Rauf Denktash. Picture from the inter-communal meetings between Clerides and 
Denktash.  
Source: Milliyet, 27 June 1968. 
 
There were different stages in the talks which lasted until 1971. The first phase of the 
talks began after the meeting of Clerides and Denktash. However both sides were 
unable to reach an agreement. The first stage of the negotiations was ‘mainly 
concerned with a rather untidy preliminary exchange of views and exploration of the 
attitudes of the two communities.’301 As stated by Polyviou, the Turkish side agreed 
with some of the issues for instance; they accepted ‘a reduction of the percentage of 
its participation in the civil service, the police and the legislature to that of its 
population ratio.’302 Nevertheless, there were other issues which need to be tackled. 
The second phase of the talks took place between 29 June 1968 and 25 July 1968 and 
the most significant topic of this section was the local authority issue. The Turkish 
Cypriot side mainly demanded that there would be separate a local authority council 
for the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. ‘Any coordination between the Turkish local 
authorities and the central government would be carried on by a Turkish Affairs 
Ministry, if created, or by the Turkish Vice-President.’303 The Greek side did not 
give a positive reply to the Turkish Cypriot idea of the local authority and the second 
phase of the talks ended without reaching a conclusion.     
According to the British evaluation of the Cyprus problem in 1968, it was reported 
that  
The pace of the inter-communal talks is now snail-like, although both sides seem to 
intent on avoiding a breakdown in the near future. But the tension in the island has 
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greatly relaxed over the past nine months, helped by Makarios’ pacification measures, 
the meetings between the Cyprus and Turkish Foreign Ministers in the summer and 
the beginning of the inter-communal talks themselves in June.
304
 
 
British and Turkish disagreement on the extension period of 
UNFICYP and the Soviet Danger 
 
As stated before, the Cyprus issue did not concern just two communities on the 
island. It also had an international dimension. As a result of this fact, after the 
beginning of the talks, another discussion arose mainly between Turkey and Britain 
about the UNFICYP.  The mandate of the United Nations Force had been extended 
for six months on 18 June 1968 and would expire on 16 December.  Britain 
supported a renewal of the UNFICYP mandate on the island.  According to the 
British view:   
The fact that talks are continuing between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots is 
encouraging. But they now seem to be running out of steam, and early agreement 
between the two sides is unlikely. UNFICYP has helped to maintain a favourable 
climate in Cyprus during the inter-communal talks, and whether the talks continue or 
break down, it will provide an essential stabilising factor.
305
  
 
However there was a disagreement between Turkey and Britain about the length of 
the extension of UNFICYP.  When informing the Prime Minister about this issue, the 
British Foreign Minister argued that 
In my view the mandate should be renewed for only three months this time. Experience 
has shown that with a longer extension the parties to the inter-communal talks are 
inclined to dawdle; and shorter renewal periods enable pressure to be kept up on the 
parties. He also said that ‘the Americans and the Canadians have come round to the 
British view about this.
306
 
 
The British evaluation of the renewal of the UN force in Cyprus seemed to be 
logical, but the purpose of keeping up the pressure between the Greek and Turkish 
sides was not the only reason for the British demand of a three month extension. The 
financial reason also appeared to play important role in the British request.  Three 
month extension of the UNFICYP would cost $750,000 for Britain
307
 and any longer 
extension would increase the amount. All these reasons led Britain to ask for a short 
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period renewal of the United Nations Force on the island in the upcoming Security 
Council meeting in the early December 1968. 
However, from Turkey’s point of view a three month extension would not make a 
positive contribution to the situation in Cyprus. In a meeting with John Beith, the 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the British Foreign Office in London, the 
Turkish ambassador Haluk Bayülken underlined the point that  
The Turkish government favoured a renewal of six months, not three. Bayülken 
explained to Beith that: their principal reason for this view that the inter-communal 
talks in Cyprus were developing into a long haul. There was no prospect that Mr. 
Denktash and Mr. Clerides would reach an agreement by next March (1969). Both of 
them favoured a renewal of the mandate for six months. It was important to show 
confidence in the two negotiators. A Security Council meeting in March (accepting 
three month extension in December meant that Security Council had to meet again in 
March for another extension decision) might have the opposite effect.
308
 
 
According to the observation of John Beith from the meeting, ‘the Turkish 
ambassador Bayülken understood that the UN Special Representative in Cyprus, 
Señor Osorio-Tafall, had now come round to the Turkish government’s view.’ Beith 
also reported that ‘the ambassador, Bayülken, suggested that Security Council 
meeting with dealing with Cyprus should be kept few and far between because they 
offered an opportunity for the Soviet government to fish in the troubled waters of the 
Mediterranean and for Makarios to get up to new tricks.’309 From the British side, 
there was no certain response to the Turkish view but Britain continued to be in 
favour of the three month renewal.  In the end, by the suggestion of the Secretary of 
General of the United Nations six month extension of UNFICYP was accepted.
310
 
Actually, the evaluation of Bayülken about the Soviet government was important 
because, in a near future, while the inter-communal talks were continuing, another 
crisis emerged after a meeting between the Soviet ambassador and Turkish diplomat 
Eralp. In this meeting, ‘the Russians had informed that the Greek side was about the 
staging a coup d’état in Cyprus and that 600 saboteurs had been sent to Cyprus from 
Athens. The Soviet ambassador commented that this could not have been done 
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without support from the Greek government. Eralp had replied that if a coup d’état 
took place Turkish reaction would be immediate.’311 
Britain was not happy with the developments. According to the British view: 
The Russians have been active in stimulating, on the basis of “intelligence reports”, 
rumours to the effect that the Greek government are planning a coup d’état in Cyprus, 
that they have been sending forces of saboteurs to the island and that their aim is to 
declare Enosis. From the subsequent conversations which we have had with the 
Turkish officials in Ankara, it would appear that the Turks realise the dangers of 
allowing these Russian stories and do not believe them all.
312
 
 
This event also showed that the Soviet government had continued to try to get a 
significant role in the Cyprus issue one more time. 
British Assessment on the Peace Talks between the Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots 
 
After two unsuccessful phases of the talks, the leaders of both communities were 
preparing to start the third round of inter-communal negotiations which lasted from 
20 January 1969 to 17 August 1970.
313
 In this period disagreement continued 
between both sides. As a result of this, some rumours appeared that the talks had 
deadlocked, but Clerides and Denktash stated that talks were making progress.
314
 
However, there were eight week intervals in the negotiation process
315
 and when 
both leaders resumed the talks in December 1969 ‘they agreed to shelve temporarily 
the local government issue and move on to other areas where compromises seemed 
more likely’.316 
In his report to the Foreign Secretary, the British High Commissioner informed 
London about the negotiations between the both communities: ‘During the six 
months the inter-communal talks between Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash have 
continued. Despite the good will of both representatives and desire to reach 
agreement, it is now clear, after 12 months of discussion that no inter-communal 
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settlement will emerge from their deliberation in the near future.’317 The comment of 
the High Commissioner on the inter-communal negotiations seemed to be hopeless. 
However, he added that  
Nevertheless, the talks have been partially successful to the extent that have served as 
a safety valve for the release of inter-communal tension; they have settled some minor 
but contentious points; they have shown that there are some areas of agreement, 
although these cannot be implemented in advance of an overall settlement; and they 
have helped to maintain contact and some degree of co-operation between the two 
communities.
318
 
 
Meantime, the inter-communal talks were continuing between the two communities. 
The negotiators exchanged the proposals. ‘The judiciary was discussed from January 
1970 to March 1970 and legislative problems dealt with between April and June.’319 
However, both sides could not manage to reach an agreement. Therefore, the third 
phase of the talks also duly broke down.
320
 
The assessments on the process of the third stage of the talks were also giving a 
signal that the both negotiators would not be able to bring a solution for the problem. 
The report of UN Secretary General U Thant to the Security Council for the period 
June-December (1970) was a good example which described the situation on the 
island:  
The record of the past six months shows neither progress toward further 
normalisation nor a return to the tense and explosive situation which existed prior to 
the commencement of the inter-communal talks in June 1968.  The situation now 
prevailing in Cyprus is one of ‘negative stability’; quiet on the surface, but strained, 
abnormal and fraught with the serious danger inherent in the continuing close 
confrontation of well-armed military forces. With the passing time, this situation is 
threatening to become the way of life of all Cypriots, thus perpetuating the need for 
UNFICYP’s presence in the island.321 
 
The report of the British High Commissioner, Peter E. Ramsbotham, in Nicosia also 
presented the situation of the negotiation in 1970 between the both sides:  
In the inter-communal talks, the most notable event was the preparation by Mr 
Clerides and Mr Denktash of a joint document listing their points of agreement and 
disagreement on the five major constitutional issues. (…) The two sides remain 
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deadlocked between Turkish Cypriot demands for constitutional guarantees of their 
security, self-administration and “partnership” in the government of Republic, and 
Greek Cypriot insistence on a unitary State, constitutionally secure from the risk of 
partition. Toward the end of the year there was a faint glimmer of hope that the two 
sides were seriously reviewing their position and might at last be moving towards 
substantive negotiations.
322  
 
Although the expectation for the solution of the problem through the negotiations 
was at a low level, the British High Commissioner in Nicosia again underlined that  
The inter-communal talks are, nevertheless, an important factor in Cyprus. In 1970 
they have proved valuable as a forum for discussing practical matters such as the 
return of the return of Turkish Cypriot displaced persons, providing aid to the Turkish 
Cypriot community, and economic co-operation between the two communities. (…) 
Both sides agreed that the talks should continue, and it is at least encouraging that 
both have turned their faces against the use of force as a way of solving their 
problem.
323
 
 
 
Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas in 1970. Source: A. Richard Patrick, Political Geography and 
the Cyprus Conflict 1963-1971, p. 464. 
 
Another important area which needs to be analysed is the British policy in the 
negotiation process. Claude Nicolet states that, in the early stage of the talks, the 
Americans and British decided not to involve in substance of talking points but 
instead encourage both parties to continue the dialogue.
324
 It was true that Britain 
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avoided interfering in the talks between the communities. While meeting the Turkish 
ambassador, Bayülken, the British Permanent Under-Secretary of State, John Beith, 
explained that they ‘attached great importance to a successful outcome to the inter-
communal talks, and will continue to give the encouragement.’ He also said they 
believe that ‘attempts to achieve full settlement of the constitutional problem can 
best proceed pari passu with attempts to improve the position on the ground.  We do 
not think we should get involved in the detail of the talks, since we doubt whether 
this would be helpful.’325 In his report the British High Commissioner, Ramsbotham, 
indicated the reasons behind their policy: 
The policy of standing back has served us well. Our interest in Cyprus, particularly 
our position as a Guarantor Power and our military interest in the Sovereign Base 
Areas, gives us influence but also make us peculiarly vulnerable should any initiative 
by us misfire. Our general interest in peace and stability is identical with that of our 
allies but our particular interest may differ. The risk for us of embarking once more on 
an active Cyprus policy, with the danger of alienating one or other communities and 
their mainland backers with whom we have relatively little influence, are 
substantial.
326
 
 
However, the High Commissioner added that the situation in Cyprus was different by 
1970. According to him, although, in the early stage of the talks, Britain preferred 
“standing back”, this strategy seemed not to help in finding a solution to the problem. 
The inter-communal talks were proceeding slowly and there was danger of 
termination of the talks. As a result of this, the British High Commissioner on the 
island, Ramsbotham, wrote a report to the Foreign Secretary and set the scene for the 
British policy review: 
Is a change of policy of required? 
External circumstances are favourable to a Cyprus solution, but differences between 
the communities within Cyprus probably preclude one.’ Therefore, ‘If policy is to be 
changed the attempt must be made to promote a new modus vivendi. This should not 
prejudice the important requirements of both sides under an eventual settlement and 
should attempt to reconcile the proposals each has made over normalisation. The 
High Commissioner suggests that the main elements might be devices for keeping the 
inter-communal talks going, by broadening the agenda introducing a third party to the 
negotiations; measures of demilitarisation; greater freedom of movement; and some 
sort of assurance against external attack.
327
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Nevertheless, the argument of the High Commissioner did not manage to find 
support. The answer to the High Commissioner from the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office was not positive.  It was said that:  
We do not believe that promotion by outsiders of a modus vivendi or temporary 
settlement is a realistic proposition in the immediate future.(…) we should prefer to 
limit our actions to encouraging progress towards a settlement by the customary 
gentle pressures in general terms on the main parties to the dispute. We should do 
what we can to keep Greek and Turkish relations close and we should continue to 
emphasise the lack of any viable alternative to the inter-communal talks. But we 
should wish to avoid positive proposal.
328
 
 
Although Britain was applying the “standing back” policy, it appeared to be ready to 
actively involve in the Cyprus problem when the separation of the island became a 
matter.  As a good illustration of this argument, it can be shown that when the inter-
communal talks seemed to fall short of meeting the expectation for the solution of 
the problem, some rumours started to rise on the island. According to this, the 
Turkish Cypriots, with the support of the Turkish government, were to declare a 
separate state in Cyprus.
329
 It was a serious issue. From the Britain’s point of view, 
the Turks were unlikely to take such action.
330
 However, in case of any Turkish 
Cypriots declaration of a separate state, Britain indicated that they would show a 
reaction such a Turkish move and actively involve in the Cyprus question: 
(a) We could not accept the legality of such a unilateral partition. Under Article II of 
the Treaty of Guarantee, we undertook to guarantee the territorial unity of Cyprus. 
(b) We could not accept the effective dismemberment of a member of the 
Commonwealth, against the wishes of the government of that country. 
 
If the Turkish move presented with a fait accompli our scope for action would 
probably be limited. The minimum that we should do in the short term would be: 
(a) To protest in the strongest terms to the Turkish government and urge them to 
revoke their decision. 
(b) To take action to a similar end in NATO and with the UN Secretary General. 
(c) To condemn the decision publicly and unequivocally and to restate our support for 
a unified Cyprus.
331
 
 
This British reaction indicated that Britain was still in favour of a solution which 
does not split the two communities on the island but unifying them under the 
umbrella of the one state. From this point of view, Britain was clearly against any 
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attempts from the Turks to establish their own administration on the island. 
Meanwhile, the new developments in Cyprus were going to interrupt the peace 
negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. 
 
 Suspension of the Inter-Communal Talks in 1971 and the 
establishment of “EOKA-B” 
 
The phase four of the negotiations between both communities’ representatives started 
on 21 September 1970 and lasted until 20 September 1971.
332
 In this stage, first 
movement came from the Greek Cypriot side. They offered a “package deal” which 
was adjusting the Greek Cypriot position on some issues.
333
 According to this, 
mainly, it was accepted that the House of Representatives would comprise 60 Greek 
and 15 Turkish members and there would be a Turkish Vice-President. Also, there 
were some other arrangements paralleled to the Turkish Cypriots requests.
334
 After 
giving the new proposal, it was announced that there would be no further 
concessions.
335
 Although the Greek Cypriots “package deal” seemed to bring an 
offer which was more agreeable, the local authority issue appeared to continue as an 
important obstacle to the settlement because, in return for their offer, the Greek side 
demanded that the proposal of separate central local government authorities for the 
both communities on the island should be abandoned by the Turkish Cypriots.
336
 
Turkey’s approach towards the Greek offer was also significant, but meanwhile, 
Turkey had serious internal problems. There was a political instability in the country. 
The Justice Party, which came to power with the general election in 1969, was in a 
difficult situation. Dissident voices against Prime Minister Demirel within his own 
party caused him to resign.  Also, the clash between extreme left-wing and right-
wing groups was causing a chaotic environment on the streets.
337
 The Turkish Army 
saw the situation as an opportunity to intervene in politics and the commanders in the 
army issued a threatening memorandum
338
 on 12 March 1971 accused the 
government of being responsible for the condition of the country and stated that the 
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army would take over the administration directly if the problems were not solved. As 
a result of this threat, the Prime Minister Demirel resigned and a new military-
backed government was established.
339
  
The formation of the new government in Turkey was an important development and 
it was unclear how this situation would affect the course of the Cyprus Problem. 
Actually, even before the military intervention, the Turkish government made its 
position clear to Britain. The Turkish ambassador to London gave the enclosed 
statement on 5 January 1971 which was explaining Turkish demands for a solution of 
the inter-communal dispute in Cyprus. In general, the Turkish requirements were not 
different from the past Turkish statements. It was mainly advocating ‘granting local 
autonomy to the Turkish Cypriot community, in exchange for certain of their rights 
deriving from the 1960 Constitution.’340 This message seemed to be a signal that the 
Turkish side would not accept the Greek side “package deal”. The Turkish Cypriots 
also appeared to find the Greek proposal insufficient because when the Turkish 
Cypriots leadership had a meeting the British Prime Minister in Nicosia on 7 January 
1971. Denktash criticised Makarios by saying that ‘he was not in need of settlement: 
he had little or nothing to lose by waiting.’341 In this meeting the Turkish side also 
explained that the problem was that the Greek side wanted to give them a minority 
status by offering what amounted to minority rights to the Turkish Cypriots. 
According to Turkish opinion, this would enable the possibility of Enosis at some 
point in the future. The British Foreign Office report also indicated the expectations 
of Archbishop Makarios from the inter-communal talks: 
He sought to ensure Greek Cypriot authority is asserted throughout the island. The 
Turkish Cypriots, with only eighteen per cent of the population should be treated as an 
ethnic minority with special privileges but with no more than a proportionate voice in 
national affairs.
342
 
 
The Turkish side did not answer the Greek offer immediately and it took a bit long. 
The new military-backed government’s Prime Minister Nihat Erim had meetings 
with Rauf Denktash between 13 and 16 April 1971. In these meetings, it was said to 
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Denktash that Turkey would continue to protect the rights of the Turkish Cypriot 
community on the island. It mentioned that the Turkish government would work to 
solve the economic problem of the Turkish Community which was living in a very 
difficult economic condition since the 1963 events.
343
 
After the meeting the Turkish Prime Minister, Denktash replied to the Greek 
proposal on 27 April 1971. According to this, it was accepted that the Turkish Vice-
President would no longer have a power of veto, but the Turkish side demanded that 
‘a local government district which would be autonomous, with such autonomy so 
written into a constitution and the boundaries of the autonomous districts would be 
drawn primarily according to communal consideration.’344 By demanding local 
autonomy, the Turkish Cypriots thought that they could live in a more secure 
environment. During the fighting in the previous November many Turkish Cypriots 
lost their life. As a result of this, establishing their security appeared to be most 
important element for the Turkish Cypriot community. However, the Greek side did 
not agree with the Turkish Cypriot proposals. According to them, such a government 
structure would be ‘expensive, inefficient and guaranteed to irritate rather than 
soothe inter-communal feelings’345 In addition, the Greek Cypriots leadership 
considered the Turkish Cypriot proposal as creating ‘a state with in a state and the 
prelude to future partition.’346 Having radically different thoughts about the solution 
to the problem was making it more difficult to reach an agreement between the both 
sides. 
The new military-backed Turkish government’s approach towards inter-communal 
talks is a significant point to analyse. Although Turkey had internal problems, the 
Cyprus dispute was still an important agenda in the Turkish government programme. 
It was said that ‘Cyprus was a national cause over which no effort would be spared to 
attain success. The solution would also help to restore Turkish-Greek relations to 
their old friendliness.’347 It was a fact that the Cyprus problem was also affecting the 
relation between Greece and Turkey negatively. In a one statement, Turkish Prime 
minister, Nihat Erim said that after the solution of the Cyprus dispute, a new period 
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would start in the Greek-Turkish relations.
348
 Therefore, the aim of improving the 
friendship with its neighbouring country could be regarded as one of the motivating 
elements for the new Turkish government in finding a solution for the problem. 
Furthermore, there were other factors which would prompt Turkey to support 
reaching an agreement to the dispute. The report of the British Embassy in Ankara 
about the attitude of the Turkish government towards the inter-communal talks 
indicated that three elements would urge the Turkish government to take productive 
action in Cyprus issue which were ‘Turkey’s internal situation, their counting distrust 
of Makarios and their understandable impatience at the lack of progress in the inter-
communal talks.’349 Indeed, the long negotiation process was economically affecting 
the Turkish Cypriots in a negative way. The gaps between the both communities 
were becoming wider and an urgent solution to the problem seemed to be more 
needed by the Turkish community on the island. 
After the Turkish Cypriot answer, the Greek Cypriot negotiator Clerides made a 
further proposal on 27 June 1971 suggesting some further arrangements.  For 
example, he thought Turkish Cypriots could form several areas of local government 
by grouping a number of Turkish villages together.
350
 However, the Greek side 
continued to be against the Turkish Cypriot request for separate central government 
authority for the both communities.
351
 As a result of this, once again, the Greek offer 
did not help towards a compromise with Turkish Cypriots or to meet their 
expectations.
352
 The Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash stated that there was no 
basis for negotiations. According to him, there were vital differences on basic issues 
which had made further talks pointless but he also said that ‘the Turkish side would 
not take initiative in breaking the inter-communal talks off.’353 Ankara was not also 
happy with the course of the negotiations. The Turkish Foreign Minister Osman 
Olcay announced that ‘progress in the Cyprus talks had left him with little hope that 
they would yield positive results.’354 As a natural consequence of the negative 
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atmosphere on the island, by August 1971, ‘both communities publicly recognised 
that the talks were deadlocked.’355  
This situation raised concerns about the future Cyprus problem. Britain was trying to 
follow the events closely. In a report which was given to Foreign Secretary Sir Alec 
Douglas Home by the British High Commissioner to Cyprus, Robert Edmonds, on 31 
August, 1971, the possible dangerous results of breaking off the inter-communal 
talks were pointed out. According to this report, if the negotiations between the two 
communities halted, a crisis could emerge on the island. In particular, the report 
expressed the view that the newly established Turkish government could use the 
military card again to increase its popularity among the public in Turkey. Also, as a 
significant  analysis in this report it was said that ‘ if the Turkish General Staff learnt 
anything from the November crisis in 1967, it must be that they should invade 
Cyprus while the going is good, without waiting for the international diplomatic 
machine to get into gear.’356 By making this assessment, Britain predicted the way in 
which Turkey would use in any major crisis on the island. This analysis might not be 
correct for the 1971, but is better suited to the Turkish Military operation in Cyprus 
in 1974. The last negotiation attempt in 1971 was on 20 September. Both sides had a 
meeting but it ended with failure.
357
 Therefore, the talks stalled.
358
  
It is important to analyse the points which led to a halt in the inter-communal talks 
without producing a successful outcome. Firstly, having different expectations 
through the negotiation process was an important factor in the failure of the talks.  
Although having the regional autonomy in their enclaves was a vital target for the 
Turkish Cypriots, preserving the total control of the government mechanism and a 
unitary state were two essential criteria for the Greek Cypriots. Another important 
reason behind the deadlock in the negotiations process was the lack of trust between 
the two communities. They were generally suspicious of each other’s requests.  
An event that occurred on the island is an example which highlights the situation 
between two sides. British troops from the Akrotiri base repaired a road which was 
between two Turkish Cypriots villages. The road was also being used by the British 
soldiers and the bad condition of the road was damaging their vehicles. This was 
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main reason to repair the road. However, the Greek Cypriot authorities considered 
the action as a favour to the Turkish Cypriots and complained to London about the 
action in the SBA
359
 While such a small incident could be interpreted as a problem, it 
was difficult to reach agreement on the major issues. Later, Clerides would regret 
that no solution emerged in his dialogue with Denktash. In his statement on the inter-
communal talks, Clerides said that ‘unfortunately, we did not grasp the opportunity 
which was here from 1968-970.’360 
Apart from the deadlock in the talks, there was another important development on 
the island in terms of the Cyprus Problem. In September 1971, it was understood that 
the Greek General George Grivas, who had been living in exile in Greece after the 
crisis in November 1967,
361
 had escaped from Athens and secretly entered Cyprus.
362
 
He set up and started to lead a so-called terrorist organisation EOKA-B to continue 
the struggle for unification with Greece.
363
 According to the British High 
Commissioner’s assessment Grivas entered Cyprus earlier and he was in hiding.364 
Grivas’ return date to the island was on 31 August 1971.365 This was a serious 
situation that affected the both communities in Cyprus. Grivas’ presence on the 
island split the Greek Cypriot community.’366 He claimed that Makarios was 
betraying the Greek national cause Enosis. He also stated that the Greek Cypriot 
leadership under Makarios was useless for the Greek community and the main reason 
for his return was to complete the age-long goal of the Greek community to unite 
Cyprus with Greece.
367
 According to British High Commissioner at Nicosia, 
although Makarios continued to be the most powerful leader among the Greek 
Cypriots, the reappearance of Grivas ‘has shaken the allegiance of many Greek 
Cypriots to the Archbishop.’368 The High Commissioner also emphasized the fact 
that Grivas had the possibility of getting 40 per cent of the vote in a Presidential 
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election ‘if he were politically skilful enough to dodge the question how Enosis could 
be achieved without leading to partition.’369  The effect of Grivas’ presence among 
the Cyprus National Guards, ‘whose commander and most of its officers were 
mainland Greeks who took their orders from Athens and had no love for the Cyprus 
government,’370 was keeping alive the danger of resorting to violence on the island 
and this situation was causing disturbance in Cyprus. According to supporters of the 
Grivas, he was planning a coup to take over the control in Cyprus.
371
 Moreover, 
illegal underground groups were being formed in Cyprus and they were taking an 
oath of loyalty to Grivas.
372
  
Greek Cypriot reservist officers, who served formerly in the National Guard, had 
also taken sides with Grivas and they sent message to Makarios that denounced his 
policy of reconciliation with the Turkish Cypriots in a unitary political solution by 
insisting on Enosis.
373
 Finally, there was the demand of ‘new noble national struggle’ 
to unite Cyprus for Greece by a group of sixty-two Greek Cypriots calling itself the 
‘Coordination Committee for the Enosis Struggle’374 which increased the concern 
over the future of the island. In particular, the concern of the Turkish community was 
at a high level. In his meeting with Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Sir Alec 
Douglas-Home, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Osman Olcay, expressed the view that 
‘the situation was not at all encouraging.’375 According to the British Foreign 
Secretary, ‘Turkey’s main concern was that the Turkish community on the island 
should not lose hope.’376 For this purpose, Turkey was closely following the 
developments. From this point of view, it is important to look at the Turkish opinion 
about the struggle between Makarios and Grivas. It can be said that the Turks 
accepted that Makarios had a reasonable approach towards the Cyprus dispute 
compared to Grivas because it appeared that while ‘Makarios insisted on caution and 
a low-geared approach, Grivas wanted an immediate military campaign.’377 
However, the Turkish side also believed that the both Greek leaders had accepted 
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Enosis as their common goal and their only difference was in the manner of 
achieving it.
378
 
The return of Grivas to the island was not also welcomed by Britain. The struggle the 
between two communities could damage to Britain’s own interest on the island. In 
the British cabinet, this issue was discussed and it was stated that: ‘A deterioration in 
the situation might have serious implications for our installations there, both inside 
and outside the Sovereign Base Areas, which were of very considerable importance 
to us.’379 Apart from this from this concern, when making the assessment of the year 
of 1971 for Cyprus, Britain examined the development on the island from two 
different perspectives. Firstly, from the standpoints of Anglo-Cypriot relations, the 
British High Commissioner in Nicosia stated that 1971 was a good year. Economic 
relations increased and Britain managed to remain the biggest trading partner of 
Cyprus. Secondly, from the angle of the Cyprus dispute, the High Commissioner said 
that it ‘was an unhappy year.’380 It was true that the ending of inter-communal talks 
without making any remarkable contribution to the Cyprus dispute and the return of 
the Greek General Grivas to the island increased British concern. It was accepted that 
the Cyprus problem was at a critical juncture and also stated: ‘there is a real risk that 
the period of negative stability, which has lasted since 1968, maybe coming to an 
end.’381 As mentioned before, a possible Turkish military operation on the island was 
a significant factor behind the British concern. According to British assessment, the 
new Turkish government which had come to power in Ankara was impatient with the 
stalemate in the talks
382
 and this could lead Turkey to use the military option which 
would be an unwanted development for Britain. In this context, the British 
government supported the continuation of the peace negotiations between the Greeks 
and Turks. Otherwise, a Turkish military operation in Cyprus could tense the relation 
between Ankara and London. 
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 Reactivation of the talks 1972-1974 
 
When the two communities on Cyprus failed to reach a settlement, Ankara and 
Athens tended to take initiative to resume the talks. The Greek and Turkish Foreign 
Ministers met in New York in October 1971 and they agreed to broaden participation 
in the inter-communal talks by including the Greek ambassador in Nicosia and the 
Turkish Chargé d’Affaires.383 Makarios was against this idea384 because he did not 
want Greece and Turkey to get directly involved in the Cyprus dispute. The attempt 
of the two Foreign Ministers was a prelude to searching for a way of reactivating the 
negotiation process. The UN was also worrying about the situation on the island. As 
a result of this, the UN Secretary-General U Thant, who was in the last month of his 
tenure of office, circulated an aide-memoire on 18 October 1971.
385
 According to 
this, he suggested that his Special Representative, Osorio y Tafall, would take part in 
the inter-communal talks and the Greek and Turkish governments would each also 
make available a constitutional expert who would attend the talks in an advisory 
capacity.
386
 U Thant’s attempt was an encouraging development.  
Apart from the UN, the suspension of the talks also caused worry for NATO because 
any conflict over Cyprus could worsen relations between Turkey and Greece and 
this, naturally, would weaken the southern flank of NATO and could help the USSR 
to increase its influence in the Mediterranean region.  From this point of view, it is 
essential to look at the Soviet position when the talks were suspended. According to 
the British, the Russians always supported maintaining the independence and 
territorial integrity of Cyprus.
387
 Therefore, they were in favour of Makarios against 
any possible attempt either for Enosis or double Enosis
388
 which, they believed, 
would bring the island under the control of NATO. The Soviet Union also was not 
happy with the presence of the British military bases on the island and, according the 
Britain, removing the British bases was one of the basic objectives of the Soviet 
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policy on Cyprus.
389
 Apart from this, ‘preventing the subordination of Cyprus to 
NATO powers and avoiding antagonising the Turkish government’390 were other 
important elements in the Soviet policy on Cyprus. As the British report stated, 
having a common frontier with the Soviet Union and NATO facilities on its territory 
and, also, controlling of the seaway between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean
391
  
made Turkey strategically important in the eyes of the Soviet Union.
392
 As a result of 
this, while formulating policy over Cyprus the Soviet Union was trying to act 
cautiously to prevent any resentment from Turkey. However, Makarios’ visit to 
Moscow in June 1971 was not welcomed by Turkey and the Soviet government 
needed to make a statement which stressed the rights of the Turkish community on 
the island.
393
 In general, the Soviet Union consented to the idea of a non-aligned 
Cyprus and avoided risk in its policy on Cyprus. In addition, they gave their support 
to the inter-communal talks. 
Meantime, while the efforts were being made to resume talks, the British Embassy in 
Ankara voiced another argument in its report about the future of the Cyprus Problem.  
According to this argument, Turkey would be silent about any attempts by Greece to 
‘bring Makarios to heel’, because both mainland powers seemed to believed that 
Makarios was an obstacle for the reaching settlement since he was not listening to 
suggestions and acting freely on his own will. The report presented the idea that 
Ankara and Athens had an ‘agreement on terms for a final settlement, at any rate one 
involving either double or “compensated” Enosis’ and this appeared to go into action 
after handling the “Makarios issue”.394 However, it was difficult to discard Makarios, 
and in particular, the discussion over the restarting the inter-communal talks between 
the two communities. Such an action would most likely result a harsh reaction from 
the UN. Ankara was also trying to act cautiously to ‘avoid being put in the position 
of appearing to be responsible for torpedoing the talks.’395 On the other hand, Britain 
observed that the relations between Makarios and the Greek government continued 
deteriorating. In particular, ‘the Archbishop’s tendency to rely on Communist 
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support both internally and internationally’396 was playing an important role in this 
situation. The Cypriot Communist party, AKEL, gave their support to Makarios. On 
the one of their conferences, it was stated that ‘the unity of the people could only be 
maintained under the leadership of the Archbishop.’397 Archbishop Makarios was 
also protecting the Communist Party.
398
 Athens was not happy with this situation on 
the island. The Greek Prime Minister, Papadopoulos, said that “the day after we are 
rid of him, we will see that Cyprus joins NATO”.399 In addition, the junta in Greece 
did not want the Cyprus Problem to continue to adversely affect its relations with 
Ankara and, for this reason; they wanted to settle the Cyprus dispute as soon as 
possible.
400
 Even so, there was still no solution through negotiations. Therefore, the 
Greek junta blamed Makarios for not making concessions to the Turkish Cypriots in 
inter-communal talks.
401
  
Furthermore, Athens’ reaction to the importation a substantial quantity of 
Czechoslovak arms to the island, one more time after 1967, in January 1972 by 
Makarios highlighted tense relations between the both sides. The Greek government 
issued a note to the Archbishop which was ‘peremptorily demanding that he should 
put the arms into the United Nations custody’.402 Ankara was also felt uneasy with 
the arms importation. The Prime Minister Erim told the UN Secretary-General on 20 
March that the enlarged inter-communal talks could not begin until the full UN 
control over the arms was provided.
403
 At the end the crisis was solved. Britain was 
also ‘played a discreet but an active part in defusing the Czech arms affair.’404   
All of these, in fact, were making an ironic situation in the Cyprus problem. 
Although both Greece and Turkey were not in favour of the Archbishop and, as 
mentioned in the British report, the both powers making the plans in behind closed 
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doors for the solution of the problem, Turkey seemed to have some concerns. British 
Embassy in Ankara reported that Turkey was ‘distrustful of the Greeks and queried 
the sincerity of their intention.’405 The reason for this appeared to be Grivas who 
could take over the administration on the island after any possible elimination 
scenery of the Archbishop. This should be regarded as a significant factor in 
Ankara’s cautious steps while talking the Cyprus issue with Greece. The British 
report was also supporting the Turkish position. According to this, Grivas’ 
continuing presence on the island was considered as a danger to stability.
406
 
Although the UN Secretary-General’s aide-memoire increased the hopes that the 
talks would resume shortly, bringing both sides back to the negotiating table would 
actually take nearly nine months. The reason for this delay was the parties’ 
expectations and demands from the inter-communal talks. In particular, the Greeks 
believed that the Turks had a hardening attitude towards the reactivation of the talks. 
When Ankara presented some demands for the resumption of the talk. It was 
generally regarded that Turkey had some ‘pre-conditions’ and this would adversely 
affect the process. In fact, the presenting of the ‘pre-conditions’ from Turkey to 
restart the inter-communal talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots seemed to 
surprise Britain and it was regarded as an unwelcome development.  When the 
British ambassador to Ankara met the officials from the Turkish MFA, he said that it 
was difficult to understand that why the Turkish government adopted a tougher line 
by presenting some conditions over resuming inter-communal talks.
407
  
Actually, Ankara also was not happy with the situation which they had got into.  It 
was explained to the ambassador that it was unfortunate that the six points had been 
presented world as ‘preconditions’.408 It was also added that ‘this misunderstanding 
may have come about through misinterpretation of the Turkish government’s 
instruction by the Turkish Mission in New York’. Later, when mentioning these six 
points, the Turkish Foreign Minister Bayülken, who was the former Turkish 
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ambassador to London, preferred to use the word of ‘suggestions’ rather than calling 
them ‘preconditions’.409 
After solving this issue, the new UN Secretary-General Dr. Kurt Waldheim submit 
an aide-memoire on 18 May 1972 which was called upon all parties to resume inter-
communal talks without delay and to continue the search for a solution for the long-
term problem of Cyprus.
410
 The parties showed positive reaction towards this call 
and, with the attendance of the UN Secretary-General the new Cyprus talks were 
launched on the island on 8 June 1972.
411
 Although the enlarged inter-communal 
talks officially started on 8 June, the first working session of the talks was going to 
begin on 3 July under the chairmanship of Osorio y Tafall, UN Special representative 
in Cyprus.
412
 According to the British report, the Turkish Cypriot representative, 
Denktash, would open with a hard line in the talks but it was also stated that  his 
speech at the inaugural session on 8 June: ‘to the need for working arrangement if 
agreement cannot be reached on principles’, seemed to remain as an encoring sign.413 
The Greek Cypriot side appeared not to fully agree on their line in the talks but the 
Greek Cypriot representative, Clerides, said that he thought there could be a chance 
of progress towards a modus vivendi.
414
 This first working meeting mainly focused 
on procedural matters. It was accepted that two meetings would be held in a week in 
future.
415
 
The first round of the talks was held on 3-21 July 1972. The Greek and Turkish 
conductor, Clerides and Denktash, discussed about their points of agreement and 
disagreement.
416
 On 6 October, the Turkish constitutional expert, Orhan Aldıkaçtı, 
presented a paper in which he argued that the main reason of the Cyprus problem 
was mutual suspicion. Therefore, it was necessary to reinforce of the existing treaty 
of guarantees of the 1960 Constitution through a new announcement by the parties 
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concerned abandoning Enosis and partition.
417
 Then the Greek expert, Decleris, 
submitted a paper which criticised the 1960 constitution as unworkable for giving too 
many powers to the Turkish Cypriots.
418
 This assessment of the Greek expert 
disappointed the Turkish side. Dr. Necdet ünel, the President of Turkish Cypriots 
Administration Legislative Assembly, told the British High Commissioner on the 
island that the paper was ‘worse than Makarios’ thirteen points’.419 After that, two 
constitutional experts worked to prepare a joint paper but, as Denktash told the 
American ambassador to Cyprus, the experts failed to agree on their joint paper on 
the Executive. The two parties had different approaches. The Turkish Cypriots 
demanded that four independent officers of the Republic (the Attorney General, the 
Auditor General, the Director of Issuing Bank, and the Account General) should all 
have Turkish Cypriot deputies.
420
 However, only a deputy Attorney General was 
accepted and the other there posts remained unresolved.
421
 
While inter-communal talks were proceeding, the meeting of the new British High 
Commissioner with Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia revealed that how both 
communities had different opinions about the efficiency of the negotiations. First, the 
Commissioner met the Greek Cypriots leaderships and their reaction towards the 
ongoing enlarged talks was positive. Then, he had meeting Denktash and other 
Turkish Cypriots leading figures on the island and the Commissioner stated that all 
of the meeting with the Turkish side “drenched me with cold water!”422 He seemed 
to have a right to make this comment because, in contrast to the Greek Cypriot 
thought about the talks, the Turkish side was very pessimistic. Denktash said that 
‘none of the really crucial questions that were being considered in the inter-
communal talks were tackled seriously, let alone solved’.423 There were some key 
points which need to be examined to understand why the two communities had the 
different views. Firstly, after 1963 constitutional crisis the Greek Cypriots started to 
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control the government alone which was recognised by rest of the world. Therefore, 
the Turkish Cypriots believed that the Greek side was not in a hurry for the solution 
because they had a “state” to govern and, as mentioned before, they were 
economically in a very good position when compared with Turkish society. This 
situation on the island can determine the reason why the Turks had concerns about 
the course of ongoing talks. The long negotiation process would make the Turkish 
position more severe with every passing day while it would not sharply affect the 
Greek Cypriot condition on the island. The British High Commissioner’s opinion 
differed from the both communities’ approach towards the talks. According to him, 
‘whilst Greek optimism was undoubtedly overplayed, Turkish pessimism was 
equally exaggerated.’ He also said that ‘the truth probably lies somewhere between 
the two extremes.’424 
While the negotiations were continuing, the struggle between Grivas and Makarios 
was keeping tension in Cyprus at a high level. It was also asserted that the Greek 
Cypriot interlocutor Clerides would be dismissed by Makarios from his position. 
Such a movement could cause to breakdown of the talks. However, Clerides made an 
explanation and said that he would continue his duty. Clerides also criticised the 
effort of General Grivas’s groups that were trying to resort violence on the island. He 
underlined that the use of violence would destroy the negotiating position of the 
Greek Cypriot side.
425
  
From the Turkish Cypriot’ point of view, they were worried that although an 
agreement reached through the negotiations, the danger of Enosis could continue to 
threaten them. Particularly, Grivas and his supporters’ activities were increasing their 
concern. As a result of this, the Turkish side wanted guarantees for their security. 
The Turkish Cypriot leader, Denktash, stated that “if Cyprus is to remain an 
independent State, the need for internal and external guarantees to protect Cyprus 
against those who do not want independence will be felt more strongly”.426 
It was true that Ankara was also giving importance to Enosis issue. In the Turkish 
Senate of Republic discussion, the Republican People’s Part’s deputy Hıfzı Ofuz 
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Bekata showed Denktash speech on 26 January 1973, on which he asserted that the 
all administrative staffs in the Greek Cypriot side were trying to spread the Enosis 
idea among the public and to make it stronger.  This, for him, was a significant 
evidence of the threat of Enosis.
427
 Another problem for the Turkish Community was 
the struggle among the supporters of Makarios and Grivas. The Turkish side was 
concerned that this could also give harm to Turkish society on the island. In his 
speech at the Turkish Senate of Republic, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Bayülken, 
underlined that ‘if Greek factional rivalry in Cyprus became a threat to the security 
or the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community, Turkey were ready and determined 
to take action to eliminate the threat.
428
 
Meanwhile, the talks were proceeding slowly and it seemed that reaching an 
agreement would be difficult. The both sides was criticising each other’s attitude 
during the talks. When listening to both sides’ arguments, sometimes it is hard to 
understand which parties were right. This difficulty can also be seen in the British 
Foreign Office reports. On 10 September, when the both communities were 
negotiating over the local government issue, the Greek interlocutor Clerides 
criticised the Turkish Cypriot attitude and complained about it, when he met the 
British High Commissioner on the island. Clerides told him that the Turkish side 
raised agricultural elements as new in issue in the talks.
429
 After speaking to Clerides, 
the High Commissioner thought that there could be a change in the Ankara’s policy 
over the talks and asked about the British Embassy in Turkey if they had noticed any 
change in Turkish policy from pushing on with the talks to playing them slowly. 
Especially, concerning Denktash’s new demands about agriculture.430 The British 
ambassador to Turkey replied that they had not detected any change in the Turkish 
policy. He also spoke to Turkish Foreign Ministry’s officials and he was told that the 
agricultural problem was about water. The Turks were worrying about discrimination 
against their villages in any Central government plans.
431
 The ambassador was told 
that this was not a new issue. On 3 August, Denktash raised this subject in the 
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context of negotiations over local autonomy at the meeting of inter-communal 
talks.
432
 Denktash also announced that the reason behind the Greek reaction was that 
‘they were not ready for final settlement because their bargaining position was 
weakened by the continuation of intra-communal disorders promoted by Grivas’.433 
Therefore, by using Turkish demands on the agriculture issue, they were trying to 
imply that the Turkish side were responsible for the impasse in the talks.
434
 After 
taking the answer from Ankara, the British High Commission in Nicosia replied that 
the Turkish side appeared to have a right about the water issue because it was an 
important problem in Cyprus. However, it was added that the Turkish timing in 
bringing this issue in the talk was unfortunate and, from here, ‘certainly looked 
disingenuous’.435 It was also said that ‘Clerides’ version to the High Commissioner 
flatly contradicts that the agriculture problem was raised as early as 3 August’.436 As 
can be seen, the statements by the parties involved sometimes could be different 
from each other which make any judgement difficult. 
The eighth rounds of talks started in August 1973.
437
 More than one year had passed 
by since the reactivation of the talks, but the communities could not manage to reach 
a settlement. This situation justified the UN Secretary-General Waldheim’s statement 
at the beginning of this process when he said that ‘Cyprus was not a problem that 
could be solved within one week or even a few months.’438 
When making an assessment of the year of 1973, the British High Commissioner, 
Stephen Olver, stated that it was a disappointing year for the talks. He also said that 
‘some details had been solved, but the central issue, on which all others depend, was 
virtually untouched.’439 According to him, it seemed that the negotiations were 
getting into an impasse once more because there was no constructive thinking about 
the alternatives.
440
 Although the High Commissioner did not have a positive opinion 
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about the future of the talks, it was still hoped that 1974 would be the year in which 
the Cyprus problem would be solved. 
Conclusion 
 
The British response to the establishment of the new Turkish administration on the 
island showed that there were major differences in the respective approaches towards 
the Cyprus issue by 1968. Although the Turks tried to explain that their aim at 
forming a separate administration of the island was to protect the Turkish Cypriots 
on the island, Britain regarded the Turkish move as an unfortunate development.
441
  
This British attitude had a negative effect on Anglo-Turkish relations. Ankara started 
to understand more clearly that British support for Turkish arguments on the Cyprus 
issue was not forthcoming. Actually, it was very problematic for Britain to formally 
recognise the new Turkish administration on the island because this would adversely 
impact upon its relations with Greece and the Greek Cypriot government, which 
showed a strong aversion to the new Turkish administration. Furthermore, UN 
criticism of the Turkish action showed that recognising the new Turkish 
administration would put Britain in a difficult position in the international arena.  
Another issue by 1968 was that the British Government seemed to consider the 
hardening Turkish position as an obstacle to the solution of the Cyprus dispute. 
Therefore, the British policy makers tried to ‘encourage the Turkish government to 
allow the Turkish Cypriots to make a positive response to any conciliatory moves 
made by the Greek Cypriots.’442 When inter-communal talks were started between 
the Greek and Turkish Cypriots encouraged by intensive efforts by the United 
Nations, British officials announced their support for the continuation of the 
negotiation process between the two sides. However, the representatives of the two 
communities found it difficult to compromise with each other. Britain avoided 
publicly criticising any attitude by the involved parties in the talks and applied a 
policy of ‘standing back’ in order not to worsen its relations with Athens and Turkey.  
On the other hand, the Foreign office documents showed that in the event of a 
declaration of a separate state on the island by the Turkish Cypriots, the Foreign 
                                                     
441
 PRO: FCO 51/47, Foreign And Commonwealth Affair‘s Research Department Memorandum, 4 
December 1968. 
442
 PRO: FCO 9/73, ‘Cyprus’, ‘British policy’, report of the Central Department of the Foreign Office, 
20 March 1968. 
100 
 
Office was ready ‘to protest in the strongest terms to the Turkish government and 
urge them to revoke their decision.’443 Even though, such a statement would have a 
negative effect on the Anglo-Turkish relations. 
In the meantime, the suspension of the inter-communal talks in 1971, due to the 
difference of opinions of the Greek and Turkish sides and establishment of the 
terrorist organisation EOKA-B worsened the general situation on the island. Ankara 
showed a strong reaction to the activities of Greek General Grivas’ on the island. In 
this sense, the British and Turkish policy was in parallel because Grivas’ return to the 
island was not also welcomed by Britain either.  
In general, the developments after the reactivation of the talks in 1972 did not make a 
positive contribution to the situation on the island. The British High Commissioner 
did not have a positive opinion about the future of the talks in 1974. From the angle 
of Anglo-Turkish relations, the developments did not have a great impact on bilateral 
relations, but their different approaches towards the events of 1974 increased 
tensions between the British and Turkish governments and adversely affected 
bilateral relation between Britain and Turkey, which is the subject of the following 
chapter. 
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4) A New Period of the Cyprus Problem: Anglo-Turkish 
Relations in the Critical Phase 
 
Introduction 
 
The first part of the chapter four analyses the developments on the island prior to the 
Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974. In this context, the last attempts of 
the Greek and Turkish Cypriot negotiators to settle the problem before the Greek 
military coup on the island on 15 July 1974 is evaluated. Britain’s response to the 
Greek demand to use the British influence to force Ankara to make some concessions 
in the talks with the Greeks is investigated in this part of the thesis. British and 
Turkish reactions towards the Greek military coup in Cyprus are looked at in the 
following section. It was an important event on the island. Turkish official statements 
at this time were giving the signal that Ankara was ready to launch a military attack 
on Cyprus to protect the Turkish Cypriots on the island. The Turkish Prime Minister, 
Bülent Ecevit, visited London with his delegation to discuss the situation on the 
island with the British government. This was an important occasion in terms of 
seeing the effect of the British and Turkish approach to the Cyprus question on their 
mutual relations. Therefore, the discussion in this meeting is examined. 
The third section evaluates the developments after the start of the first military 
operation in Cyprus on 20 July. There were reactions from around the world to 
Ankara’s decision to send the Turkish soldiers to the island. From this point of view, 
the British government approach to the Turkish military operation is presented. In 
particular, British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan’s attitude towards Turkey’s 
action is one of the important subjects of this part. In addition, his efforts with the US 
Foreign Secretary Henry Kissinger to ensure a ceasefire between the Greeks and 
Turks is explored. 
The last section looks at the discussions between the British, Greek and Turkish 
delegations at the first Geneva conference which sought to find a solution to the 
problem. There were accusations from the Greek side that the Turkish army on the 
island was breaching the ceasefire agreements. Therefore, Callaghan’s position on 
these allegations is examined in the light of the British archival documents. Also, his 
102 
 
approach to the general Turkish arguments at conference is presented which gives an 
idea about the impact of the Turkish military operation on Anglo-Turkish relations. 
 The Cyprus Problem by 1974 
 
The year of 1974 started with an important development on the island which was the 
death of the Greek General George Grivas after a heart attack on 27 January.  He had 
returned to the island in 1971, established so called EOKA-B and become a 
significant figure among the Greek Cypriot Community.  Grivas’ power struggle 
with Makarios had caused an increase in tension on the island from time to time. The 
course of EOKA-B after the death of Grivas was also an important issue on the 
island.  It was announced by the leadership of the organisation that they would 
continue the struggle which Grivas had begun in 1955.
444
 Similarly, at the funeral of 
Grivas, Nicos Sampson,  a former EOKA member sentenced to death by the British 
in 1957 for killing British soldiers,
445
 declared that ‘the ex-fighters had renewed their 
oath to continue the struggle for Enosis at all cost.’446 These statements seemed to be 
giving a signal that EOKA-B would try to increase its position in Cyprus. The report 
of Olver, the British High Commissioner on the island, also supported this idea. 
According to him, the death of Grivas should not be interpreted as the end of the 
Enosis because it had existed before Grivas and would continue without him.
447
 
Furthermore, after Grivas, the influence of those Greek officers in EOKA-B, who 
had strong connections with the Greek junta in Athens, would increase 
dramatically.
448
 In particular, after the replacement of the Greek military regime by a 
counter-coup by Dimitrios Ioannidis on 25 November 1973, who was the Chief of 
the Greek Military Police and had been a leading figure in the Greek Junta,
449
 Athens 
would increase its activity in Cyprus.  This in turn would worsen the relationship 
between Athens and the Archbishops. After the counter-coup, General Phaedon 
Gizikis became the new President of Greece but real power belonged to Ioannidis. In 
                                                     
444
 PRO: FCO 9/1886, ‘Internal situation of Cyprus’, EOKA-B after Grivas, letter from the British 
High Commission in Nicosia to FCO’s Southern European Department, 31 January 1974. 
445
 PRO: FCO 9/1890, ‘Military Coup in Cyprus (Monday 15 July) part A’, telegram from the British 
High Commission in Cyprus, no: 191 of 15 July 1974, 19 July 1974.  
446
 PRO: FCO 9/1886, the death and funeral of General Grivas, letter from the British High 
Commission in Nicosia to FCO’s Southern European Department, 4 February 1974. 
447
 PRO: FCO 9/1886, Lt. General George Grivas-Dighenis 1898-1974, letter from the British High 
Commissioner in Nicosia to James Callaghan, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, p. 20. 
448
 Denktash, The Cyprus Triangle, p. 64., Uslu, The Cyprus Question, p. 115. 
449
 Constandinos, America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974, pp. 96-101. 
103 
 
fact, the government change in Greece raised some concerns about the new 
government policy over Cyprus. Therefore, A. Metaxas, the Head of Cyprus 
Department of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, talked to the British Embassy 
in Athens and he confirmed that there would be no change in the new Greek 
government’s position over the Cyprus dispute and it would be exactly the same as 
that of its predecessors.
450
 From Makarios’ angle, a British report suggested that his 
position was strengthened by Grivas’ death.451 The Archbishop made a short 
declaration upon Grivas’ death and praised his ‘enormous contribution to the 
liberation of the Greek Cypriot people’.452 Also, Makarios announced the release of 
many prisoners who had been Grivas supporters.
453
 
In the meantime, the talks were still being held in 1974 between the Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot representatives but the optimism found in the beginning of the talks 
was disappearing with each passing day. Actually, it should be pointed out that the 
both sides seemed to manage to find a way to compromise with each other in issues 
other than that of the local government, which appeared to continue to be important 
matter that had the potential to block the whole negotiation process. Denktash and 
Clerides were submitting their papers on this issue. In the beginning of 1974, they 
again presented papers about shape of the local government. It was obvious that each 
side was approaching the issue from their own perspective. The Turks again 
demanded more autonomy while the Greek tried to protect the authority of the 
central government. The assessment of the British High Commissioner on the latest 
Greek and Turkish offer on the local government matters was that `the papers were 
in most respects diametrically opposed.’454 As can be understood from the 
Commissioner’s comment, the negotiation process was not going well. In fact, the 
point was that the talks between the two communities started in 1968 and six years 
had already passed, but both sides still could give papers which were “diametrically” 
                                                     
450
 PRO: FCO 9/1886, letter from the British Embassy in Athens to FCO’s Southern European 
Department, 16 January 1974. 
451
 PRO: FCO 9/1886, Death of Grivas, confidential telegram the British High Commissioner in 
Nicosia 28 January 1974. 
452
 PRO: FCO 9/1886, EOKA-B after Grivas, letter from the British High Commission in Nicosia to 
FCO’s Southern European Department, 31 January 1974. 
453
 PRO: FCO 9/1886, the death and funeral of General Grivas, letter from the British High 
Commission in Nicosia to FCO’s Southern European Department, 4 February 1974.  
454
 PRO: FCO 9/1884, ‘Discussions on Cyprus’ inter-communal problems part A’, Inter-communal 
talks: the papers by Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash on local government, memorandum from the 
British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Mr.Olver to Sir Alan Goodison, 14 January 1974. 
104 
 
opposed. This can be interpreted a lack of understanding and tolerance between the 
sides in the negotiation process.  
Despite inter-communal negotiations, the Cyprus problem continued to have an 
uncertain future. As a result of this, other countries showed some interest in the 
problem and thought that they could help for the solution in the dispute. For instance, 
the new Libyan ambassador on the island visited the British High Commissioner and 
told him that Libyan leader, Muammar Qadhafi was unhappy with the situation on 
the island and wanted to take a personal initiative.
455
 However, there were already 
many attempts, as the High Commissioner also stated, most importantly from the 
UN.  Therefore, any involvement from other countries seemed to have had only a 
symbolic effect.  
From the Greek perspective, the junta in Athens seemed to be in favour of the idea of 
putting some pressure to the Turkish side to make some concessions on their local 
government position. When John Denson, the official in the British Embassy in 
Athens, met Metaxas, the Head of Cyprus Department of the Greek Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Denson was told that it would be good if the British government 
“showed more interest” in the talks.456 Denson appeared not to be happy with the 
Greek request and replied that Britain already gave the talks support on all suitable 
occasions.
457
 In his later comment on the Metaxas’ demand, the ambassador pointed 
out that if the Greeks wanted Britain to urge the Turkish Cypriots directly, or through 
the Turkish government, to make concessions, this would not be easy to implement 
because, he added, on such an occasion, ‘the Turks would think that we had been put 
up to it by the Greeks.’458 
In addition to the Metaxas’ request, N. Diamantopoulos, Minister-Counsellor at the 
Greek Embassy in London, talked about the same issue when he met Sir Alan 
Goodison, Head of the FCO’s South East European Department (SEED), on 16 
January 1974.
459
 Diamantopoulos complained about the Turkish position in the talks 
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and criticised their “intransigence”. 460 He also told Goodison that although the 
Greek government was well aware of the current British Policy, they hoped that 
Britain would speak to Turkish government to urge them to make some concessions. 
Goodison replied that it was necessary to see the new Turkish government’s action 
on the Cyprus policy in Turkey before taking any measurements on the Cyprus issue. 
He also added: ‘I had no intention of recommending that we should intervene with 
the Turkish government on the lines the Greek requested.’461 However, to give some 
assurance to Diamantopoulos, he sent an instruction to Horace Phillips, the British 
ambassador in Ankara, to contact with the new Turkish Foreign Minister and, in 
accordance with British general policy, to stress British anxiety to see a successful 
conclusion to the talks. 
It was true that the government in Turkey had changed in January 1974. This was an 
important development because after the military intervention in 1971, this was the 
first government which elected by the votes of the Turkish people. The election had 
been held on 14 October 1973 and the leader of Republican People’s Party, Bülent 
Ecevit, who was a Social Democrat, won by gaining 37 per cent of vote in Turkey. 
However, this was not enough to establish a single-party government. Therefore, 
after a long negotiation process, Ecevit reached an agreement with Necmettin 
Erbakan to form a collation government. Erbakan’s the right-wing National Salvation 
Party was the third largest part in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey which 
emerged as the Islamic party of 1970s Turkey.
462
 These two parties had different 
political views and their government would only manage to last less than a year. 
However, one of the important decisions in the Turkish Republic’s history would be 
taken by this coalition. 
When the new Turkish government came to power in January, it was speculated just 
what its policy over the Cyprus issue would be. In the new government programme, 
it was stated that an appropriate solution for Cyprus would be found in a federal 
system.
463
. The Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit was in favour of a federal 
solution in Cyprus. This statement caused some concerns on the Greek side. 
                                                     
460
 PRO: FCO 9/1884, letter from the FCO’s Southern European Department to the British High 
Commission in Nicosia, 16 January 1974., Hamilton and Salmon (Eds.), Ibid. 
461
 PRO: FCO 9/1884, Ibid. 
462
 Constandinos, America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974, p. 102. 
463
 PRO: FCO 9/1884, the new Turkish government and Cyprus, letter from the British Embassy in 
Ankara to FCO’s Southern European Department, 5 February 1974. 
106 
 
Makarios said that this federal policy could end the inter-communal talks.
464
 When 
the British ambassador to Ankara, Phillips, met Ismail Soysal, Director-General of 
Political Affairs at the Turkish Foreign Ministry, the ambassador asked that what 
exactly the government statement over Cyprus Soysal meant.  From Soysal’s answer, 
the ambassador came to a conclusion that the “federal” statement was mainly to 
satisfy the public’s nationalist feelings. Turkey would be not change policy towards 
the inter-communal talks.
465
 
However, the Greek frustration over Ankara’s statement on “federalism” increased. 
At the inter-communal meeting on 2 April, Clerides asked Denktash about Ecevit’s 
word on the federalism. Denktash explained that the references by Ecevit to federal 
solution were a political statement for the domestic policy parallel to Makarios’ 
comments in support of Enosis from time to time and should be treated as such.
466
 
Denktash also underlined that Ecevit’s announcements was not related to inter-
communal talks and there was no shift in the Turkish support to the talks.
467
 
However, Clerides rejected the Turkish arguments and adjourned the talks sine 
die.
468
 The British High Commissioner, Olver, assessed the situation and commented 
that ‘there was some degree of right on both sides’469. According to him, the Greek 
side was responsible for the suspension of the talks but he also said that the Turkish 
statements on federalism caused anxiety on the Greek side and gave them an 
excellent pretext for calling a halt.
470
 
After representatives of the both communities stopped the negotiations with each 
other, the UN again started to find a way to reactivate the talks. For this purpose, 
Roberto Guyer, the UN Secretary-General’s Representative was preparing to go to 
the island on 5 April. Before going to Cyprus however, he stopped by London and he 
was told that Britain appreciated the UN efforts and diplomatic actions and they were 
ready to help him in his mission. The British officials believed that such efforts by 
the UN would bring successful outcome.
471
 Although the British were optimistic, 
                                                     
464
 Ibid. 
465
 Ibid. 
466
 PRO: FCO 9/1884, ‘Inter communal talks’, letter from the British High Commission in Nicosia to 
FCO’s Southern European Department, 8 April 1974. 
467
 Ibid. 
468
 Ibid. 
469
 Ibid. 
470
 Ibid. 
471
 PRO: FCO 9/1885, ‘Discussions on Cyprus’ inter-communal problems part B’, Cyprus: 
Background note, registry no: WSC 1/2. 
107 
 
Guyer became gloomy about the long-term future of the talks when he visited the 
island. He told the High Commissioner, Olver, that ‘if the talks resume we would 
have done no more than buy time.’472 According to him, Makarios seemed to not 
believe that the talks would bring a solution. Therefore, he used the Turkish 
announcement to stop the talks. Guyer added that the same situation could happen 
again in the future.
473
 The comment of the UN Secretary-General’s Representative 
appeared to have been right because after the Turkish statement on the “federalism”, 
Denktash many times reassured the Greek side that it would not affect the 
negotiations process.  However, the Greek Cypriots refused to continue the talks. The 
British High commissioner also reported to London that Guyer’s opinion about the 
present situation of the problem had changed. Before he thought that the Turks were 
mainly to blame for the impasse, he then started to believe that Makarios was 
responsible to suspension of the talks.
474
 On the Greek side, Diamantopoulos, 
Minister-Counsellor at the Greek Embassy in London, came again to visit Sir Alan 
Goodison on 17 April. Goodison stated that Diamantopoulos showed the Turkish 
government as being responsible for the breakdown of the talks, but Goodison 
refused to agree that the Turks were mainly to blame by saying that ‘the word 
“federative” had not been introduced into inter-communal talks.’475 According to 
him, as the High Commissioner stated before, both sides were at fault.
476
 
It was a fact that the continued status quo on the island was deteriorating as far as the 
economic position of the Turkish Cypriots was concerned. As a result of his, the 
Turkish community seemed to face with an emigration problem. The British High 
Commission in Cyprus reported that it was claimed by the local Turkish newspaper 
that Turkish Cypriots at the rate of 200-300 per month were leaving from the island 
to go to Australia mostly via Greece
477
. Denktash also said that emigration was 
causing a problem.
478
 From this situation, it appeared that a quick solution to the 
problem was important for maintenance of a Turkish community. 
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After the efforts of the UN, Osorio y Tafall announced that the talks would resume 
between both communities.
479
 Although it was hoped that the talks were going to 
produce a useful outcome was low level, it was good to see that both sides would 
again come the negotiation table. The talks started again on 11 June. In this meeting, 
Clerides restated the Greek Cypriot position. He again underlined that settlement of 
the Cyprus dispute should be based on the principle of a unitary state.
480
 After the 
meeting, Denktash indicated that he would reply at the next meeting which was on 
18 June. In the second meeting, Denktash submitted a statement which was showing 
the Turkish position. He also talked to the reporters and he said that there was no 
benefit on trying to give a name to a settlement before ‘the structure and the base of 
the new order had become completely crystallized.’481 By making this statement, 
Denktash showed that he was not happy with Clerides’ speech in the first meeting 
which presented the unitary state notion as a certain basis for the talks.  
After these two meetings which representatives of both communities had, the High 
Commissioner, Olver, believed that the resumption of talks was unlikely to bring a 
solution to the problem because both sides had lost faith in each other. According to 
him, early years of the talks both sides could have made some achievements. He 
argued that the failure of the Greek Cypriot Administration in removing 
discrimination against the Turkish Cypriots
482
 aftermath of 1968 alienated them from 
the idea of living together with the Greek Cypriots. He also defended that ‘a great 
opportunity was lost by the Greek side between the years of 1969 and 1972.’483 
According to his opinion: 
 An imaginative directive from Makarios to the Greek Cypriot Administration to end 
all aspects of administrative discrimination might have won over the Turkish Cypriot 
Community and tipped the scale towards a settlement. That opportunity has gone and 
meanwhile, Turkish separatism markedly hardened.
484
 
 
Parallel to the High Commissioner’s assessment, as an important contributor to the 
beginning of the inter-communal talks and in making the effort to keep it working, 
                                                     
479
 PRO: FCO 9/1885, ‘inter-communal talks’ confidential telegram from the British High 
Commission in Nicosia to FCO, no: 124, 20 May 1974. 
480
 PRO: FCO 9/1885, Inter communal talks, letter from the British High Commission in Nicosia to 
FCO’s Southern European Department, 12 June 1974. 
481
 PRO: FCO 9/1885, Inter communal talks, letter from the British High Commission in Nicosia to 
FCO’s Southern European Department, 19 June 1974. 
482
 PRO: FCO 9/1885, Ibid. 
483
 PRO: FCO 9/1885, Inter communal talks, letter from the British High Commission in Nicosia to 
Goodison, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 19 June 1974. 
484
 Ibid. 
109 
 
the UN was not also happy with the course of the negotiation process. The United 
Kingdom Mission to the UN reported that the UN Secretariat accepted that no 
significant progress would be made.
485
 They were concerned that the situation in 
Cyprus would worsen Greco-Turkish relations which had been stable since the 1967 
crisis.
486
 As a result of this, The UN also made another attempt and replaced Osorio y 
Tafall with Luis Jesús Weckmann Muñoz as the Secretary General’s Special 
Representative to Cyprus who impressed the UN Secretariat with his performance 
over the Iran/Iraq dispute.
487
  
However, the last meeting between Clerides and Denktash was held on 9 July and 
ended without achieving anything.
488
 After 6 days, on 15 July, the Greek military 
coup on the island
489
 ended the talks which had started in 1968 and opened a 
significant new period in the Cyprus problem. 
The 1974 Greek Coup on the island and British and Turkish 
Responses to the Coup 
 
As mentioned before, the government change in Greece and then, the death of Grivas 
were important events which helped Athens to increase its activities in Cyprus 
through the Greek Officers in the National Guard who took orders from Greece and 
seemed to have close relations with EOKA-B. The Archbishop was closely following 
developments on the island and he seemed to come to the conclusion that it was 
essential to act to prevent Cyprus from becoming Athens’s playground. Thus, he was 
planning to send back the Greek officers in the National Guard on the island to 
achieve his aim. For this purpose, he sent a letter to the President of Greece, General 
Phaedon Gizikis, on 2 July 1974. In his letter to Athens, Makarios accused Greece of 
being behind the terrorist activities of EOKA-B.
490
 Therefore, he said that the Greek 
officers in the National Guard needed to return back to Greece.
491
 According to his 
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plan, ‘200 of them would leave in July, 200 in August’492 and he only accepted that 
amount of the ‘100 or 150 Greek officers to stay in Cyprus as instructors and military 
advisers.’493 Through this demand, Makarios aimed to significantly decrease the 
Greek junta’s influence on the island. Nevertheless, a coup was staged in Cyprus 
before he got any answer from Athens.  
Later, when the Archbishop met the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson in 
London, he would recall that, in response to his demand, the Greek government had 
decided to launch a coup against him.
494
 Although it was difficult to say that the 
Archbishop’s letter was the only reason for the coup, it should not be ignored that the 
junta in Greece used the letter as an excuse for overthrowing Makarios.  
After the National Guard launched a coup on 15 July, it was essential to the British 
government to get fast and accurate information from Cyprus in order to be able to 
act immediately to control the situation. As a result of this, on the day of the coup, 
the British High Commissioner, Olver, was trying to keep London informed about 
the situation on the island and he was sending immediate telegrams for this purpose. 
However, as he indicated, all telephone lines had been cut in Cyprus
495
 which made 
difficult to get information. Later, on the same day of the coup, an announcement 
was made from the junta via the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation which was sent to 
London by Olver: 
The National Guard intervened today to stop internecine war between the Greeks. The 
main purpose of the National Guard is to maintain order. The matter is internal 
between the Greeks alone. The National Guard at this moment is in control of the 
situation. Makarios is dead. Anybody interfering will be immediately executed.
496
 
  
After getting the news from Cyprus, Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, made a 
statement in the House of Commons on the same day of the coup and he emphasized 
that if the report of the death of Makarios was actually true, then whole House and he 
himself would express their very deep dismay and regret at the death of the 
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Archbishop.
497
 After the coup, the reaction of the Turkish government was 
significant. In particular, Ankara might have started a military operation to protect 
the Turkish community on the island. Therefore, James Callaghan also announced 
that he had talked to the Greek and Turkish governments and had expressed the 
necessity for restraint on all sides.
498
 Furthermore, he sent his personal message to 
the Greek and Turkish Foreign Minister. In his message to the Turkish Foreign 
Minister, he said that ‘I hope very much that the Turks will avoid any kind of 
precipitate action or intervention at this stage.’499 
The British Embassy in Ankara delivered Callaghan’s message to the Turkish 
Ministry of Defence, Hasan Esat Işık, who was also acting as the Foreign Minister 
because Turan Güneş, the Foreign Minister, was outside the country at that time. It 
seemed that Işık was happy with the British interest in the event. He said that Ankara 
considered intervention an undesirable option but he did not confirm that they had 
fully disregarded it.
500
 Işık also said that if the British and Turks worked together a 
reasonable solution could be found.
501
 The British Diplomat, Fyjis-Walker, reported 
that it was not easy to understand the Turkish intentions from the Minister’s talk. 
However, he reported that: 
The Minister had given the impression of being determined to defend Turkish Cypriot 
and Turkish rights (under the 1960 treaties) but uncertain as yet of what this would 
require of Turkey.
502
 
 
In fact, although there were some serious intelligence reports, Turkey did not think 
that the Greek junta would attempt such an action. When the news about the coup in 
Cyprus reached to Ankara, the Turkish government had a difficulty to assess the 
situation correctly, because on the day of the coup, the Prime Minister, Bülent 
Ecevit, was on the way of his visit to the Turkish province Afyon, the Foreign 
Minister Turan Güneş, was in China, Turkish ambassador to Athens, Kamuran 
Gürün, was on ‘yachting cruise in the Mediterranean, and the Chief of the General 
Staff was in Istanbul.’503 
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The first statement from Ankara was made by the Turkish Ministry of Defence, 
Hasan Esat Işık, and it was underlined that the Turkish government was watching the 
situation carefully and would not fail to take essential precautions.
504
  
Later, the Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, stated that: ‘Let no one try to profit from 
the chaotic situation in Cyprus to infringe upon the rights of the Turks. We will never 
accept a fait accompli. We will let no one trample the rights of the Turks.’505 After 
this statement, Soysal, Director-General of Political Affairs at the Turkish Foreign 
Ministry, contacted the British Embassy in Turkey to get more information and 
views on the situation in Cyprus. He was given brief information which the British 
High Commissioner reported earlier.
506
 The British diplomat in the Embassy, Fyjis-
Walker, asked about the Turkish response to the coup. Soysal said that it was early to 
make any decision and they were still at ‘the stage of consultation and assessment’ to 
understand the situation. He also added that they were suspicious that Athens was 
behind the coup.
507
 Furthermore, after getting the news of the coup, the Turkish 
armed forces were placed on a state of alert.
508
 Also, at a midnight meeting of the 
Turkish National Security Council, the intervention option was discussed and Eceveit 
was told by the Generals that the Turkish Army was ready to complete its 
preparations in a short time to launch a military landing in Cyprus.
509
  
The Soviet Union was concerned with the situation on the island, when the Soviet 
Counsellor in their Embassy in Cyprus met the British High Commissioner to discuss 
the situation on the day of the coup, He stated that they had strong information on 
Greek involvement and ‘the Soviet government would react strongly’.510 
Meanwhile, there were also important developments on the island. The new military 
regime in Cyprus announced that they had chosen Nicos Sampson as the President of 
the new government.
511
 From the Turkish Cypriot perspective, they were deeply 
concerned about the situation on the island. Denktash made an announcement and 
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requested the Turkish Community to ‘remain calm and avoid any involvement in the 
conflict between the Greek Cypriots.’512 
Another significant development was Makarios’ message from a radio station. It had 
been earlier announced by the junta that he had died. However, he was alive and sent 
a message from a secret “free Cyprus radio station”: 
I was the target for the Athens military junta, but the military coup by the junta will 
not succeed…They have been trying to get me for a long time now they have decided 
to destroy Cyprus and its people. The people of Cyprus will resist and fight.
513
 
 
From his message, it was clearly understood that Athens was behind the coup and 
Ankara’s concerns increased.  They were concerned that after taking down Makarios, 
the next step of the junta would be Enosis. After hiding for a while on the island, a 
British helicopter took the Archbishop to Britain’s sovereign base at Akrotiri and 
then, he went to London via Malta.
514
 
The situation was serious and Turkey appeared to use all diplomatic actions to settle 
the crisis before applying a military option. Consequently, Ankara thought that they 
could have a chance to solve the issue by acting together with another guarantor 
power Britain.  As a result of this, a Turkish Committee lead by the Turkish Prime 
Minister, Bülent Ecevit, went to London on 17 July to discuss the situation.  
This was an important development because any decision was taken from this 
meeting could directly affect the Cyprus problem. In the meeting, the first speech 
was given by Ecevit. He said that Ankara was happy with the British decision not to 
recognise Nicos Sampson.
515
 Then, Ecevit stated that ‘the situation in Cyprus was 
intolerable…because it was a form of unnamed Enosis’516. He drew attention to the 
danger of Sampson’s regime taking root on the island. He said that if such a thing 
was allowed ‘it would be the end of the Southern-Eastern flank of NATO.’517  
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Furthermore, he stressed that the Turkish government did not have any intention to 
exploit the situation in Cyprus and they also did not want to take an action alone 
against the coup. Therefore, Ecevit defended that the British co-operation with 
Ankara was essential to ‘avoid bloodshed and a confrontation between Greece and 
Turkey.’518 For this purpose, Ecevit asked the British government permission for 
using the British SBAs to send the Turkish soldiers to the island.
519
  
After Bülent Ecevit’s speech, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, 
Callaghan, started to talk. He said that they were sharing the same opinion with 
Ecevit on many points. He agreed that the Sampson regime should not be allowed to 
take root on the island.
520
 He also accepted that ‘it had not been an internal coup; the 
offices of the National Guard had been directed, either openly or covertly, from 
mainland Greece.’521 Therefore, Callaghan, stated Britain understood the Turkish 
government’ concern over the Enosis issue.  
However, in related to the Turkish demand for using the British SBAs, he indicated 
that ‘he could not recommend such a course’522. The British Prime Minister, Harold 
Wilson, also added that ‘the Sovereign Base Areas had been established for the 
benefit of British forces only. The move suggested would not be advisable’523. 
Instead of this Turkish request, British suggested a tripartite talk between the British, 
Greek and Turkish delegations.
524
  
This statement from the British side highlighted the difference between Anglo-
Turkish approaches towards the crisis. There were some basic elements which were 
reason for the difference. Mainly, they were that the Turkish side wanted a quick 
solution because they believed that talking with Greece would not contribute to the 
solution of the problem but would give time to the junta to take root on the island. 
According to Turkish opinion, the long negotiation process before the coup had 
showed that the talks between the Greek and Turks would not provide a quick 
solution. Ecevit was worrying about the Turkish populace on the island and he 
thought that ‘redressing the balance of forces on the island by an intervention of 
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Turkish troops’525 would provide safeguards for them. It was most likely that if the 
government failed to take such an action and the Turkish Cypriots had been harmed 
because of this failure, it would be difficult for the Turkish government to explain the 
situation to the public in Turkey. On the other hand, Britain’s position seemed not to 
be difficult when compared to Ankara’s one. First of all, it could be said that the 
British government did not have much public pressure on it to solve the problem and, 
it appeared that Britain did not have to worry much about the situation of British 
citizens on the island when again compared to Turkey. Therefore, as Callaghan 
stated, ‘the British government was in no hurry’526 in seeking a peaceful solution to 
the problem.  
Ecevit did not have a positive outlook on the British offer of a tripartite meeting. He 
said that Greece was the aggressor, which was also accepted by Callaghan, and 
Turkey and Greece could not come together.
527
 However, Ecevit also indicated that 
‘Turkey would not object if the British government sought to talk to Greece.’528 
Furthermore, he talked about the British answers to the Turkish government request 
to use the British bases on the island. He said that Britain was at liberty to decide 
how to use its own bases in Cyprus. In contrast to Wilson’s statement earlier, Ecevit 
said that he did not think that there were any restrictions for Britain in the use of the 
bases.
529
 Then, he added that ‘He feared that the British government might feel a 
burden on her conscience in future by declining to accept the Turkish proposal.’530 
It was obvious that the Turkish government did not get the result what they expected 
to have from the meeting. However, they were determined to take action. Before this 
meeting, the Turkish position was explained by the Turkish chargé d’affaires in 
Cyprus, Asaf İnhan, to the British High Commissioner. İnhan again indicated that 
‘the highest state bodies of Turkey were alerted.’531 He also added that Turkey was 
inclined to go for military intervention alone if no agreement reached with Britain.
532
 
The High Commissioner replied that it was not likely that the British government 
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would use to force the restore the situation, İnhan replied that ‘we are ready to do 
so.’533 
From the British angle, although they did not agree with Turkey about the way of 
taking action against the crisis on the island, they knew that they had some 
responsibility to deal with the issue. Therefore, after the meeting with Turkish 
committee, the British government evaluated the situation in the cabinet meeting. 
The Prime Minister, Wilson, underlined the reasons for the necessity of the 
involvement of Britain in the present crisis. According to him, ‘Britain was 
inevitably much involved in the problems created by the overthrow of President 
Makarios.’534 Then, he explained that: 
The existence of our Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus and the presence there of our 
forces and their families was one aspect of our involvement, and studies were being 
made urgently of the implications of military intervention, whether or not we 
participated in it. We also contributed to the United Nations Force in Cyprus. We 
were fellow members of the Commonwealth and, together with Greece and Turkey, we 
were guarantors of the I960 Treaty. A number of countries were pressing us to take 
the lead. The Soviet ambassador, who had delivered a message to me from Mr 
Brezhnev earlier in the week which  was entirely in accord with our position as 
guarantors of the Treaty that we should pursue consultations with Turkey and 
Greece.
535
 
 
In the meantime, diplomatic actions were continuing. The efforts of the US were also 
significant for the solutions of the crisis. James Callaghan was in contact with the US 
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Nevertheless, in the first days of the crisis, both 
sides approach towards the coup implied that there was a difference between their 
policies. In the British cabinet meeting, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary 
said that ‘United States policy was not entirely clear.’536 In fact, Britain fully 
supported the idea of return of Makarios to the island as the President. When 
Callaghan met with Ecevit on 17 July, he clearly stated that the British government 
wanted to see Archbishop Makarios restored to power.
537
  
However, Henry Kissinger seemed not to think the same way as Callaghan. After 
having a phone call with Kissinger, the British ambassador, Peter Ramsbotham, 
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reported to London that Kissinger appeared to question the British in their absolute 
support of Makarios.
538
 Ramsbotham indicated that Kissinger had concerns that if 
Makarios returned to power he would increase his connection with Russia which 
allowed the communist influence to increase on the island.
539
 Therefore, Kissinger 
avoided making an announcement that the United States continued to recognise 
Makarios as the legitimate ruler of Cyprus.
540
   
However, there were some allegations
541
 that the US knew that there would be a 
coup in Cyprus and failed to prevent it. Actually, taking up a position against the 
Archbishop was making these allegations stronger. Washington was not happy with 
these accusations. Later, Kissinger denied the accusations by saying that ‘the 
information concerning an impending coup was not exactly lying around the 
street.’542 
Meanwhile, there was no a significant attempt to solve the crisis on the island. As a 
result of this, Ankara was making its final preparations to launch its ‘peace 
operation’ in Cyprus. This was going to be a turning point in the history of the 
Cyprus dispute and going to have an important effect on Anglo-Turkish relations.  
 The first Turkish Intervention on the island and the British Reaction 
to the Intervention 
 
By 19 July, the crisis was still unresolved. There were strong reports on the Turkish 
Military preparations in the southern Turkish city of Mersin, which indicates that 
Ankara would start a military operation very soon. As a result of this, Kissinger 
instructed Joseph Sisco, the Under Secretary of State, who was in Athens at that 
time, to go to Ankara to give his message to the Turkish government.
543
 In fact, the 
relationship between Kissinger and the Turkish Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, dated 
back to old times. In 1957, Ecevit went to the USA to study at Harvard University 
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and Kissinger was one of his lecturers at the University. Thus, they had known each 
other in better times. Later, Kissinger stated in his memoirs that ‘I was prepared to 
use that relationship but not to rely on it, much less to subordinate American policy 
to it. I am certain that Ecevit was following the same principles in his relation with 
me.’544 In his message to Ankara, Kissinger stressed that the US was extremely 
concerned about reports on the Turkish military preparations and said America did 
not approve a military operation in Cyprus. He also underlined there was still a 
chance to solve the problem by using diplomatic process.
545
  
However, Ankara was determined to make an intervention. While Sisco was in 
Ankara the Turkish navy was heading to Cyprus. When he asked ‘has the operation 
has been launched already?’ Ecevit replied that ‘it is about to begin. The planes are 
just about to take off.’546 After this answer Sisco left Ankara and what Ecevit called 
‘the peace operation’ started at dawn on 20 July547 through the landing of Turkish 
troops near Kyrenia.
548
 
The British government was shocked when they heard that the Turkish Military 
operation had started. Of course, there were intelligence reports on the Turkish 
military preparations and because of this, the British FCO sent a telegram to the High 
Commission in Cyprus to contact with Sampson and asked him to allow British 
civilians to move towards the SBAs in case of a military operation by Turkey.
549
 
However, they did not think that Turkey was going to start the operation on 20 July.  
According to British assessment, the Turkish Prime Minister just returned from 
London to Ankara and he would need a time to reach a decision.
550
 The British also 
thought that Turkey would not start a military operation while Joseph Sisco was in 
Ankara.
551
 Therefore, after the getting the news of the Turkish government’s action 
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Callaghan immediately summoned the Turkish ambassador Rıfat Turgut 
Menemencioğlu to Britain and told him that he very much regretted that the Turkish 
government had not informed him before their actions and he heard about the 
Turkish military operation from the radio news.
552
  
Callaghan seemed to be frustrated and added that ‘this was not how relations 
between co-guarantors should be conducted.’553 According to him, there was no 
attack against the Turkish Cypriots on the island and there was no necessity for 
Turkey to conduct a military operation to protect the Turkish community.
554
 
Menemencioğlu replied that he also did not know about his government action and 
heard about it on the BBC.   He also said that he would convey Callaghan’s message 
to his government.
555
 Furthermore, after the news of the Turkish military operation, 
Callaghan sent a flash message to the British offices and presented his immediate 
aims of the policy. Some of them were: 
(I) to protect British lives and property in Cyprus 
(II) to ensure the continued security of the Sovereign Base Areas 
(III) to put maximum pressure on the Turks to limit the fighting and to bring about a 
ceasefire at the earliest possible opportunity 
(IV) to get the Turks to issue a statement of intent that they wish to see the return of 
constitutional rule in Cyprus  
(V) to invite immediately the governments Greece and Turkey to hold talks in 
London.
556
 
 
Apart from these, Britain had also another immediate objective along with the US 
which was to ‘prevent a situation developing in which the Soviet Union could 
intervene.’557  
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Bülent Ecevit, Turkish Prime Minister, while talking to the press after the start of the first 
Turkish military operation in Cyprus. 
Source: Milliyet, 21 July 1974. 
 
From the angle of the Greco-Turkish relationship, Ankara had threatened military 
operation before in the 1964 and 1967 crisis but they were prevented by the 
intervention of the United States. Therefore, the Greek government seemed to think 
that, as happened in the past, the US would not allow Turkey to use the military 
option in Cyprus. Even when the Greek Ministry of Information was told about the 
movement of the Turkish fleet, they replied dismissively:  ‘there is nothing to worry 
about. The Turks have formed a habit of going out the sea every year or two just to 
breathe Mediterranean air and return home.’558 It seemed that the junta in Athens did 
not take the Ankara’s warnings seriously. Therefore, Greece was shocked when the 
news of Turkish military intervention on the island was reached to them.  
As a reaction to the Turkish move, the US ambassador in Athens had been said by 
the Greek government that Greece would withdraw from NATO and this decision 
was going to announce by the Greek Prime Minister.
559
 If Greece left NATO it 
would weaken southern flank of the organisation. Therefore, the Americans 
intervened and managed to prevent any announcement from the Athens about 
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withdrawing from NATO, but the US did not completely succeed in getting rid of the 
Greek government’s thought about quitting NATO.560 
Actually, the situation was serious. Apart from the NATO crisis, there was danger of 
a war between Greece and Turkey. Kissinger telephoned Callaghan and told him that 
the Greeks had informed him that if the Turkish troops were not withdrawn from the 
island ‘they would declare war on Turkey and also declare Enosis.’561 In that time, 
the US Under Secretary of State, Sisco, was in Athens and Kissinger told him to 
warn the Greek government that if they started a war, ‘all the US military aid would 
be cut off immediately.’562 After having the conversation with Kissinger, Callaghan 
sent message to the British Embassy in Athens and instructed them to contact with 
the Greek government at the highest possible level on behalf of the British 
government and warned them not to escalate the situation.
563
  
Callaghan also met the Greek Charge and explained that Britain had no prior 
information about the Turkish military operation
564
 and he stressed that the 
government should not take any counter action which would make the situation 
worse.
565
 Although Callaghan said that Britain did not know the Turks would attack 
on 20 July, the Turkish intervention in Cyprus caused public frustration in Greece 
towards the British government. It appeared that they were angry with Britain in not 
preventing the Turkish military operation. There were demonstrations on the streets 
and some of the protestors attacked the British Embassy in Athens. According to the 
Embassy reports, they were chanting slogans including Enosis and “British out”.566 
The crowd also started to throw stones on the Embassy building.
567
 
On the Turkish side, when Ankara decided to conduct a military operation in Cyprus, 
the Turkish government considered that Greece could respond militarily against the 
Turkish move. Therefore, the Turkish army closely observed any military movement 
from Greece. In other words, the Turks seemed to take the possibility of a war with 
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Greece into account before starting their action. When Sisco told Ecevit that Athens 
was ready to embark on war with Ankara in case of a Turkish intervention, Ecevit 
replied that ‘we had no intention of going war with Greece but if we are attacked we 
shall hit back.’568  Ankara used only 30 percent of its landing ships for the military 
intervention in Cyprus. The rest was on the western shores of Turkey facing Aegean 
Islands
569
 anticipating the danger of a possible Greek attack on Turkey.  
In fact, Ankara’s strong belief that Athens would launch an attack on them led to 
Turkey to hit its own forces mistakenly. On the second day of the operation, the 
Turkish General Staff got an intelligence report that a convoy of Greek ships was 
heading towards to Cyprus to help Greek Cypriot troops on the island.
570
 Upon this 
news, the Turkish naval and air forces attempted to stop the Greek ships which they 
had learnt about from the intelligence report.  
However, there were no Greek ships and the Turkish air force mistakenly attacked 
Turkish warships. In fact, the pilots saw the warships were flying the Turkish flag 
but they thought that this was a trick by the Greeks. In the end, the Turkish warship 
Kocatepe was sunk by so-called friendly fire and most of the soldiers lost their lives. 
It was true that Britain failed to solve the crisis before the conflict started. 
Nevertheless, Callaghan continued to work with Kissinger to stop the fighting in 
Cyprus by using the all available diplomatic means. For this purpose, tripartite talks 
between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom were considered by him.  He 
called Kissinger and said that he had a conversation the Greek Foreign Minister, 
Konstantinos Kypraios, and it seemed that the Greeks would not attend the talks until 
ceasefire had been arranged.
571
  
Kissinger replied that ‘more pressure had to be brought to bear on the Turks’572 from 
different diplomatic channels including the US, the UK and the Secretary General of 
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NATO.
573
 According to this idea, diplomatic notes to be delivered to Ankara needed 
to be stiff and to call for ceasefire by 22 July.
574
 He also suggested that Athens also 
should also receive similar diplomatic notes.
575
 Callaghan knew the seriousness of 
the situation and replied that ‘he would emphasise the grave consequences for all of 
any further continuation of hostilities.’576  
The United Nations was also worried about the situation in Cyprus. Thus, a 
resolution was issued by the UN which demanded a ceasefire from all parties and 
called upon Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom enter into negotiations without 
delay.
577
 The US, Britain and the UN continued to make effort for an immediate 
ceasefire. As a result of these efforts, Ankara announced that they had accepted a 
ceasefire in Cyprus on 22 July.
578
 Ecevit also made a statement and said that:  
The great victories of the Turkish Armed Forces in the days would be strengthened by 
the time the ceasefire came into effect. From now on, there would be peace, liberty 
and equality in Cyprus, and no one would be able to tamper with Turkish rights 
there.
579
 
 
After the ceasefire, Vienna was suggested as a venue for tripartite talks. Later, the 
Greek government told Callaghan that they preferred Geneva to Vienna.
580
 Callaghan 
spoke to Ecevit and the Turkish side also accepted Geneva. Callaghan also said that 
it was important that any talks should begin on the following day, 23 July. Turkey 
seemed not to show any objection to this idea.
581
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Clerides-Denktash meeting after the Turkish government’s acceptance of the cease-fire. 
Source: Milliyet, 24 July 1974. 
 
In the end, the call for a ceasefire was successful and the parties reached an 
agreement to attend a tripartite conference to find a solution to the Cyprus crisis. 
However, the ceasefire seemed to be ‘slow to take effect and appeared fragile.’582 
There seemed to be problem in bringing Greece to the negotiating table. The Greek 
Foreign Minister told the American ambassador in Athens that they would postpone 
their attendance of the tripartite talks because they asserted that there was a report of 
a Turkish bombing of the Nicosia airport since the ceasefire.
583
 Actually, the Nicosia 
airport was an important place on the island and Ankara wanted to take it under its 
control. However, Britain did not want the airport to be taken over by the Turkish 
forces. Therefore, the relation between the Ankara and London was tense. There was 
a small UNFICYP force at the airport which consisted of British, Canadian and 
Finnish troops.
584
 However, the Turkish army was so close to the airport and could 
make attempts to take over its control. As a result of this, the small UNFICYP force 
was reinforced by ‘British armoured cars and infantry from the Sovereign Base 
Areas.’585 Also, Callaghan called and gave an order to the British troops to stand fast 
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and not allow the Turks to go forward.
586
 In addition, Phantom aircraft were sent 
from the UK to Cyprus to give the British forces air cover.
587
  
In fact, this created the risk that there could be a fight between the British and 
Turkish soldiers which would make the situation very serious on the island. 
Callaghan spoke to Ecevit on the phone and they had an acrimonious conversation 
according to his later recollections.
588
 Callaghan warned the Turkish Prime Minister 
that the British forces on the island had received an order that ‘they would hold their 
ground and resist any further encroachment. If they were fired on they would 
respond.’589 The British seemed to be determined not to give up control of the airport 
at all cost. Actually, the situation was a bit complicated because different information 
was coming from the island. The Turks claimed that they had already taken the 
airport under their control because the Greeks were using it to send military 
reinforcements to Cyprus
590
 while the British were saying it was under the control of 
the UN forces, which mainly consisted of the British soldiers, and the Turkish forces 
surrounded it to attack.
591
 Apart from Callaghan, the British Prime Minister, Wilson, 
also called Ecevit. In their conversation, Wilson’s speech was perceived as 
threatening. Bülent Ecevit graduated from Robert College in Istanbul, where 
instructional language was English. Therefore, he could speak English fluently. 
Ecevit tried to explain the situation on the island to Wilson. It is important to show 
the some parts of the telephone conversation record to understand the British reaction 
well: 
… 
Prime Minister Wilson: 
... some very alarming news…? Your people tonight are going to conduct military 
operations against United Nations forces… which include British Forces who have 
been reinforced… their responsibility as well as fellow Europeans. I have to tell you 
that if that happens we cannot stand by. 
….. 
Prime Minister Ecevit: 
Our people have strict orders not to fire and not to cause any confrontation with any 
UN forces. Either British, Canadian or otherwise. 
Prime Minister Wilson: 
… Attack on the airport tonight… 
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Prime Minister Ecevit: 
No. No. I am telling you. Our orders to our people are to the contrary. No attacks to 
anyone in or around the airport. 
Prime Minister Wilson: 
… Military operation tonight on the airport by your ground forces… 
Prime Minister Ecevit: 
No. No. 
Prime Minister Wilson: 
No?? 
Prime Minister Ecevit: 
No. Because, well you see, … our information is based on different … I wish we could 
both go and see the situation by our own eyes. Our people claim, may be they are too 
optimistic, that they have already got control of the airport. The UN says “No, we 
have got control of it”. Whichever may be true, our military people are not going to 
attack at all. They have strict orders not to attack. 
Prime Minister Wilson: 
Your people have instruction not to attack on the airport tonight?? 
Prime Minister Ecevit: 
No. No. So that is the situation. 
Prime Minister Wilson: 
Well as long as this clear… just in case of any doubt, because it is difficult to hear one 
another, I have to say that on so far as any attack on the airport which could involve 
risk to any of the UN forces, we cannot stand by… Royal Air Force has instructions to 
present the attack. 
Prime Minister Ecevit: 
Yes. 
… 
Prime Minister Wilson: 
Well that’s better; that’s all right. As long as there is no attack on the airport tonight 
Prime Minister Ecevit: 
No. No. 
Prime Minister Wilson: 
That’s what we want to hear…592 
 
Although the Turkish government was not happy with the British government’s 
reaction to the crisis, they did not hold the control of the airport or make any attempt 
to take the control of it and the airport remained closed.
593
 Meanwhile, an important 
negotiation process in Geneva was beginning Geneva to find a solution to the 
problem. 
 The First Geneva Conference 
‘A gruelling cliff-hanger’594 
After intensive Anglo-American efforts, the British, Greek and Turkish Foreign 
Ministers came to Geneva to discuss future of the Cyprus issue on 25 July. The 
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meeting had been planned to be held earlier, but important developments in Greece 
caused a delay of the date of the Geneva conference.
595
 The Turkish Military 
operation on the island had shaken the authority of the Greek junta in Athens. The 
Generals could not take any military measurements against Ankara. As a result of 
this, the chief of the Greek armed forces called on professional politicians to form a 
government of national unity.
596
 The junta leaders appeared to think that while the 
Cyprus issue was in  a process of negotiation, it would best to hand over the 
administration to the people who had sufficient skill to get a successful result from 
the discussion over Cyprus. In the end, Constantine Karamanlis, who was the former 
Prime Minister and was living in exile in France, returned to Athens and formed a 
new civil government.
597
 Apart from Greece, there were also important 
developments in Cyprus. Nicos Sampson, who came to power after the coup on the 
island, resigned on 23 July and the New Greek Cypriot government was established 
by Glafkos Clerides.
598
 The replacement of the junta in Athens was welcomed by 
Ankara. The Turks thought that their intervention in Cyprus had made a significant 
contribution to the restoration of democracy in Greece.
599
 Even, the Turkish Prime 
Minister, Ecevit, indicated that: ‘When our operation began I said it would bring 
peace and democracy not only to Cyprus, but to Greece as well. My prediction has 
come true.’600 Ecevit also sent a message to Athens and congregated Karamanlis.601 
It seemed that before the Geneva conference the relations between the two 
governments had shown some improvement.  
On the other hand, from the Anglo-Turkish angle, the event which had happened 
after the Turkish military operation in Cyprus, showed that Britain and Turkey had a 
different approach towards the Cyprus issue. Firstly, Ecevit’s visit to London did not 
produce enough cooperation to settle the problem. Then, the Turkish military 
operation was not welcomed by the British government. Later, the Nicosia airport 
crisis enflamed Anglo-Turkish relations. Finally, when the all sides had agreed on a 
ceasefire and had started negotiations in Geneva on 25 July another problem 
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occurred. This was the allegations of breach of the ceasefire from the Turkish forces 
on the island. Callaghan appeared to show a strong reaction to it. Before the start of 
the conference, it was reported from the British Embassy in Athens that the Greek 
Foreign Minister had said that if the activities of the Turkish forces’ continued in 
Cyprus, ‘they would without doubt withdraw’ from the conference.602 On the first 
day of the conferences, this issue started the discussion.  
 
 
1 James Callaghan, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.  
Source: Milliyet, 1 August 1974. 
 
On the following day, Callaghan emphasized that ‘the ceasefire had to be 
implemented with monitoring by UNFICYP of further supplies and the movement of 
arms.’603 He also asked the Turkish Foreign Minister, Güneş, about the intentions of 
the Turkish government over the reinforcements in Cyprus.
604
 The Greek Foreign 
Minister, Mavros, also stated that he was still receiving reports which indicated 
Ankara’s breach of the ceasefire on the island.605 After these accusations, Güneş 
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replied that the Turkish Forces were not in Cyprus as an invading army.
606
 The 
Turkish forces were there to protect to security
607
 as a Guarantor power according to 
the 1960 Agreements.
608
 He also added that they did not meet to discuss ceasefire 
allegations and he said that ‘he could produce many such allegations against the 
Greek National Guards.’609 Güneş’s reply showed that according to the Turkish 
government’s opinion, there was an overreaction against Ankara on the breach of 
ceasefire issue. In particular, Callaghan’s approach could worsen the British 
government’s relationship with Ankara because on the first day of the conference he 
sent a telegram from Geneva to the FCO in which he demanded information about 
the most up-to-date strength of the Turkish forces on the island. He also asked for an 
assessment of whether any intervention by the Royal Navy could prevent Turkey 
from reinforcing its troops in Cyprus and ‘if so, how many ships would be required 
and whether this could be done within the existing United Nations mandate.’610 This 
was a risky move. Later, the British ambassador to Ankara, Horace Phillips, sent a 
telegram to Callaghan and explained the danger of such a move by the British 
government. In his assessment, Phillips tried to present the situation in Turkey. After 
stating that there was great support in the whole country for the government’s 
decision to intervene in Cyprus, the ambassador underlined that: 
The Turks did the military operation alone. Britain would not help. That is not widely 
held against us (though it is not forgotten). But that we should not have helped, yet 
now seem to be trying to stand in the way of Turkish consolidation, which to all Turks 
is unforgivable…. They are not aiming to annex Cyprus and they cannot understand 
why in our (as the Turks see it) anxiety to please Greece we should deny Turkey the 
right of secure its national interest in Cyprus.
611
 
 
As an answer to Callaghan’s opinion about taking action to prevent Turkey to supply 
its forces on the island, Phillips pointed out that: 
Her Majesty’s government will, I know, give the deepest thought to the grave 
consequences of any attempt by the Royal Navy with or without the US sixth fleet to 
blockade Turkish naval movements. The Turkish forces are on the ground in Cyprus. 
They need to be supplied. Even if they are reinforced, this cannot be a serious danger 
unless they are seen to be aiming to take over the whole island. There have been 
serious breaches of the ceasefire in similar circumstances elsewhere in the world. I 
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hope we will not get ourselves into a position over the ceasefire here which Turkey 
would regard as tantamount to war on it.
612
 
 
In the end, the British government did not use any military option to stop Turkey. 
However, the issue of the violation of ceasefire continued during the first two days of 
the conference and appeared to bring the talks to deadlock. Later, when the 
discussions were continuing in Geneva, Callaghan met William Buffum, the 
American observer at the conference. Buffum told him that Kissinger had sent 
messages to the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers, Karamanlis and Ecevit, to urge 
them to continue the talks at the conference in Geneva. In his message, Kissinger 
also emphasised the significance of the talks and told that a breakdown of 
negotiations could have unforeseeable consequences.
613
 Callaghan seemed to 
appreciate the American efforts. However, he was still thinking about the Turkish 
Army’s activities in Cyprus after the ceasefire was provided. In their conversation, 
Callaghan suggested that Kissinger might send another note to the Turkish 
government to ask about the reports on the advance of the Turkish forces in Cyprus. 
According to Callaghan’s opinion, despite the ceasefire, if the Turkish army 
continued to advance this meant the army ‘was in a state of rebellion in defiance of 
the orders of the Turkish government.’614 In the end, on 27 July, the Greek and 
Turkish Prime Ministers agreed to the adoption of a new ceasefire line which both 
sides’ forces accepted.615 
In fact, it was expected that the Geneva conference would end the crisis in Cyprus, 
but when it began, the ceasefire issue between the Greek and Turkey had already 
shown that it would not be easy to reach a compromise between the parties. As a 
result of this, Callaghan, who had worked hard to gather this conference, started to 
believe that it would be a very difficult process. After the first day of the conference, 
Callaghan stated in his report that ‘the tripartite meeting was heavy going.’616 He 
also said that ‘judging by tonight’s performance I am not very optimistic and it will 
certainly be very hard slog to get anywhere.’617  
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On 28 July, after finding a way to overcome the ceasefire issue, the parties started to 
focus on searching for a solution to the problem. A meeting was held between the 
delegations. They were trying to agree on a draft text for the agreement. The Turkish 
Foreign Minister, Güneş, told Callaghan that he had to send any draft text agreed in 
Geneva to Ankara to get approval.
618
 Güneş explained that ‘the Turkish government 
was in real difficulties with its Generals.’619 Therefore, any solution was also 
accepted by the Turkish Military.
620
 In that time, it was a fact that the Generals in 
Turkey were a powerful position and they could intervene in the Turkish political 
life. As mentioned before, Ecevit’s government was the first elected government 
after the Army’s intervention on 12 March 1971 but there was still a risk of a 
military coup in Turkey. Moreover, the military operation was also an important 
event for Turkey and any agreement in Geneva that would have a possibility to be 
interpreted by the public as putting the Turkish army into a difficult position in 
Cyprus could give huge political damage to Ecevit’s government. Therefore, the 
conference in Geneva was being closely followed by Ankara.  
Apart from the talks in Geneva, the leaders of the communities on the island were 
also stating their own opinion on the solution of the problem. Denktash said that they 
wanted Cyprus to remain an independent state. Therefore, they did not seek partition. 
However, it was stated that ‘autonomy for each community’s canton within a federal 
structure’ 621 was the Turkish community’s aim when searching the solution for the 
problem.
622
 This time, according to the British High Commissioner Olver the Greek 
side appeared to have a similar opinion with the Turkish Cypriot leadership.
623
 
By 29 July, the negotiations in Geneva had apparently turned into a struggle between 
Callaghan and the Turkish government. The Greek delegations were objecting to the 
Turkish government’s demands but there was a new government in Athens and it 
was not politically strong enough yet. Therefore, Callaghan appeared to find himself 
in a position of negotiating with Ankara to find a solution. When the three Foreign 
Ministers in Geneva agreed on a draft text which requested the implementation the 
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UN resolution 353 within the shortest possible time, Ankara raised an objection 
because one of the clauses of the resolution was demanding withdrawal of the all 
foreign military personnel without delay from the island.
624
 Thus, according to the 
Turkish government’s opinion, accepting such a declaration would put them under an 
obligation to withdraw their forces from Cyprus which would be regarded as the 
government’s failure in Turkey. Therefore, Ankara sent a slightly different draft to 
Geneva which did not specifically mention the UN resolution.
625
 On the phone, 
Ecevit even told the Turkish delegate, Haluk Ulman, in Geneva that: ‘I do not wish 
to see any mention of withdrawal in this agreement. I would rather you abandon the 
conference.’626 
After Ankara’s objection, the Greek Foreign Minister, Mavros, met Callaghan and 
said that he could not accept the Turkish government’s proposal. He was preparing to 
give a press conference ‘at which he would announce the failure of the talks and (his) 
departure.’627 Callaghan replied that he would give an ultimatum to the Turkish 
government to produce ‘a more reasonable formula on the paragraph relating to 
withdrawal (by) 30 July.’628 After this answer, Mavros agreed to stay on at the 
conference. Later, Callaghan met Güneş and delivered his ultimatum.629  One of the 
reasons for Callaghan’s move was that the negotiations had lasted for four days and 
three Foreign Ministers were in Geneva and it seemed that the time for ending the 
talks was still uncertain.  Callaghan indicated that: ‘I cannot stay here much longer. 
If we are going to issue a statement, let us do it as soon as possible.’630 Consequently, 
he considered that giving an ultimatum would force Turkey to accept a solution to 
the problem. Although a quick solution appeared to be important to prevent fighting 
on the island, it should be pointed out that Britain and Turkey were in a different 
situation at the negotiating table. The Turkish forces were on the island which made 
the Turkish government act more cautiously because Ankara did not want to sign any 
declaration which had the potential to show the Turkish forces in Cyprus as an 
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invasion force. It seemed that Callaghan did not fully understand the Turkish 
position. In his telegram to David Ennals, Minister of State at the FCO, Callaghan 
also confessed that he found it ‘hard to fathom Turkish motives and objectives.’631 
As a result of this, in his conversation with Güneş, he said: ‘I am not here to await 
your pleasure. I have other things to do’632 In another important development, 
Callaghan stated in his report that his meeting with Güneş made him understand that 
‘the only way they could reach an “agreement” in Geneva was to get rough and put 
maximum pressure on Ankara.’633 He also asserted that this idea had been advised by 
the British official in his party by the Turks.
634
 After deciding a new strategy, he 
asked ‘the American to exert maximum pressure on Ankara.’635 Thus, Kissinger 
spoke to Ecevit and urged him to accept an agreed declaration in Geneva.
636
 
 
2 Gerogios Mavros, Greek Foreign Minister.  
Source: Milliyet, 1 August 1974. 
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On the other hand, Callaghan’s ultimatum to the Turkish government seemed to have 
a negative effect on the Anglo-Turkish relations. It appeared that there was a 
perception among the Turks that Britain was on the side of the Greeks in the talks. 
Therefore, when the British ambassador to Ankara, Phillips, met Işık, the Turkish 
Minister of Defence and acting Foreign Minister, he needed to explain to Işık that the 
presumption by the Turkish government that the United Kingdom was favouring 
Greece was not true.
637
 In addition, Turkey’s Permanent Representative in Geneva, 
Coşkun Kırca, saw Charles Wiggin, Under-Secretary at the FCO and told him that he 
was instructed by the Turkish government to issue a formal protest against delivering 
an ultimatum to Ankara. He said that the Turks had acted with goodwill and ‘there 
was no ground for threatening them with ultimate.’638 
In the end, after long discussions, an agreed declaration was signed by three Foreign 
Ministers on 30 July. Through this declaration, most of the Turkish demands were 
accepted by Greece. Although the UN resolution was mentioned in the text, there 
was no specific time for Ankara to withdraw its forces from the island.
639
 Moreover, 
by referring to two autonomous administrations on the island, the declaration 
recognised the Turkish Cypriot Administration which existed since 1964.
640
 As a 
result, from the Turkish point of view, the result of the first Geneva conference was 
successful. In his message to the British High Commission in Nicosia, after the 
declaration, Callaghan also mentioned this situation:  
We do not underestimate the concessions made by the Greek side at Geneva. The fact 
is that the Turks showed themselves determined to exploit the mistakes made by the 
present Greek government’s predecessors. Both we and Americans have however 
made great efforts to get Turks to agree to a reasonable package. The declaration 
represents the best we could do for the time being, but it is only a first step.
641
 
 
Apart from these, it was also accepted that the talks would resume in Geneva on 8 
August at the official level to continue to search permanent solution for the 
problem.
642
 The representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities on the island 
did not attend the first Geneva conference. This was because the main aim was to 
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restore peace in Cyprus. However, the second talks would include the discussions on 
the constitutional question and inter-communal relations. Therefore, in the next 
stage, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives would join the negotiations.
643
 
In a cabinet meeting, Callaghan pointed out that in the first conference the Greek and 
Turkish Foreign Ministers expressed the view that they did not seek either partition 
or Enosis. Therefore, according to him, a federal solution might be possible.
644
  
Conclusion 
 
The negotiations between Greeks and Turkish Cypriots in the first half of 1974 were 
ended by the Greek coup in Cyprus. Their different approaches to the Cyprus 
question made almost impossible to reach an agreement with each other. As a result 
of this, Athens asked British officials to apply some pressure on the Turks to force 
them to reach an agreement with the Greeks. Although Britain knew that the talks 
between the communities was not going well, such an action from the British 
government could adversely affect its relation with Ankara because the Turkish 
government would assume that Britain was in favour of the Greeks. Therefore, the 
Greek demands were rejected by the British officials.
645
  
Essentially, the British government did not want to have a problem with Turkey over 
the Cyprus issue. However, the events after the Greek coup on the island did worsen 
Anglo-Turkish relations. Actually, the first reaction of both the British and Turkish 
governments to the coup in Cyprus was similar. Both heavily criticised the coup and 
declared that they would not recognise Greek junta as the legitimate ruler of the 
island. Nevertheless, there were some major differences in their approach to the 
situation on the island which affected mutual relations. Ankara seemed to be in 
favour of applying an aggressive policy for a solution to the crisis which included a 
military operation against the Greek junta on the island, but Callaghan’s message 
immediately after the coup to the Turkish government to warn the Turks to avoid any 
kind of intervention
646
 caused a disappointment on the Turkish side. Turkish Prime 
Minister Ecevit visited London but also did not manage to gain British support for a 
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joint military action on the island.  This widened any existing differences between 
British and Turkish policy on Cyprus. 
As a result of this, Ankara launched a military operation alone. Callaghan’s reaction 
towards the Turkish action was strong because he did not expect Ankara would 
actually take such an action while Britain and the United States were against it. 
Therefore, as mentioned, he told the Turkish Ambassador in London Menemencioğlu 
that he very much regretted that the Turkish government had not informed him 
before their actions and he heard about the Turkish military operation from the radio 
news.
647
 Furthermore, the Nicosia airport crisis on the island also negatively affected 
Anglo-Turkish relations.  
After the intensive efforts of Britain, the US and the UN, a ceasefire was reached on 
the island and a conference gathered in Geneva to settle the problem. However, the 
differences in the British and Turkish approaches at the conferences led to tension 
between the two sides. In particular, the Turks believed that Callaghan was 
supporting Greek allegations against the Turks. In addition, Callaghan’s attempts to 
prevent Ankara from reinforcing its troops on the island was a dangerous move by  
Britain which was probably only stopped by the British ambassador’s warning that 
such a move could start a war between Britain and Turkey.
648
 Nevertheless, it was a 
good example to see the poor level that Anglo-Turkish relations. The first Geneva 
conference ended with an agreement but it was fragile and the sides were resolved to 
meet again to find a permanent solution to the problem. 
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5) The second Turkish Military Action on the Island 
 
Introduction 
 
The first part of the chapter five examines the second Geneva conference and its 
impact on Anglo-Turkish relations. Developments after the first Geneva session are 
evaluated and the discussions at the second Geneva meeting are presented. This was 
an important event for both the solution of the Cyprus problem and the course of 
relations between London and Ankara. The first Geneva session had a negative effect 
on the mutual relations between the British and Turkish Governments. Therefore, an 
examination of the attitude of British and Turkish delegations at the second Geneva 
conference showed that if there was a change in the British and Turkish positions. 
In this context, the second part of the chapter looks at the end of the second Geneva 
conference and the beginning of the second Turkish military advance on the island. 
An evaluation of the second Geneva conference is made. The Turkish Foreign 
Minister’s assessment of the British Foreign Sectary Callaghan’s attitude towards to 
Turkish Government’s arguments is in this part of the thesis. 
The third section examines British and international reactions towards the second 
Turkish military operation on the island. Britain had stood against the first Turkish 
military action and clearly stated that it would not support such an action taken from 
the Ankara. Therefore, there is an assessment of the British government’s approach 
to the second Turkish military operations and its impact on relations between Ankara 
and London. In particular, the policy of Callaghan and Kissinger is examined. The 
international reactions towards the Turkish action is also the subject of this part 
which enables us to see both the similarities and differences of the British and 
international reactions to Turkey’s move on the island. 
The last section analyses the Cyprus question after the second Turkish military 
advance on the island. There were attempts to restart the negotiations between the 
Greek and Turkish communities. However, there was a new situation on the island. 
The Turkish side now demanded a federal solution. Therefore, the British 
government’s approach to the Turkish position is explored. Callaghan was one of the 
important actors in the Geneva peace talks. Therefore, the discussion on his position 
in future talks between the Greeks and Turks is also examined. 
138 
 
 The Second Geneva Conference: Callaghan’s Effort to Stop the Turks 
‘Ecevit had not sent his troops to Cyprus “to play football”649 
After signing the declaration, the parties left Geneva to prepare the second stage. 
From the Callaghan’s perspective, although he recognised that the declaration was 
not perfect, he stated it provided three major gains which were: 
(a) a commitment to a steadfast ceasefire; 
(b) an agreement on machinery for delineating the zone controlled by Turkish 
mainland forces; 
(c) an agreement on the principle of a buffer zone patrolled by UNFİCYP.650 
  
Callaghan’s efforts in Geneva were roundly congratulated.651 The British Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson conveyed his gratitude to Callaghan. According to him, 
although much hard work still remained, Callaghan had provided the essential 
starting point by the Geneva declaration.
652
 The US Secretary of State, Kissinger, 
also called Callaghan to offer his personal congratulations on the result of the first 
phase of the Geneva conference. Callaghan seemed to be pleased with the attitude 
towards his mission in the conference but he replied that he considered that ‘the 
second stage of the Cyprus talk would be somewhat different and slower moving.’653 
From the point of view of Anglo-Turkish relations’, the first Geneva talks showed 
that there was almost no common ground between the two countries on their Cyprus 
policy. After the end of the conference Callaghan asked Sir Michael Carver, Chief of 
Defence Staff, to send him a personal report about the future of Cyprus.
654
 After 
pointing out that it was not easy to reach a solution in the Cyprus issue,
655
 in his final 
words of the report, Carver presented the Turkish attitude as responsible for the 
problem on the island. In fact, Callaghan’s telegrams from Geneva to London about 
the process of the talks during the first conference were also generally criticising the 
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Turkish side. However, Carver’s opinion about the Turkish position in the Cyprus 
problem was more rigorous which indicated that the Anglo-Turkish relations over the 
Cyprus dispute were at a poor level. He said that: 
The Turks do not know the meaning of the word compromise. History has taught them 
that they cannot compete in wits or in argument with the Greeks. Their only hope 
resides in a stubborn refusal to budge, however long they may have to wait for results 
and however much they may suffer in the process.
656
 
 
This comment demonstrated that it would be very difficult for the Turkish 
government to get its offer of a solution accepted by not only the Greeks but also 
British at the second part of the Geneva conference.  
From the British point of view, because the first Geneva conference needed to be 
arranged as quickly as possible, it seemed that Britain did not have much chance to 
prepare. Nonetheless, British Foreign Office was preparing for the second stage. 
There were two main British aims which were stated as immediate and long term 
ones.  The immediate British objectives were: 
(i) to achieve as much progress as possible towards making ceasefire and buffer zone 
arrangements stick; 
(ii) to give  impetus, and if possible guidelines, to the constitutional negotiations; 
(iii) to establish a satisfactory machinery for the continuation of discussion at official 
level and for periodic ministerial involvement.
657
 
  
The immediate British objectives mainly aimed to provide and maintain the peace on 
the island. In this way, Britain would have an opportunity to apply its long term 
objectives in Cyprus by which the British government had planned to reduce its 
responsibility on the island. These objectives were: 
(i) to permit the gradual disengagement of HMG from the prominent position 
accorded to then in the 1960 agreements and the Geneva Declaration; 
(ii) to avoid perpetuating the work of UNFICYP-and Britain’s contribution to it- at its 
present level; 
(iii) to keep open our options on the Sovereign Base Areas.
658
 
  
Concerning about the Treaty of Guarantee, the FCO’s report indicated that it had 
often been regarded as a burden to Britain. It was said that:  
the Treaty of Guarantee binds us to uphold the state of affairs established by the basic 
articles of the Constitution which in practice we have been able to enforce. The new 
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constitutional settlement may require either a new Treaty of Guarantee, or 
amendments to the old. This would give us to slip out of being a Guarantor power.
659
  
 
The Geneva declaration at the end of the first talks was the outcome of a really tough 
process. Callaghan expressed the view that ‘both Greeks and Turks were at times 
inclined to say that they were prepared to face war rather than what they chose to 
categorise as “retreat” or “humiliation”.660 The British government knew that the 
second stage could be more difficult than the first one. This time, apart from Athens 
and Ankara’s delegations, there would be Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives 
at the negotiation table. It was stated in the FCO’s report that in this situation a 
danger that the ‘delegations would dig in for a very long session’ could emerge 661 
which ‘could enmesh us (Britain) in negotiations until 1974 or beyond’662. This 
would be an undesirable result for the British government. Therefore, Britain had 
planned to put strong pressure on the parties with the intention of preventing the talks 
from an impasse. For this purpose, a number of arguments were prepared to deploy 
to urge the parties to reach an agreement. Some of them were: 
(i) the risk of increasing Soviet interference; 
(ii) the threat to the economy of island; 
(iii) growing international criticism of Turkish military occupation; 
(iv)  criticism from the UN about the delay in implementing Resolution 353: risk of a 
special session of the General Assembly.
663
 
 
While the parties were preparing for the stage two of the Cyprus talks, the British 
High Commissioner on the island, Olver, sent a report to London and described 
situation in Cyprus briefly and gave his opinion about the second Geneva conference. 
The first point which he mentioned was the condition of the ceasefire on the island. 
He stated that there was good progress on the demarcation of the ceasefire line and 
said that this had prevented the Turkish forces advancing.
664
 However, according to 
him, this situation was quite fragile because the Turks did not manage to get what 
they expected and planned. This comment seemed to be a fair point since the Turkish 
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military operation had just lasted two days and then, the Turkish government had to 
accept the ceasefire on 22 July. As a result of this, the Turkish forces were simply 
holding a small part of the island. Another reason for the first Turkish military 
operation fell short of the Turkish hope was that the strength and number of the 
Greek Cypriot National Forces was far above the expected level of the Turkish 
general staff.
665
 Therefore, the High Commissioner suggested that Ankara could use 
any attack on the Turkish community in Greek-held Cyprus as an excuse to continue 
its military operation. Thus, he said it was important that the level of the inter-
communal temperature should be at a low level. To achieve this, he believed, it was 
important to avoid any long lapses or interregnum in the Cyprus talks.
666
 From this 
point of view, the High Commissioner indicated that ‘a long stalemate in Geneva 
would be particularly dangerous.’667 His final assessment was on the Treaty of 
Guarantee (1960). He suggested that Britain should get rid of the agreement because 
it was an important element in providing the pretext for the Turkish intervention.
668
 
Although Olver mentioned that the ceasefire issue was better, in his letter to the 
Kissinger, Callaghan once more complained about the continuing Turkish military 
encroachment in Cyprus. He also expressed the view that he would particularly like 
to talk with Arthur Hartman, the US Assistant Secretary of State for European and 
Canadian staff, in Geneva about ‘how both America and Britain could influence the 
Turkish government’s policies for the better.’669 
Ankara’s position and demands would obviously play an important role in the course 
of the second Geneva conference. Thus, Hartman spoke to the Turkish Prime 
Minister, Foreign and Defence Ministers. He did not openly threaten them but said if 
the Turks wanted America’s continued support, they would need to help the 
Americans by searching reasonable solution for the Cyprus problem. He also said the 
Greeks ‘should not be treated as conquered or humiliated.’670 The Turkish Prime 
Minister, Ecevit, was not affected by Hartman words and suggested that the United 
States should be thankful to Turkey for conducting a ‘surgical operation’ on the 
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island.
671
 Ecevit also said the Turkish solution was an autonomous region for the 
Turkish Cypriot community amounting to 30 per cent of the island.
672
 The British 
ambassador to Ankara, Phillips, also summarized the Turkish expectations from the 
second Geneva talks. He said ‘nation-wide there was no variation in the 
determination to hold on to what has been fought for.’673 According to his 
assessment, if Greece did not accept the Turkish demands and the talks failed in 
Geneva, the Turks would not mind. In such a case that the Greeks left the talks, the 
Turks would be able to present themselves as the blameless party and they would 
justify ‘any continued military activity by the Greek refusal to sit down and talk.’674 
Phillips was observing the situation in Turkey, and he also reported that: 
Rightly or wrongly, the Turks see themselves as holding the winning cards in Cyprus. 
They will not be dictated to by anyone, will not yield anything unless on reciprocity 
and will compromise only in so far as the security achieved by their military 
superiority is not put at risk.
675
 
 
The second Geneva conference began on 8 August. Callaghan gave a brief press 
conference on the first day of the talks. He complained that ‘the terms of the Geneva 
declaration had not been fully carried out.’676 Then, he met the Greek and Turkish 
Foreign Ministers. In these meetings, both parties criticised each other. First, Mavros 
accused the Turks of violating the ceasefire and then, Güneş complained about ‘the 
failure of the Greek Cypriot National Guard to evacuate Turkish villages.’677 The 
first two days of the conference, discussion would take between Greece, Turkey and 
Britain alone and by the 10 August, the representatives of the Greek and Turkish 
communities in Cyprus would be joining the conference.
678
 
From the Greek and Turkish point of view, they continued to have different offers for 
a solution to the problem in the second stage of the Geneva talks. The Greek Cypriot 
leader Clerides told Callaghan that ‘he could accept functional federation but not 
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geographical separation.’679 However, as the British ambassador in Ankara, Phillips, 
mentioned that the Turkish government had three principles not open to negotiation: 
(a) a sovereign independent Cyprus under a central government, 
(b) within this, geographic delineation of the two communities, 
(c) absolute autonomy for these.
680
  
 
It was clear that the both sides had made diametrically opposing demands. According 
to the ambassador, the Turkish Prime Minister, Ecevit, had met the US ambassador 
in Ankara to look for American understanding of their case. Although the United 
Kingdom government was one of the parties in the Geneva conference, Ecevit did 
not call the British ambassador to talk. Phillips’ evaluation of the reason for not 
being called by the Turkish government to discuss was ‘because the government in 
Turkey felt that the United Kingdom was swinging favour of Greece.’681 
On the third day of the conference, Callaghan had a meeting the UN Secretary 
General Dr. Waldheim. Callaghan told him that failure of the talks would most likely 
lead to continuation of the Turkish military action on the island. He said that ‘this 
would be a most serious step and one which would have implication for the UK as a 
guarantor power.’682 In fact, their conversation indicated that they appeared to 
believe that the second stage of the Geneva talks would not be able to produce a 
solution. Callaghan predicted that Turkish action might start as early as the week 
beginning 19 August.
683
  Dr. Waldheim replied that he would not the discard the 
likelihood of even earlier action.
684
 In point of fact, the Turkish Cypriot leader, 
Denktash’s words, in his meeting with Callaghan on the same day, seemed to be 
indicating the reason behind the Secretary of State, Callaghan and the UN Secretary 
General, Dr. Waldheim’s predictions for the possibility of the Turkish military 
action. Denktash told Callaghan that the objectives of the Turkish troops on the 
island were to ‘stop Enosis and to save the Turks. They had achieved the first but not 
the second.
685
 Callaghan did not want the Turks to start another operation in Cyprus. 
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This time, he was ready to use the British forces to prevent any Turkish military 
advance on the condition that The US and UN supported it.
686
 Nevertheless, America 
had its own internal problems at this time. The President of the United States, 
Richard Nixon, resigned on 9 August because of the Watergate Scandal. As a result 
of this, Hartman explained the US position to the British officials at the Geneva 
conference. He emphasised that: 
(a) if the Turks do take military action, there will be a major US  diplomatic effort in 
NATO and bilaterally to stop them, 
(b) the United States could not consider military action against the Turks: it was out 
of the question at a time when a US administration was taking office, 
(c) Kissinger does not consider threats of military action are helpful in present 
circumstances. Such gestures tend to generate problems for Ecevit with the extremists 
in Turkey.
687
 
 
After Hartman’s explanation, Callaghan stopped contemplating military action 
against a possible Turkish military operation and the action of reinforcements of the 
British forces in Cyprus was also suspended.
688
 
Clerides and Denktash met on 12 August. In this meeting, Denktash gave the Turkish 
proposal which was for two federated states and the Turkish sector to compromise 34 
percent of the territory of the island.
689
 Clerides rejected Denktash’s proposal. He 
said that acceptance of this plan was impossible for him. He believed that this would 
‘divide the island in two and turn it into a concentration camp for the refugees.’690 
After this reply from the Greek side, the Turks offered a cantonal system for the 
solution of the problem. According to the proposal, there would be six Turkish 
Cantons
691
 on the island which would cover 34 percent of the island.
692
 After talking 
with Kissinger and seeing the difficulties of getting a two federated states plan 
accepted by the Greeks, Ecevit decided to offer this cantonal solution, though the 
Turkish Cypriot and Turkish Foreign Minister Güneş were not happy with the offer 
because they believed that it would be difficult to provide security for of the Turkish 
community.
693
 Callaghan told Güneş that the Greeks had also rejected this Turkish 
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proposal. Ankara was ready to give a start to the second. On 13 August, a plenary 
session was gathered on which Güneş repeated the Turkish proposals and urged the 
Greek parties to give their final answer.
694
 Clerides demanded 48 hours to think it 
over.
695
 Callaghan also told Güneş that: ‘if the Greeks and Greek Cypriots were 
given 48 hours, they would work hard on their respective governments and would 
possibly return prepared to discuss the broad shape of a single Turkish Cypriot 
geographical zone.’696 Callaghan also spoke to Kissinger and asked him to put 
maximum pressure on the Turkish Prime Minister not to start military action in 
Cyprus.
697
 However, the Turkish side did not accept the Greek demand and they 
interpreted the Greek answer as a delaying tactic.
698
 Meanwhile, Ankara was waiting 
for a news from the Geneva Conference to start the second military operation in 
Cyprus. 
 
 The Turkish Foreign Minister, Turan Güneş, at Geneva.  
Source: Milliyet, 15 August 1974. 
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 The Failure of the Geneva Talk and the Second Turkish Military 
Intervention in Cyprus 
 
There was a very serious situation in Geneva. Kissinger again spoke to Ecevit on the 
phone and told him that the Greeks were insisting on a recess period for consultation. 
Ecevit replied that: ‘I have told you several times that I cannot keep the army waiting 
any longer. I cannot tolerate these continual delays’699 but, Ecevit made a new offer 
to Kissinger which required the Greek acceptance of the Turkish solution offered in 
principle at the Geneva conference
700
 and removal of any Greek forces from the area 
controlled by the Turkish forces ‘who occupied seven percent of Cyprus’ 
territory.’701 Ecevit told Kissinger that he was ready to delay several weeks, in case 
of acceptance of his offer by the Greeks.  
After his conversation with Ecevit, Kissinger contacted the parties in the conference 
and explained the Ecevit’s offer.702 Nevertheless, he did not manage to gain either 
Greek or Greek Cypriot support for the plan.
703
 Callaghan stated that the second 
Geneva conference did not have a formal end.
704
 On 14 August Wednesday at 02.20 
a.m., Callaghan asked the parties if they wanted to continue the talks. Clerides and 
Mavros replied yes, Denktash said ‘if Turkey comes, I shall be here also.’705 
However Güneş remained silent and did not answer Callaghan’s question. When 
Callaghan described this situation, he used harsh words to describe Güneş’s attitude. 
He said: ‘Güneş rose from the table at which we sat, ungracious as ever, and 
departed, followed by his aides.’706 This move by Güneş was the end of the second 
Geneva talks. The British and Greek delegations also left the conference and Turkey 
started its second military action on the island.  
The Turkish rejection of the Greek request for a delay of the conference to consult 
their governments about the Turkish proposal was an important cause of the failure 
of the Geneva talks. Later the Turkish Cypriot leader, Denktash, explained the 
reasons for the Turkish objection to an adjournment of the Geneva conference. 
According to him, the Turks thought that during a recess, ‘the Greeks might have 
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brought Makarios from London to replace Clerides.’707 He also said that ‘this was a 
dreadful prospect for us.’708 Secondly, he expressed the view that the Greek National 
Guard’s fortification on the island and flow of military supplies from Greece was 
another reason for the Turks to oppose to any delay in the Geneva talks.
709
 
In fact, the Geneva conferences were significant events which brought the three 
guarantor powers to the negotiation table.   Therefore, before beginning to look at the 
second Turkish military operation, it would be beneficial to analyse these 
conferences in terms of Anglo-Turkish relations.  It was a fact that the conferences 
were unsuccessful efforts that did not manage to bring a permanent solution to the 
Cyprus issue, but apart from that, the Geneva conferences also had a negative effect 
on Anglo-Turkish relations. In particular, Callaghan‘s attitude towards to the Turkish 
policy on the Cyprus problem was the most important reason for this situation.  
After the second Geneva talk, David Hildyard, UK Permanent Representative to the 
UN and other International Organisations in Geneva, met Turkey’s Permanent 
Representative in Geneva, Kırca. In this meeting, according to Hildyard’s report, 
Kırca told him that ‘whatever either side might have said in heat of the moment in 
Geneva, the Turkish government considered that Britain had been good and impartial 
mediators and hoped that Britain would continue to play the same role.’710 Hildyard 
also added that Kırca pointed out that ‘Britain has always shown understanding of 
the Turkish case.’711  
On the other hand, the Turkish side’s statements after the Geneva conferences did 
not match with Kırca’s explanations. Kırca might have assessed the situation from 
his own perspective or tried to use diplomatic language not to worsen the relation 
with the British government over the Cyprus dispute, especially when Ankara needed 
more international support while conducting the second military operation on the 
island because, contrary to Kırca’s words, the Turkish Foreign Minister Turan 
Güneş’s announcements after the second Geneva conference seemed to present a 
genuine Turkish view on the British government’s attitude at the Geneva talks. In his 
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interview with the German newspaper Die Welt, Güneş accused the British side and 
showed them as being responsible for the failure of the talks. David Dain, the First 
Secretary at the British Embassy in Bonn, reported that: 
‘Güneş blamed Callaghan for the breakdown of the conference and accused the UK of 
making it impossible to reach an understanding at the conference because of the one-
sided British attitude over Cyprus which had contributed to the hardening of the 
Greek position.’
712
  
 
Another argument by the Turkish Foreign Minister was that Callaghan was against 
the Turkish military existence on the island because this ‘would reduce the value of 
the British bases and would revive the earlier international discussion about the 
rights of the British to maintain their military presence in Cyprus.’713 It can be said 
that the personal relations between the Callaghan and Güneş were not on a good 
level. In particular, as mentioned before, Callaghan’s harsh attitude towards Güneş at 
the first Geneva talks might have led the Turkish Foreign Minister to criticize 
Callaghan in that respect. According to Dain’s letter to London, in the interview, 
Güneş also defended that during the Geneva conference, ‘Callaghan was interested in 
nothing other than removing Turkish forces from Cyprus.’714 He also added that the 
relations between the United States and Turkey were not affected adversely after the 
breakdown of the Geneva talk because the United States supported the Turkish idea 
of generating autonomous areas for the Turkish community on the island.
715
 Güneş 
had noticed during the conference distinct differences between British and American 
approach. He indicated that:  
the American position was essentially more understanding and flexible than 
London’s... not only United States but also the Soviet Union had shown more 
understanding for the Turkish position than had Mr Wilson’s government, whose pro-
Greek attitude had become daily more evident after the fall of the military government 
in Athens. In the United Nations Security Council debates on Cyprus, there had been 
no criticism of Turkish behaviour by the Americans and Russians. Only Britain and 
France had made speeches against Turkey.
716
  
 
From Callaghan’s point of view, he, of course, would not accept the allegation that 
his attitude was in favour of the Greek side but in his telephone conservation with 
Kissinger, Callaghan admitted that he had not put sufficient pressure on the Greek at 
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the second Geneva conference. He said that: ‘My own very strong view is that if I 
reproach myself with one thing it is that I did not put more pressure on the Greeks 
earlier than I did.’717 
On the other hand, while Güneş criticised British attitudes and praised American 
understanding of the Turkish position in the Geneva conference, the Greek side had a 
different opinion on the British and American role in the Geneva process. Makarios 
said that he was disappointed by the American approach to the Cyprus crisis. He 
expressed the view the view that the United States could have prevented the Turkish 
military action by exerting pressure on Turkey. Makarios also announced that he was 
pleased with the efforts of Callaghan and the British government.
718
 
After the failure of the second Geneva conference, Callaghan returned to Britain. A 
meeting was arranged in London at 10 Downing Street on 14 August to discuss the 
existing state of the Cyprus problem. In this meeting, Callaghan said that there would 
be no diplomatic solution for the Cyprus issue at the present. He indicated that the 
Turks were going to choose military action as the solution of the problem and he 
added that ‘there was no possibility of stopping the Turks from achieving their 
military objective.’719 He again mentioned that American willingness to take military 
action against Ankara was preventing Britain to act militarily.
720
 The Prime Minister, 
Wilson, was against any idea of using British troops without American and the UN 
help to stop the Turkish military advance in Cyprus. He told Callaghan that ‘if he 
was asked whether Britain was considering a major military role the answer must be 
no.’721 In the meeting, the question of any possible Turkish request of using the 
British Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus was also discussed. The Minister of State for 
Defence, Roy Mason, said that the Turks might want to use the SBAs to pass through 
them. Such permission from Britain would not be welcomed by the Greeks. In the 
end, it was decided that a diplomatic initiative would be taken with the other 
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governments included Greece, Turkey to ‘ensure that the neutrality of SBAs should 
be respected.’722 
The second Turkish military intervention in Cyprus started on 14 August. After that, 
the Turkish government issued a declaration which was aimed to explain that why 
Turkey decided to take such an action. After mentioning the Greek coup on 15 July 
on the island and the Turkish reaction to the coup, it was said that from the 
discussions at the second Geneva conference, Turkey realized once again that Greece 
would never renounce from its goal to unite the island with the Greece. It was also 
stated that the Greeks did not want to accept ‘the recognition of equal rights and 
opportunities and well deserved security to the Turkish Community.’723 The Greek 
attitude was presented as being responsible the existing situation on the island and it 
was indicated that: 
…under these circumstances, it has become obvious that all peaceful representations 
that have been cried out by Turkey with utmost goodwill and patience would not 
culminate in a positive result. Turkey has been compelled to take unilateral 
action…
724
 
 
Turkey was aware of the fact that there could be some strong international reaction to 
the second Turkish intervention. Therefore, to reduce any possible reaction, it was 
also underlined in the declaration that: 
This action is not against Greece. Nor is it against the Greek Cypriot community. This 
action is aimed at safeguarding the independence of Cyprus, securing peace and 
tranquillity for the Turkish and Greek communities and establishing a durable peace 
in the region.
725
 
  
On the first day of the military action, Ecevit also made a statement and said that ‘the 
operation will be completed in a very short time.’726 He also again underlined the 
view that Ankara did not have any intention of invading Cyprus. He indicated that 
the aim of the operation ‘was to save Cyprus and to put an end to the suffering the 
Turkish Cypriots have had to endure over the years.’727 
After the Turks started to conduct their second intervention, Callaghan spoke to 
Kissinger on the phone to evaluate the situation. When Kissinger asked Callaghan 
                                                     
722
 Ibid. 
723
 PRO: FCO 9/1921, ‘Turkish government Declaration’, registry no: 16, 16 August 1974. 
724
 Ibid. 
725
 Ibid. 
726
 The Times, 15 August 1974. 
727
 Ibid. 
151 
 
what his view on what the American and British stand was, 
728
 Callaghan already 
knew that there was nothing that could be done to change the situation on the island 
either militarily or diplomatically while the Turkish forces were already advancing. 
Hence, he replied Kissinger’s question that: 
Well, I was just thinking- I think in military terms; obviously the Turks will carry on 
until they have got this line that they have figured out on the map, let’s hope they get it 
quickly.
729
 
  
Kissinger said that he agreed with Callaghan’s judgment.730 The United Nations 
Secretary-General Waldheim’s thoughts on the course of the second Turkish military 
operation were also similar to Callaghan’s. On 14 August, he told the British Prime 
Minister, Wilson, that the Turks would continue their operation until they gained the 
control of the northern sector of the island.
731
 In fact, it seems that Callaghan was in 
a difficult position. After the first Geneva conference, an agreement was reached 
between the parties, though both sides accused each other of violating it. As 
mentioned before, Callaghan’s role in this process was praised by his own Prime 
Minister, Wilson, and the American Secretary of State, Kissinger. Although it was a 
fact that there was no great expectation that the second Geneva conference would 
find a solution to the problem, any possible agreement from this talk would have 
brought a relaxation to the region. From this point of view, the second Geneva 
conference was considered as an important event. Therefore, Callaghan might have 
felt sorry to have missed the chance to end the Cyprus dispute. However, after the 
second Geneva process had ended in failure, the new American President, Gerald 
Ford, personally told Callaghan himself
732
 and Harold Wilson
733
 that he was grateful 
for the efforts made by the British Foreign Secretary in the second Geneva talks. 
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Furthermore, the UN Secretary-General, Dr. Kurt Waldheim, also told Wilson that he 
appreciated Callaghan’s effort to achieve an acceptable compromise at Geneva.734 
Meanwhile, the Turkish military operation was continuing in Cyprus. On the third 
day of the intervention, Callaghan predicted that the Turks would hope to restart 
talks soon because economic burdens would lead them to do so. In addition, 
Callaghan emphasized the fact that that international pressure on the Turkish 
government would be also an important factor in forcing Turkey to end its military 
operation in Cyprus and resuming negotiations. In this respect, he thought that 
Ankara would want to settle before the United Nations General Assembly meeting 
on 17 September to avoid facing any possible resolution against them.
735
 In fact, the 
Turkish government had already planned to end its military operation in Cyprus. The 
Turkish Prime Minister, Ecevit, invited the British ambassador, Phillips, on 16 
August and told him to confirm to Callaghan that Ankara would be ending its 
operation by night and then, would be ready to continue talks at any time.
736
 
Callaghan expressed the view that Britain did not approve the Turkish decision of 
using military option, but he pointed out that the general the Greek Cypriot 
behaviour towards the Turkish community in the past provided an excuse for the 
situation on the island.
737
 Another point that Callaghan had to evaluate was the 
possible solutions to the Cyprus dispute after Turkish military action. In the second 
Geneva conference, the Greek side was against the Turkish proposal for the 
establishment of two different autonomous administrations for the both communities 
on the island which would be based on geographical separation.  
However, Callaghan thought that after the second Turkish military action, the Greek 
Cypriots might accept a geographical separation because there had already been huge 
population movements across the island from the both communities 
738
 while the 
Turkish Cypriots were moving the areas which were seized by the Turkish forces, the 
Greeks were moving other way round.  According to Ecevit’s statement, the Turkish 
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government already expected high number of voluntary movements of the Turkish 
Cypriots but he also said that the Greek Cypriots would not be forcibly expelled from 
the Turkish-held regions.
739
 As Callaghan remarked, this situation in Cyprus was 
establishing grounds for the geographical separation.  On the other hand, he also 
argued that the Greek side would not agree with the Turkish request for 34 per cent 
of the island because this amount was higher than the population percentage of the 
Turkish Cypriots. Therefore, he believed that the Turks would need to be ready to 
negotiate on the size of their sector, if they want the Greek to return to the conference 
table.
740
  
However, Ecevit told Phillips that some changes might have made in the Turkish 
proposals at Geneva if the Greek negotiated with them ‘sincerely’ but he underlined 
the fact that the second Turkish intervention had removed this possibility.
741
 This 
meant that Turkey would not accept any offer abandoning geographical separation of 
the two communities. Furthermore, Callaghan also mentioned that because of there 
was no determination to use force against the Turks, the actions outside Cyprus to 
stop the Turkish military operation would be confined to the diplomatic field.
742
 
The Turkish intervention ended on 16 August. Besides 30.000 Turkish troops which 
were accompanied by 200 tanks, the Turkish army also had a strong air support in 
this operation
743
 As a result of this, after three days fighting, the Turks gained control 
of the northern 36 percent of the island.
744
 Then, a ceasefire call was made by Ankara 
and it was stated that the Turkish government was ready to return to the conference 
table.
745
 Clerides replied to Turkey’s offer on behalf the Greek side and announced 
that the ceasefire had been accepted.
746
  
                                                     
739
 PRO: FCO 9/1927, ‘ Turkish objectives in Cyprus’, report sent from P. Mangold, Western and 
Southern European Section Research Department, to  Mr. Miles, South East European Department 
(SEED), FCO, 28 August 1974. 
740
 PRO: FCO 9/1921, immediate telegram (confidential) from Callaghan to Tehran, no: 346, 16 
August 1974. 
741
 PRO: FCO 9/1927, immediate telegram (confidential) from the British Ambassador in Ankara, 
Phillips, to FCO, no: 1006, 16 August 1974. 
742
 PRO: FCO 9/1921, op. cit. 
743
 PRO: FCO 9/2149, ‘Cyprus: annual review for 1974’, report from ‘the British High Commissioner 
at Nicosia to the Secretary of State for Foreign and commonwealth Affairs’, 21 February 1975. 
744
 Ibid.; Bölükbaşı, Turkish American Relations and Cyprus, p. 211. 
745
 The Times, 17 August 1974. 
746
 Ibid. 
154 
 
 The British and International Reaction to the second Turkish 
movement 
 
There were differences between the reactions showed towards the first and second 
Turkish intervention. Because the first Turkish military operation was generally 
considered to be a righteous action against the junta on the island, Ankara had not 
come in for so much criticism. However, after the second advance, world opinion 
seemed to turn against the Turkish government. In particular, the fall of the junta in 
Athens and the establishment of the Karamanlis government increased the 
international expectation that a solution would come from dialogue between Turkish 
and Greek governments. Therefore, it appeared to be difficult for Turkey to justify 
the reason for its second offensive in the international arena. Consequently, it was 
started to be regarded as an ‘occupation’.747 
As happened after the first Turkish intervention, which had started on 20 July, as a 
reaction to the second Turkish advance, the United Nations Security Council again 
adopted a resolution on 16 August by which the organisation recalled its resolution 
353 of 20 July and demanded the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cyprus.  It 
was stated that the Security Council was gravely concerned at the deterioration of the 
situation on the island. Furthermore, it was stated that the military action by the 
Turkish government was formally disapproved of by the United Nations.
748
 The 
Security Council resolution clearly showed that the United Nations did not recognise 
the Turkish excuse for conducting of the second advance on the island.  
,From Ankara’s perspective, Turkey’s Permanent Representative in Geneva, Coşkun 
Kırca, told his British counterpart, Hildyard, that the Turks could not accept the 
resolution. He also said that ‘the Turks could not agree that it should be in the 
background to any further meeting or that it should be mentioned any new 
agreement.’749 Accepting the resolution as a basis for the further negotiation would 
force Turkey to withdraw its forces from the island before reaching a settlement. 
According to Turkish opinion, there was no guarantee that any further negotiation 
process would bring a solution to the Cyprus dispute in a short time. When taking 
past negotiation processes between the two communities as a reference, it was most 
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likely that any further talks would not be easy. Therefore, the Turks thought that after 
the withdrawal of their forces, there was a danger that a long negotiation period for a 
settlement could have worsened the condition of the Turkish Cypriot community 
again which would render meaningless the purpose the past two Turkish military 
interventions. Kirca also accused the Greeks of expecting that Turkey would be 
forced to resign from its demands in the Cyprus issue by the rest of the world, 
particularly Western powers.
750
 He defended that this idea of the Greek side had led 
them to be unwilling to accept ‘the need for constitutional changes during the second 
phase of the Geneva conference.’751 
Apart from the Kirca’s explanation about the situation of the Turkish troops on the 
island, when Haluk Ulman, Ecevit’s foreign affairs adviser, and the Turkish Senator, 
Kamuran İnan, met the British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, David Ennals, in London, they also gave a similar explanation.  Ennals asked 
about the reduction and withdrawal situation of the Turkish troops by referring to 
Security Council resolution no. 360. Ulman replied that ‘the sooner an agreement 
could be reach on Cyprus; the sooner reduction would take place.’752 His answer was 
another example of the Ankara’s determination not to withdraw its forces from the 
island completely until reaching a settlement. 
Actually, the purpose of the visit of Ulman and İnan to London was ‘to explain the 
Turkish position and to hear the British view’753 on the course of the Cyprus 
problem. The Turkish side was also hoping that the British could use their influence 
to help to bring the parties back to the negotiation table. Apart from the withdrawal 
issue, Ennals also asked the size of the Turkish area in Cyprus. He also mentioned 
the Turks had previously announced that they requested for 34 percent of the island 
and added that ‘this was difficult to justify’754 because of the population rate of the 
Turkish community on the island. İnan replied that the Turkish government was not 
thinking of indicating any percentage at this stage and ‘the size of the territory issue 
should be subject to negotiation’755 between the parties. Although Ennals suggested 
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that without knowing the specific demand of the Turkish side they could not use their 
influence on Greek to any effect, the Turkish delegations refrained from giving any 
specific information about the territory issue.
756
 
When the first Turkish military operation started, the British government made it 
clear that it did not support the Turkish action. After the failure of the second Geneva 
talks and the beginning of the Turkish offensive, there was no change in the British 
response to the second intervention. In fact, the reactions of the British government 
were understandable because it was a general British policy that Britain had been in 
favour of searching for a solution for the dispute through the inter-communal 
dialogue and supported any initiatives taken in this perspective.  
The failure of the Geneva talks and the Turkish intervention could lead Britain to 
revise its policy over the Cyprus problem and not to take part in any future 
negotiation process, but Callaghan’s words after the Turkish military operation 
showed that there would be no major change in the British policy. He said that if the 
parties did not raise an objection, there would be no problem for him to continue to 
play a leading role in the search for a solution.
757
 Nevertheless, the only point 
Callaghan stated that Britain would be ready to continue negotiations ‘as soon as 
there was some assurance that these would be productive.’758  
The deadlock in the Geneva conferences might have led Callaghan to think like that. 
He said that before starting any future talks, he wanted to be certain that the Greeks 
Cypriots were not going to completely reject any offer of a solution based on the 
geographical separation of the two communities because Callaghan knew that 
Ankara would insist on its proposals, in particular, after the military operation in 
Cyprus. Therefore, any rejection from the Greeks (before resuming negotiations) 
meant that no agreement would appear in negotiations between the two communities.  
Callaghan also expressed the view the view that the Turks would need to be ready to 
‘negotiate seriously to reach a settlement rather than just proceeded by 
“ultimatum”’759 
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This was the Callaghan’s new strategy to reach a settlement in further Cyprus 
negotiations. After meeting with Henry Kissinger the British ambassador to 
Washington, Ramsbotham, reported to London that Kissinger found Callaghan’s 
ideas for the reopening the negotiation very positive. According to the British 
ambassador, Kissinger gave the impression that he would surely support it.
760
 He 
also expressed the view that Kissinger was happy with Callaghan’s acceptance of 
taking role in the further talks for the solution of the dispute.  
Sir Alan Goodison, Head of the FCO’s South East European Department, also made 
an assessment on the course of the British policy over the Cyprus dispute after the 
second Geneva conference. He pointed out the danger of the Soviet influence in the 
Eastern Mediterranean region and said that continuation of the Cyprus problem was 
giving greater opportunity to them to intervene in the region.
761
 Therefore, he said 
that the British interests ‘must lie in the achievement of a satisfactory settlement.’762 
Apart from the British government’s effort to find a settlement to the Cyprus dispute, 
there was another issue for the Wilson government to solve which was the 
evacuation of the Britons from the island.  
The Turkish military action also affected the British who were living on the island. 
Britain had two military bases in Cyprus. As a result of this, there were many British 
service families across the island and it was difficult to provide protection for them. 
Thus, the British government took a decision to return these families members, 
whose number was nearly ten thousand, to the United Kingdom.
763
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British government was helping the UK staff’s families who were evacuated from the island to 
Britain after the Turkish military operations.  
Source: PRO: FCO 77/248, ‘Evacuation of Embassy staff from Cyprus’. 
 
The reaction of Greece towards the second Turkish advance was important. Any 
counter attack from the Greek government could lead to a war between Turkey and 
Greece.  On the second day of the Turkish Intervention, the Greek Prime Minister 
Constantine Karamanlis made a speech addressed to nation on which he said ‘Greece 
would not go to war.’764 He also explained that why the Greek government would not 
launch an attack on the Turks. He said that the distance between Greece and Cyprus, 
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and the danger of risking Greece’s own defence were some of the important reasons 
for Greece to not to respond to the Turkish military action.
765
 
On the other hand, although Karamanlis’s message showed that Greece would not 
take military action against the Turks, the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson sent 
a personal message to him and said that he heard from the British ambassador to 
Athens, Sir Robin Hooper, that the possibility of ‘sending a military division by 
convoy to Cyprus was still under discussion in Athens.’766 Wilson indicated that: 
This would be a most unwise course…because it would increase risk of further 
Turkish force being sent to island and those already there moving yet further 
forward.
767
 
 
It was also stated that in case of an outbreak of war with Turkey after such an action 
by Athens, Britain and the United States could not guarantee that they would provide 
air protection for Greece against the Turkish air force.
768
 
Eventually, as Karamanlis stated in his speech, Greece did not use its forces as a 
response the Turkish intervention on the island and the Greek Cypriot National 
Guard Army also did not have enough power to stop the Turks. Therefore, Ankara 
did not face real difficulty while conducting its second operation. However, it was 
reported from the British High Commission in Nicosia that there were some rumours 
that preparations for guerrilla warfare was being made by armed bands in the Greek 
Cypriot area.
769
 Clerides indicated publicly that ‘this might happen, whether his 
government wished it or not.’770 The Turkish reply was strong those rumours. 
Denktash expressed the view that in case of any movement of guerrilla warfare 
against the Turks, the Turkish forces would continue to their advance until they 
gained control of the island.
771
 According to the British High Commission’s 
assessment, it was early to talk about any action from the Greek Cypriots armed 
bands against to the Turkish forces which it might never happen, though uncertainty 
in negotiations for the settlement could trigger it. The High Commission reported 
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that the danger for Britain was  in the case of any conflict, ‘potential guerrillas might 
try to use the SBAs as a haven for strikes the Turks or hope to embroil them with 
British and broaden the conflict’772 which could put Britain in a difficult situation. 
Although the Turkish government indicated many times that the purpose of the 
operation was to bring “peace” to the island, the Greek side never thought like that. 
According to the Greek government’s evaluation, the Turkish intervention in Cyprus 
was not a spontaneous decision by Ankara. During his visit to Paris, the Greek 
Foreign Minister, Mavros, asserted that  
The Turkish operation had been prepared for a year two previously, which 
demonstrated that the present Turkish regime was motivated by expansionism and 
shared certain characteristics with the Ottoman Empire.
773
 
 
This statement showed that how the Greeks looked at the Turkish military in 
intervention in Cyprus. There were huge differences between the Greek and Turkish 
approach. While the Turkish called it as “peace operation” the Greeks regarded it as 
“invasion”. 
As stated before, Greece also was not happy with the United States government’s 
reaction to the Turkish military operation. Actually, the American government knew 
that the Turkish intervention would have some adverse impact on relations between 
Athens and Washington. Hence, Kissinger sent a compassionate message to the 
Greek Prime Minister, Karamanlis, on 17 August and said that the United States 
government understood of his difficulties and ‘willing to help in finding a reasonable 
solution’.774 It seems that the empathetic message of Kissinger would not be enough 
to decrease the level of anger against the American government. It was also 
announced by the Greek Prime Minister that Kissinger also invited the Greek 
Foreign Minister Mavros, to Washington in order to discuss possible ways to settle 
the critical situation in Cyprus
775
 which was rejected by the Greek government. Apart 
from the people in Greece, there was also frustration among the Greek Cypriots on 
the island against the second Turkish advance. In parallel to Makarios’ explanations, 
which tended to present the American attitude as being responsible for the Turkish 
action, the Greek Cypriot community was also blaming the United States for what 
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happened in Cyprus.  As a result of this, there were anti-American protests on the 
island and the American ambassador to Cyprus, Rodger Davies was killed during the 
anti-American riot on 19 August by the one of the Greek Cypriot protestors.
776
 Henry 
Kissinger also sent a message to the Turkish Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit. In 
contrast to his message to the Greek Prime Minister, Callaghan sent a tough message 
to Ecevit. He notified him that the Turks would need to relinquish some of the places 
in Cyprus which they had taken during the second Turkish advance.
777
 Kissinger had 
also advised them to ‘return to the negotiation table.’778 
In fact, although there was no major reaction to the British government, it was 
generally difficult to say that the Greeks were fully content with the British efforts to 
stop the Turks. The Greek ambassador to London, Stavros Roussos, told the British 
Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Roy Hattersley, that ‘the 
Greek government had not been happy with the way Britain had interpreted its 
responsibilities in Cyprus.’779 However, when compared with the American 
government’s approach the crisis, which had strong military relation with Ankara 
and huge potential to affect the Turkish decision, the Greek side seemed to be 
pleased with the British government’s approach to handling the crisis. 
Apart from criticising the United States government, Greece had also complained 
about NATO’s position in the crisis. As mentioned before, after the first Turkish 
intervention, Athens made a movement to leave from NATO. This attempt was 
prevented by the United Nations diplomatic intervention. Nevertheless, as a reaction 
to the second Turkish advance, it was announced by the Greek government that 
Greek armed forces had been withdrawn from NATO on 14 August. The reason for 
this action was NATO’s failure to prevent the Turks from carrying out a military 
operation. However, Greece did not completely leave the alliance. There would be 
Greek participation in the political activities of NATO.
780
 The British government 
was not happy with the Athens’ decision. Callaghan said that ‘we hope that the 
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Greek decision may not be irrevocable.’781 Later, the Greek Prime Minister, 
Karamanlis, sent a letter to the British Prime Minister, Wilson, and explained the 
reasons behind the Athens decision. He said that the events happened in Cyprus 
showed that there was a ‘grave weakness in the fabric of the alliance.’782 He also 
expressed the view that NATO’s failure in preventing an armed conflict between two 
its members had given a damage to the Alliance’s credibility and also caused the 
effectiveness of the alliance against external threats to be questioned.
783
  
The decision by Greece could damage to the southern flank of NATO. Turkey and 
Greece were regarded as important members of NATO and the deterioration of their 
relations over the Cyprus issue would not bring any benefit to the organisation. As a 
result of this, Secretary-General of NATO, Dr. Josef Luns, decided to follow the 
situation closely. For this purpose, he was thinking of visiting Ankara, but he told 
Callaghan that the Turkish respond to his request had been negative.
784
 He said that 
after the Turkish reply, he started to think that Chief of the General Staff was in full 
control of the Turkish government.
785
 Callaghan indicated that he was not sure about 
Dr. Luns’ assessment since he suggested that the difficulties at Geneva had been 
because of the different approaches in the Turkish coalition cabinet between Ecevit’s 
the Republican People’s Party (RPP) and the National Salvation Party (NSP) rather 
than because of  disagreement between the cabinet and military.
786
 Although the 
influence of the Turkish army over the Turkish political life was an indisputable fact, 
Callaghan’s observation had also a point which was correct. Ecevit later explained 
that his government could not offer concessions to Greece to start the negotiations 
again after the second offensive because a political struggle inside the coalition 
cabinet had stopped the government from doing so.
787
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The Cyprus problem after the second Turkish military operation 
 
After the end of the second Turkish military advance, the important question in the 
Cyprus problem was that which measures would be taken to prevent any future 
conflict between the two sides and to bring a permanent solution to the dispute. From 
this point of view, the restarting of negotiations was regarded as an important step 
towards normalisation on the island. Callaghan stated that there was no problem with 
the Turks in terms of the resumption of talks. He said the Turks declared even before 
16 August that they would be ready to continue negotiations immediately.
788
 
However, Callaghan also added that the Greek side were most likely not to resume 
negotiations without any precondition.   
 
The situation on the island after the second Turkish advance.  
Source:  The Times, 17 August 1974. 
 
From the Greek perspective, asking for some concessions from the Turks before 
taking part in the negotiation table seemed to be understandable because they felt that 
their national pride was hurt by Turkish actions. In this respect, the Greek Foreign 
Minister, Mavros, also told the British ambassador, Hooper, on 2 September that 
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there was no possibility of resumption of talks ‘until conditions had been created in 
which an honourable settlement was possible.’789 The Greek Prime Minister, 
Karamanlis, also made a similar statement with Mavros. He said that ‘Greece could 
not and never would, accept a settlement in Cyprus which would be regarded as a 
national humiliation.’790 However, according to Callaghan, if the Greeks demanded 
preconditions, such as return of the Turkish troops to the 9 August cease-fire line, it 
was most likely that negotiations process would not be restarted.
791
 Callaghan also 
started to regard a bi-regional federation option as the basis of a durable solution in 
the Cyprus problem which was also defended by the Turks but he also said that in 
this case, the Turks would have to make some gestures, such as ‘the Turkish 
withdrawal from the formerly Greek part of the city of Famagusta and acceptance of 
the return of the refugees to their homes throughout the island.’792 According to him, 
these kind of gestures would help the Greeks negotiate on the basis of a bi-regional 
federation without endangering their domestic position
793
 because they would have a 
chance to show their people that not only they, but also the Turks were making some 
concessions to reach an agreement.  
Hilldyard reported to London after his talks with Kırca that the Turks seemed to 
accept the idea to make concessions which ‘could be claimed as a victory by the 
Greeks, and as a justification for returning to the conference.’794 However, Hildyard 
also mentioned that the Turks would not make concessions on their principle of a 
Turkish autonomous region and there would be no possibility to leave Famagusta to 
the Greeks, though the Turks appeared not to raise an objection to the return of the 
Greek Cypriots to their areas.
795
 The statements of the Turkish officials showed that 
the Turks were going to make some concessions to begin again negotiations. In his 
visit to London on 22 October, Denktash would also tell Callaghan that he accepted 
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that ‘in order to achieve a settlement he must make some concessions.’796 However, 
the concessions that the Turks would offer were not mostly likely to be as big as the 
Greek side expected. 
Callaghan also indicated that the British government would welcome the political 
pressures, which aimed to urge the parties to resume negotiations, whether from 
Western European countries or more broadly General Assembly.
797
 He said that lack 
of progress in proceeding talks would have its own danger. He explained that if the 
negotiation did not restart, the Turks could make another military move which would 
make the resumption of dialogue process much harder. Furthermore, Callaghan also 
said that the danger for talks could also come from the Greek side, as mentioned 
before, the risk of guerrilla activities by the Greek Cypriots or the risk of the possible 
Greek government military action against the Turks could adversely affect the efforts 
for the continuation of negotiations.
798
 
Callaghan appeared to have a point to worry about because by the beginning of 
September, there was still uncertainty in reactivation of the talks, though the 
ceasefire was accepted on 16 August.  The Turkish Prime Minister, Ecevit, told the 
British ambassador, Phillips, that in case of the Greek refusal of restarting talks, the 
two separate areas on the island would unavoidably consolidate their position 
without the connection with a central government.
799
 Denktash also suggested that 
there would be no any other option for him to declare the independence of the area 
held by the Turkish troops unilaterally in the case of the Greek refusal to start the 
peace negotiation with them.
800
 Mavros’ reply for the Denktash’s explanations was 
to say that the majority of the population in Cyprus were Greek and any ‘social 
upheaval and guerrilla warfare would make life difficult for the Turkish Troops.’801 
Apart from these discussions, there were still differences in the parties’ explanation 
of the negotiation process. Denktash told the press that he believed that a solution for 
                                                     
796
 PRO: FCO 9/1956, ‘Visit by Rauf Denktash, Vice President of Cyprus, to London, 22-23 October 
1974’, ‘record of conversation between the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
and the Vice-President of Cyprus at the Foreign and Commonwealth office’, 22 October 1974. 
797
 PRO: FCO 9/1921, ‘Cyprus’, immediate telegram (confidential) from Callaghan to certain posts 
and missions, no: 111, 30 August 1974. 
798
 Ibid. 
799
 PRO: FCO 9/1927, immediate telegram (confidential) from the British Ambassador to Ankara, 
Phillips, to FCO, no: 1006, 16 August 1974. 
800
 PRO: FCO 9/1927, ‘translation of Greek Foreign Minister Mavros’ interview with “Corriere della 
Sera”’, letter form the British Embassy in Italy to FCO’s Southern European Department, 28 August 
1974. 
801
 Ibid. 
166 
 
the Cyprus problem which was based primarily on geographical separation of the 
two communities on the island would be accepted by the Greeks. He also added that 
in less than one month’s time, the Greeks would be ready to begin talks with the 
Turks.
802
 However, the Greek Cypriot acting President, Clerides, made a completely 
different statement from the Denktash.  He said that there would be no negotiations 
before the return of the refugees to their homes and ‘they cannot accept negotiations 
based only on geographical federation’803  
Actually, the Turks did not disagree with the Greeks request for the return of the all 
Greek Cypriots to their home but Ecevit’s foreign affair advisor, Ulman, told the 
British Foreign Minister, Ennals that this would happen ‘when there was agreed 
solution’804 which appeared to mean that the Turks would not accept the Greek  
demand for the refugees. Ulman also added that they were not planning a forced 
population exchanged between the two communities on the island.
805
 After the two 
different announcements by Clerides and Denktash, the British Commissioner on the 
island, Olver, made a comment on the leaders’ explanations but his comment seemed 
to be one sided and tended to criticise only Denktash’ attitude. He thought that the 
reason behind the Denktash’s statement was likely to ‘sabotage negotiations by 
provoking Clerides into a tough counter statement.’806 He also suggested that by 
doing so, Denktash was preparing ‘the ground for the proclamation of an 
independent Turkish Republic of Cyprus.’807 Later, when Denktash spoke to 
Callaghan in London on 22 September, he asserted that Clerides agreed to the 
establishment of a bi-regional federation privately at Geneva, but he also said 
Clerides could not simply announce this publicly.
808
 Apart from Clerides, Makarios 
also indicated that he did not want a solution which would render geographical 
separation because, he meant that this type of settlement would require huge 
population transfers which was difficult to do.  Also establishing a geographical 
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federation without population transfers would cause many problems for the Cypriot 
people. Therefore, he believed that rather than being considered as a regional one, 
the Cyprus problem needed to be internationalised by bringing moral pressure on 
Turkey through the United Nations.
809
  
Callaghan was making plans to bring the parties to the negotiation table. He thought 
to send a British minister to Nicosia, Ankara and Athens to try to narrow the gap 
between them but he indicated that this plan would not be applied unless the 
American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, gave his support for it. Thus, 
Callaghan sent Sir John Killick, Permanent Under-Secretary at FCO, to Washington 
to assess Kissinger’s opinion on his plan.810 Killick told Kissinger about Callaghan’s 
plan to send the British Minister of State at FCO, Roy Hattersley, to the area to 
‘undertake shuttle diplomacy between three capitals.’811 However, Kissinger did not 
want to take part in the British plan by giving the American support but he added that 
‘if the United Kingdom were to carry out through its initiative on its own, he would 
give his blessing.’812 After learning Kissinger’s approach towards his proposal, 
Callaghan decided to cancel his plan. He also informed High Commissioner in 
Nicosia, Olver, about his decision and he added that other diplomatic means would 
be searched for so that negotiations could be resumed.
813
  
Later David Ennals, Minister of State at the FCO, sent a letter to Callaghan and 
asked permission to visit Nicosia. He argued that as one of the Guarantor power in 
the Treaty of Establishment, Britain seemed not to be active publicly in the Cyprus 
issue as they might have been. He said the main aim of his visit was to explore 
humanitarian problems. He also added that he would meet the community leaders 
Clerides and Denktash to talk about the course of further talks. He stated that his visit 
would demonstrate publicly ‘Callaghan’s continuing interest and concern in the 
Cyprus problem.’814 However, when Hattersley mentioned to the Greek ambassador 
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Roussos, about the British plan to send a British minister to Cyprus to look at the 
humanitarian aspect of the problem,
815
 Roussos thought that the plan had some risk 
for the British government. He believed that ‘Britain should keep its prestige 
intact’816 and added that: ‘if a ministerial visit could bring about results, it could be 
useful; but if not, Britain would simply incur blame from both sides.
817
 
While the efforts were continuing to reach an agreement between the Greek and 
Turkish sides in order to reopen the dialogue for a permanent solution for the 
problem, the Cypriot leaders Clerides and Denktash met on 6 September in the Ledra 
Palace UN conference area, Nicosia. This meeting was not intended to cover 
negotiations on the whole Cyprus dispute. At this stage, their discussions were 
mainly on humanitarian issues
818
. After the meeting, it was announced that there was 
an agreement between the two leaders on the certain humanitarian points and some 
of them were: 
1. to set up immediately a scheme for the general release of prisoners and detainees 
2. to exchange list of missing persons and to make every effort to trace them 
3. to give every assistance to the aged and infirm, Greek and Turkish Cypriots, who 
have found themselves isolated as a result of the hostilities.
819
 
 
It was also decided by Clerides and Denktash that they would held regular weekly 
meetings. 
The Turkish Foreign Minister, Güneş, seemed to be pleased with the start of the 
meeting between Clerides and Denktash. He said that these meetings were a new 
element which ‘would permit the revival of talks in more general.’820 
In his report to London, Derek Day, the Counsellor at British High Commission in 
Nicosia, also indicated that although some main issues, such as refugee problems, 
remained untouched, ‘this initial meeting had served a valuable purpose.’821 He 
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believed that ‘progress of lesser issues might improve the general climate’822 for the 
solution of the Cyprus problem.  
It seemed that it would take some time for Denktash and Clerides to start to deal with 
the whole Cyprus question because the parties appeared not ready for it yet. The 
Greek side did not completely focus on the reactivation of negotiations because of 
the election in November, which was won by Karamanlis in Greece. As a result of 
this situation, while going to London to discuss the situation in Cyprus, Clerides told 
in a press conference that he would not start any substantive negotiation unless 
consulting with the Greek government, and Archbishop Makarios in Athens
823
 to get 
a document presented an agreement on the framework of negotiations to which 
Clerides would follow while negotiating with the Turks. By requesting such a 
document, he might have also wanted to make sure about the Greek “red line” in 
talks before starting it. Thus, he could negotiate with the Turks according to that 
guideline. He emphasized that ‘he would not accept the role of the negotiator in the 
absence of a common line put down signed in writing and signed.’824 
Meanwhile, while the reactivation process was continuing, there was another 
important development in the Cyprus problem which was the return of Archbishop 
Makarios to the island on 7 December. Although “EOKA” had lost its power and 
influence after the Turkish military operation, before Makarios’ return, some leaflets 
were circulated signed “EOKA” in which they asserted that Makarios’ reappearance 
in political life would only bring division and strife between the Greek Cypriots.
825
 
The explanations indicated that the remaining “EOKA” member would continue to 
be oppose to the Archbishop’s political leadership.  
Actually, there had been a struggle between Right and Left wing groups among the 
Greek Cypriots over the return of Makarios. While the Left wing groups had given 
their support the Archbishop and politically attacked the acting President Clerides, 
the extreme Right wing groups preferred Clerides to Makarios.
826
 The Turkish 
Foreign Minister, Güneş’ opinion about the return of the Archbishop to Cyprus had 
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been also asked and he replied that ‘if the Greek community wanted Makarios as its 
head, the Turks would not be opposed’827 but he also added that he personally did not 
think that ‘Makarios was a valuable interlocutor to re-establish peace on the 
island.’828 The Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit’s answer to the question on the return 
of Makarios was in parallel with Güneş. Ecevit said that: ‘we are not interested what 
the Greeks do with him.’829 On the other hand, the Turkish Senator, İnan told 
Hattersley that he feared that return of Makarios could negatively affect any chance 
of finding a peaceful solution on the island. According to him, if Britain did not 
support his return Makarios would not make such a move. Hattersley replied that the 
British government was regarding the Archbishop as an elected President and it was 
impossible for it to prevent Makarios going to Cyprus.
830
 
Another problem on the island was the situation of the Turkish Cypriot refugees in 
the British Western Sovereign Base Area which put Britain in a very difficult 
situation politically. After the second Turkish Military operation the Turks who lived 
southern part of the island took refuge in the British base in this area in order to be 
safe. When Denktash met Callaghan in London, he asked Callaghan to allow the 
refugees in the British base to leave in a Turkish ship. The refugees would go firstly 
Turkey and, then to the north of Cyprus. Callaghan replied that the British 
government could not permit the refugees to leave without an agreement between the 
Turkish and Greek side on this issue because the Greek side would be strongly 
against such an action from the British government. He added that although it was 
humanitarian problem, the political consequences of such an action could not be 
ignored.
831
 Makarios explained to Callaghan the reason for the Greek refusal of the 
evacuation of the Turkish refugees from the British base. He said that if the British 
government agreed to remove the Turkish refugees, it ‘would in effect be helping the 
Turks to populate the Northern area vacated by Greeks.’832 However, as Callaghan 
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stated when he met with the Greek Foreign Minister, Mavros, that the British 
government was subject to strong pressure by Ankara to permit the evacuation.
833
 
The British ambassador to Turkey, Sir Horace Phillips, was also in a difficult 
situation. His New Year’s Eve party was publicly boycotted by the Turkish 
government and there were articles against him in the Turkish press. Later, when Sir 
T. Brimelow, the Permanent under Secretary of State for FCO, met Turgut 
Menemencioğlu, the Turkish ambassador to the United Kingdom, he criticized the 
Turkish official’s attitude towards the British ambassador in Ankara.834 
Furthermore, it was also difficult for Britain to hold thousands of refugees in its own 
base.
835
 Callaghan told Kissinger that this issue had become much more serious with 
the ‘onset of winter and the consequent deterioration of the Turkish refugees physical 
condition.’836 Also, there was still no hope for an agreement between Denktash and 
Clerides on the refugee problem in a short time. As a result of this, in the end, Britain 
had to accept to allow Turkish Cypriots to leave
837
, though it knew that this decision 
would cause vigorous protests among the Greeks and add further tension its relations 
with Athens.
838
  
Conclusion 
 
The British government knew that it would not be easy to reach an agreement at the 
second Geneva conference because of the different expectations of the Greek and 
Turkish sides. Therefore, British officials made preparations before the conference to 
ensure that there would be no deadlock in the discussions. However, the conference 
ended with a failure and this result was a disappointment for Britain.  Another 
disappointment was that the second Geneva conference actually made relations 
between the British and Turkish governments worse. In particular, Callaghan’s 
attitude at the conference led the Turks to think that Britain was in favour of the 
Greeks. Furthermore, while the second Geneva conference was continuing, 
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Callaghan’s plan to prevent a possible further Turkish advance on the island by using 
force, which was rejected by the Americans, showed the poor level of mutual 
relations by 1974.  
Additionally, the Turkish Foreign Minister Güneş’s statements after the second 
Geneva conference also demonstrated the distrust between London and Ankara. 
According to Güneş, the United States’ approach to the Turkish arguments on the 
Cyprus issue demonstrated more understanding than the British approach. As 
mentioned before, he also advocated that Callaghan’s position in the second Geneva 
conference ‘was nothing other than removing Turkish forces from Cyprus.’839 Later, 
Callaghan’s acceptance that he had not put more pressure to the Greek side840 was 
also an example of the British attitude toward the Turkish delegations at Geneva. 
Essentially, it was difficult for Britain to persuade Turkey to make significant 
concessions in the meetings because of Turkey’s strong bargaining power at the 
Geneva conferences. Turkey was also aware of this situation. Even if they refused to 
make concessions, Britain could not apply any military action against the Turks since 
Turkey’s location was so important to NATO. In such a scenario, NATO would lose 
an important member thereby strengthening the Soviet position in the region.  When 
the second Turkish military advance started on 14 August, Britain knew that the 
Turks could not be stopped because America opposed the use of force against the 
Turkish army. Nevertheless, Britain continued to criticise Ankara and expected that 
the Turks would end their operation shortly. The United Nations and the United 
States also stated that they disapproved of the Turkish action.  
After the end of the second Turkish military intervention, it was expected that 
negotiations between the communities would start again. In this context, Callaghan 
stated that he could be a mediator in  future talks between the Greeks and Turks, but 
there must be a guarantee that both sides would be ready to make some concessions 
to reach an agreement otherwise there would be no benefit in  continuing the talks. 
On the other hand, it seemed that it was difficult for Ankara to accept him as a 
mediator because of his performance in the Geneva talks.  
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Meanwhile, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots leaders, Clerides and Denktash, started 
to have meetings and discuss the Cyprus issue. The Turks were holding nearly 34 
percent of the island and would not accept a settlement which was not based on a 
federal solution. Britain did not issue a statement that it was against a federal solution 
because such a statement would only have made its relations with Turkey even 
worse. However, the negative British attitude towards the Turks would continue after 
the restart of inter-communal talks in 1975 which is analysed in following chapter. 
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6) The period 1975-80 in the Cyprus dispute and 
Negative Stability in Anglo-Turkish Relations 
 
Introduction 
 
The first section explores the Turkish policy on Cyprus after its military operations 
on the island in 1974. In this context, the political situation in Turkey is presented. 
Another significant point, “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” was declared on the 
island by the Turks in 1975.  This was an important development in the future of the 
Cyprus problem. Therefore, the reasons behind this Turkish decision are also the 
subject of the first part of the chapter. The Greeks were obviously not happy about 
the establishment of a new Turkish administration on the island because they 
regarded this Turkish move as a step towards the partition of the island. Apart from 
the Greeks, the British and international reaction to the Turkish decision is examined. 
In particular, the British High Commissioner’s reports on this matter are analysed in 
order to understand the British response the new Turkish administration. 
By 1975, the Vienna talks were started between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots by 
an initiative of the United Nation. Therefore, the second part of the chapter looks at 
the discussions between the communities. It should be pointed out that by 1975, 
while Ankara was still actively involved in the Cyprus dispute, the British 
government started to be less interested in the dispute. It seemed that because of the 
failure of the Geneva talks, in which Britain was actively involved, the British 
government lost its motivation and its belief that the Greeks and Turks would be able 
to reach an agreement with each other in the near future. However, the negotiations 
continued to be closely followed by Britain. As a result of this, British assessments 
of the Turkish position in inter-communal talks are investigated which enable us to 
compare to the British and Turkish policy on the Cyprus issue. 
From this point of view, the British evaluation of the Denktash-Makarios meetings in 
1977 and the Denktash-Kyprianou summit in May 1979 are examined in the chapter 
six. These were important events in the history of the Cyprus dispute because after 
these meetings, expectations of the solution of the problem increased. Therefore, the 
impact of these meetings on the Cyprus issue and the discussions between the Greeks 
and Turks are presented here.  In particular, there were Greek complaints about the 
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Turkish attitude in the negotiations. As a result of this, British opinion on the Turkish 
position while negotiating with the Greeks is evaluated in order to gauge the 
similarities and differences between the British and Turkish policy on Cyprus by 
1980. 
 The British Response to the Declaration of a “Turkish Federated 
State of Cyprus” 
 
By the end of 1974, developments showed that it would not be easy to find a 
permanent solution to the problem. Although Denktash and Clerides continued the 
negotiations, which were started in September 1974 to deal with the humanitarian 
problems on the island, it appeared that the talks would not produce a solution to the 
Cyprus issue in a near future. The political situations in Greece and Turkey were also 
making difficult for both countries to take major decisions in this process. The 
government in Greece, which was formed after the fall of the junta, was not 
politically strong. After the election in November, a new government came to power 
in Athens and tried to focus on the Cyprus issue.  
In Turkey, disagreements inside the coalition government resulted in the resignation 
of the Prime Minister, Ecevit, on 18 September, which led to a political crisis in 
Turkey. The political parties had difficulty in reaching an agreement with each other 
to form a new government in Ankara. In the end, President Fahri Korutürk, had to 
ask the Turkish Senator Sadi Irmak to form a government.
841
 Irmak became the 
Turkish Prime Minister on 17 November 1974 but his caretaker government, which 
remained until 31 March 1975, did not have the political power to take a major 
decision on Cyprus. Consequently, there seemed no great expectation about the 
settlement of the Cyprus problem. When Sir Alan Goodison spoke to Ecmel Barutçu, 
the Director for Cyprus and Greece in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he 
said that after the election in Greece in November, the negotiations for Cyprus could 
be accelerated but Barutçu mentioned the government crisis in Turkey and added that 
‘real negotiations must await outcome of elections’842 The British ambassador to 
Turkey also expressed the view that, because of the political crisis in Turkey, ‘no 
major decisions on either internal or external issue could be expected and this would 
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set back prospect for an agreement over Cyprus.’843 Furthermore, in its letter to FCO, 
the British Embassy in Ankara also stated that the Turks ‘have urgent problems to 
solve...in terms of their internal politics.’844 On the other hand, an unsuccessful 
negotiation process could cause other developments in the Cyprus issue. One of his 
interviews, the Turkish Chief of General staff, Semih Sancar, also ‘referred to the 
possibility of a third military operation if negotiations made no progress.’845  
In fact, the uncertainty in the negotiations also seemed to lead the Turks to 
implement their own policy for the settlement. The British High Commissioner, 
Olver, spoke to Denktash about the future of the island on 14 September. He also 
tried to understand that if the Turks had an intention to declare an autonomous 
Turkish Republic. Denktash explained that establishing an autonomous Turkish 
Republic on the island was his idea. He was planning to use this argument ‘as a way 
of putting pressure on the Geeks to negotiate.’846 However, Denktash said that his 
idea had not got the support of Ankara. Therefore, he assured the High 
Commissioner that the Turks were not planning to take such an action in the near 
future.
847
 On the other hand, Olver reported that the Turks continued to consolidate 
Turkish zone in the north and he added that ‘the Turkish lira was about to be 
introduced alongside the Cyprus pound.’848 
A new Turkish Republic was not established in Cyprus, but the ‘Autonomous 
Turkish Cypriot Administration’ was declared on 1 October 1974 which took the 
place of the ‘Turkish Cypriot Provisional Administration’ on 28 December 1967. 
This new administration established its own Central Bank and took important 
financial measurements on the island including local taxation.
849
 At the beginning of 
January 1975, Olver had a conversation again with Denktash and told him that the 
measures taken by the Turkish Cypriots in the northern Cyprus was being interpreted 
as a step towards separation of the island. Denktash replied that they did not have 
such an intention and their goal remained an independent and sovereign Cyprus 
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under a federal government
850
 on which the Turkish-controlled area needed to be at 
least 30 percent of the island.
851
 
Meanwhile, the negotiations between Clerides and Denktash were continuing. When 
both negotiators met again on 14 January 1975 with assistance of ambassador Luis 
Weckmann Muñoz, the special representative of the UN Secretary-General,
852
 they 
decided to start to discuss other aspects of the Cyprus problem.
853
 On the other hand, 
the United States pressure on Turkey was increasing for the solution of the problem. 
It seemed that the Turkish military operations adversely affected its relations with the 
US. As a reaction to the Turkey’s policy on Cyprus, the American Congress ‘passed 
a cut off of military aid to Turkey.’854 This decision was delayed by the president 
until 5 February 1975 ‘if the progress could be made in negotiations’855 between the 
two communities. It was also expected that Turkey would not send more troops and 
equipment to the island.
856
 In his conversation with Sir T. Brimelow, the Permanent 
under Secretary of State for FCO, Turgut Menemencioğlu, the Turkish ambassador 
to the United Kingdom also said that the ‘Turkish government were under pressure 
from the United States.’857 He added that Ankara was withdrawing a thousand troops 
from Cyprus and ready to take initiative on the other issues such as reopening of 
Nicosia airport.
858
  
However, the Turks could not make territorial concessions, mainly because of the 
political situation in Turkey. Therefore, the withdrawal of a thousand troops seemed 
to be a minor concession
859
 to prompt the negotiation and prevent the American 
embargo on military aid to Turkey which came into effect 5 February 1975.
860
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According to Goodison’s assessment, because of Turkey’s dependence on the spare 
parts for aircrafts, the suspension of US military assistance to Ankara would mostly 
affect the Turkish Air Forces operations. He stated that ‘the Pentagon estimated that  
the Turkish Air Force may run out of spares in the next three months and the Navy in 
six or seven months.’861  
The Turkish reaction to the American decision was also strong, apart from the 
closure of American military installations in Turkey
862
, the Turkish attitude towards 
the Cyprus issue also hardened.
863
 On 29 January, Denktash told Olver that ‘his 
Council of Ministers was indeed engaged in a plan for an early declaration of 
independence for the Turkish zone.’864 He added that this was a reaction to the 
American plan to suspend of its military aid to Turkey on 5 February.
865
 Olver also 
thought that after the American decision, independence for the Turkish zone in 
Cyprus would follow automatically.
866
 On the first day of the American embargo, 
Denktash was asked by journalists if he had any intention to declare an independent 
Turkish Cypriot State. Denktash replied: ‘We are already 98 percent in independent 
existence. So, whether we shall declare the remaining 2 percent today or tomorrow or 
within the next few months, is a matter for us to decide.’867 After this development, 
the British Prime Minister and the President of the United States, Ford, sent a 
message the Turkish Prime Minister and the President in which they said that any 
Turkish action to establish an independent area could cause a renewal of fighting on 
the island.
868
 Nevertheless, in the end, the ‘Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’ was 
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declared by the autonomous Turkish Cypriot administration
869
 at noon local time on 
13 February 1975.
870
  
The evaluation by the British ambassador Phillips suggested that, apart from being a 
reaction against to the American embargo, the Turkish decision on establishing a 
Turkish Federated state was also a reaction to the Greek side’s attitude in the 
negotiations. He said that the Greeks had ignored or rejected the gestures, such as 
withdrawal of some Turkish troops and offering to resettle some Greek refugees in 
the Turkish controlled northern part of the island, which had been made by the Turks 
to make progress in the inter-communal talks.
871
 Denktash also defended that 
Makarios’ unwillingness to solve the problem pushed the Turks to take this step on 
the island.
872
 The Turkish Prime Minister Irmak’s also made parallel statements with 
Denktash. He said that the decision was inevitable for the Turkish Cypriot 
community on the island after ‘the lack of reasonable response’ by the Greek side to 
their approach.
873
 
Furthermore, Phillips also mentioned that if the Greek hoped that the suspension 
American aid would force to the Turks to make major concessions in the 
negotiations, he said, the Turks would not give up their national interest in Cyprus 
because they regarded it as vital.
874
 In his speech in the Turkish Parliament, Melih 
Esenbel, the Turkish Foreign Minister, also said that the effect of the American 
embargo in the Cyprus issue would be contrary to the United States’ expectations 
from it.
875
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Upon the declaration of the new Turkish Federated State, Denktash gave a press 
conference, in which he also talked about the recognition issue. He said that; ‘For the 
moment, I do not need international recognition. I am not a separated state. I am the 
federated wing of the republic of Cyprus.’876 After the Denktash’s press conference, 
Olver expressed the view that the Turks seemed to be cautious ‘initially at least to 
avoid confrontation or provoking too fierce a world reaction.’877 Şükrü Elekdağ, the 
Undersecretary of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also assured the British 
ambassador Phillips that ‘the entity was not a state in the international sense.’878 
Ankara’s reaction to the establishment of  the ‘Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’ 
was positive, the Turkish Prime Minister, Sadi Irmak, stated that the Turkish 
government would respect the decision of the Turkish Cypriot. He added that the 
decision did not emphasize partition or Enosis but independence of the republic.
879
 
However, the American reaction to the Turkish Cypriot community’s decision was 
negative. It was announced that the United Sated was against unilateral actions on 
the island by either side which would make difficult finding a peaceful solution for 
the problem. The American statement also emphasised the fact that the United States 
was regarding the negotiation process between Clerides and Denktash as an 
important instrument in reaching any eventual settlement of the dispute and fully 
supported it.
880
 
Athens also showed a harsh reaction to the Turkish Cypriot move. The Greek Prime 
Minister Karamanlis said that the Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash’s answer to the 
Greek Cypriot plan for the peaceful solution was the declaration of a Turkish 
Federated State which, he expressed the view, ‘aimed at making permanent the 
partition of Cyprus.’881 He also mentioned that the Greek government considered the 
Turkish action as ‘illegal and contrary to international conventions and decisions.’882 
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From the British point of view, the Turkish action on the island was regarded as 
unwelcome development. In his statement in the House of Commons on 14 February, 
Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Hattersley, said that the 
British government deplored the action taken by Denktash.
883
 On the same day, 
Hattersley met the Turkish ambassador Menemencioğlu, and also told him that the 
British government regretted the Turkish decision. He complained that Denktash had 
made no formal communication to them prior to issue of his statement. 
Menemencioğlu replied that his government had instructed him to say that ‘Turkey 
accepted Denktash’s statement and supported him.’884 Hattersley also informed 
Menemencioğlu that although he stated in the House of Commons that Denktash’s 
action did not mean establishing a separate state, there was a strong feeling between 
the members of the Parliament that the situation on the island would lead de facto 
separation in the future.
885
 Hattersley also mentioned their concern for the British 
families and property in the north of Cyprus. Menemencioğlu said that he would 
convey the British concerns to the Turkish government.
886
 
Another matter for the British government was the official contact with the new 
Turkish administration. After the announcement of the new administration, British 
High Commissioner, Olver, asked London about what the British attitude would be 
towards the Turkish action. He underlined that there was a need for a public 
statement on this issue because, he said, there was a danger that some Greek Cypriot 
media would start to accuse the British of being in collusion with the Turks.
887
 It 
seemed that the British High Commissioner was right to worry about the Greek press 
campaign against them because the British ambassador in Athens also reported that 
some of the press in Greece had started to present the Turkish action as ‘British and 
the United States plans for partition.’888 
Callaghan sent a telegram to Olver and informed him about the British position after 
the declaration of Turkish Federate State. Callaghan indicated that there would be no 
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change in the British High Commissioner relations with the Turkish Cypriot 
community on the island. He said that because, as Denktash had stated, it was not a 
unilateral declaration of independence and the new Turkish Federated state 
considered itself as a part of the Republic, the High Commissioner Olver, ‘should 
continue to conduct business with Denktash as the Vice-President of the Republic of 
Cyprus’889 In the case of preventing any future initiatives from the Turks to seek 
formal recognition for their administration from the United Kingdom, Callaghan also 
instructed Olver to inform Denktash that any kind of formal recognition would cause 
Britain great difficulty.
890
 Later, the Greek ambassador to Turkey also told the 
British ambassador Phillips that the Greeks were satisfied with the prompt the British 
government declaration that they would continue to recognise Makarios as President 
of the Republic.
891
 The Greek ambassador to the United Kingdom, Stavros Roussos, 
also conveyed a similar message to Hattersley.
892
 
After the declaration of the ‘Federated Turkish Cypriot States’, Denktash told Olver 
that he was ready to continue the inter-communal talks, which had been suspended 
by the Greeks after the Turkish decision, whenever the Greek side wanted.
893
 The 
Turkish Cypriot constitutional proposals were announced in which the Turkish side 
stated that a constitution shall be made for ‘a bi-communal and bi-regional federal 
state.’894 The Turkish proposal did not get a support from the Greek side. In 
particular, the Turkish demand on the bi-regional federalism was criticised by the 
Greek Cypriots.
895
 However, both sides knew that the inter-communal talks had to be 
proceeded to reach a permanent settlement. Thus, the communities on the island was 
going to start the Vienna talks soon. 
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 The Vienna talks and the British Position 
 
The United Nations took an initiative to start a new dialogue between the two 
communities on the island once again. In this connection, the UN Security Council 
report on 12 March 1975 called for urgent resumption of the inter-communal 
negotiation on Cyprus.
896
 It seemed that with each passing day the rift between the 
parties’ solutions was widening. The British Cabinet Office’s Joint Intelligence 
Committee’s report on 13 February attempted to convey the general situation in 
Cyprus. It was stated that the Turks’ immediate goal was to strengthen their position 
in the north of the island ‘in which the Turkish Cypriots could live safely.’897 The 
report also suggested that there was a possibility that a solution could be found and 
the Greek also could accept it. However, the settlement would most likely need the 
Turkish demand for a bi-regional federation for any peace scenarios to be 
conceded.
898
 
Meanwhile, a right-wing coalition government, which was called as the first National 
Front, was formed in Turkey and Demirel became the Prime Minister on 31 March 
1975. The new Turkish government’s approach towards the Cyprus question would 
be important for the solution of the problem. In his interview, the new Foreign 
Minister Çağlayangil expressed the view on his government policy on Cyprus. He 
said that it was vital that any solution in Cyprus must be permanent so that ‘the 
problem did not blow up again a few years later.’ Therefore, he regarded bi-regional 
solution in Cyprus as essential to achieve this aim. He also stated that ‘Turkey’s 
stand was not rigid and the frontier between the two regions in Cyprus was 
negotiable.’899 
After the UN’s call for dialogue, efforts were increased to arrange a meeting between 
the leaders Clerides and Denktash. However, the Greek Cypriot leader, Clerides, told 
Olver that he was planning to resign his post as a Greek Cypriot negotiator.
900
 Olver 
reported that the reason for the Clerides’ action was his political struggle with 
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Makarios who had returned to the island on 7 December 1974. Olver expressed the 
view that while Makarios talked about ‘a long struggle and resistance to fait 
accompli’, Clerides did not want to take all the blame for any results from inter-
communal talks which could show him up a as traitor who made concessions to the 
Turks.
901
 
After having been informed about the Clerides’ intention to resign, the British 
government prepared to take some actions to persuade him to withdraw his 
resignation. In this connection, the British High Commissioner, Olver, was instructed 
by the FCO to express the Secretary of State’s ‘regret and deep concern’ to 
Clerides
902
 but they heard from the UN Secretariat that the UN Special 
Representative in Nicosia, Luis Weckmann Muñoz, had spoken to Clerides who told 
Weckmann Muñoz that he would continue to be the negotiator ‘if an announcement 
were made quickly about the resumption of talks in Vienna.’903 Upon this 
information, the British decided to suspend their action.
904
 Later, the British 
ambassador in Athens informed FCO that the Greek Prime Minister, Karamanlis, had 
talked to Clerides and asked him to continue as a negotiator in the inter-communal 
talks.
905
 Furthermore, in his statement, Makarios also declared his support for 
Clerides
906
 and said that he ‘would not accept the resignation if it came.’907 
On 7 April, The UN Secretary-General, Waldheim, expressed the view in a press 
conference that the negotiations between Clerides and Denktash would resume. He 
said that there was no exact date for their meeting yet but it would take place in the 
Vienna at the end of the April.
908
 One day after this statement, the UN Secretariat 
announced that the talks would begin on 28 April.
909
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The British government regarded the Vienna talks as an important step towards a 
solution of the problem. As a result, it was planned that the talks would be closely 
monitored through the British Embassy in Vienna. However, the embassy had not 
been closely involved in the talks on Cyprus until that time.
910
 Therefore, FCO 
decided to send Miss Maeve Fort, who was the First Secretary in SEED, to Vienna to 
help the embassy with observing the talks.
911
 Callaghan also gave importance to the 
Vienna talks. He instructed Olver to convey his message to Makarios that ‘he 
regarded these talks as a new opportunity which should not be missed.’912 Callaghan 
also sent a similar message to Clerides and Denktash and the Greek and Turkish 
Foreign Ministers in which he ‘urged a flexibility and serious approach in the Vienna 
talks.’913 
On the other hand, although the Vienna talks were regarded as an important 
development, it was stated by Hugh Travers Morgan, Assistant Under-Secretary of 
State for superintending SEED and SWED at the FCO, that ‘the prospect for the 
resumed talks was uncertain.’914 According to the assessment, a bi-regional solution 
was the major Turkish precondition for the negotiation and it was believed by the 
British that Clerides was also prepared to discuss this issue in the talks. However, the 
UN Secretariat sources argued that there was a possibility that Makarios would not 
allow Clerides to discuss a solution based on a bi-regional federation. Therefore, the 
UN Secretariat thought that the Greeks might consider the Vienna talks as no more 
than exploratory which could cause a rapid breakdown.
915
 Furthermore, it was also 
pointed out that there was also no great expectation that the Turks would have a 
willingness to discuss ‘the key question of the extent of the area of Turkish control 
which could cause the Greek Cypriot reaction.’916 In his letter, Morgan also 
mentioned the British position in the Vienna talks and suggested that Britain would 
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continue to send messages of encouragement to the main participants but would not 
be in the centre of stage in the process.
917
 
The High Commissioner, Olver, reported that Denktash was also pessimistic about 
the prospect for Vienna who believed that Clerides did not have real freedom of 
negotiation and his resignation threat had failed to get this.
918
 Furthermore, Denktash 
mentioned that there was a little common ground between the each side approach to 
the problem. However, he added that he would continue to negotiate to prevent 
immediate breakdown of the talks in Vienna.
919
 
The first round of the Vienna talks was held on 28 April-3 May
920
 under the auspices 
of the UN Secretary-General Dr Kurt Waldheim.
921
 In his opening statement, 
Waldheim expressed the view that he attached very great importance to the talks in 
making some progress towards settlement of the problem.
922
 In the first day 
discussion in Vienna, Denktash said that he could only make a reduction in the extent 
of the Turkish-controlled area if the Greek Cypriots did not want a powerful central 
government. Otherwise, he would not agree any reduction in Turkish position on the 
island.
923
 
In the session on 2 May, Denktash made an offer that he would agree to ten thousand 
Greek Cypriots settling  in the Greek villages behind the Turkish lines, in return for 
freedom of movement of the Turkish Cypriots in the south (which meant, in effect 
that they could go to the north). However, Clerides rejected this offer.
924
 Sir Denis 
Laskey, the British ambassador in Vienna, reported that, in this session, Clerides 
seemed to lose hope that the talks would produce a solution and said that he did not 
see any point in continuing the negotiations because he believed that in the second 
round of the talks in June, Denktash would only offer minor adjustment to the 
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Turkish line.
925
 However, by the efforts of the UN Secretary-General, Waldheim, 
Clerides decided to continue the negotiations.
926
 
In his meeting with Miss Fort, who had been sent by the FCO to Vienna on 30 April, 
Clerides also complained about Denktash’s attitude in the talks. He argued that the 
Secretary-General had made various proposals on the refugee issue but Denktash was 
simply taking notes and saying that he would refer this matter back to his advisers for 
advice. Therefore, according to Clerides’ evaluation, it appeared that Denktash did 
not have full authority to negotiate.
927
 Later, the Greek ambassador in London also 
called R. Francis Cornish from SEED, FCO and told him that the Greek government 
was not happy with the Turkish side’s attitude in the Vienna talks.928 
The first round of the Vienna talks ended on 3 May. The most important outcome of 
these meetings was the acceptance of the establishment of an expert committee to 
discuss the power and functions of the central government. The committee would be 
consisting of three Turkish Cypriot and three Greek Cypriot members.
929
  
In the meantime, after the end of military junta rule in Athens, the Greeks were 
trying to strengthen the democratic regime in their country.  However, the British 
High Commission informed London that according to the rumours, the danger of a 
military coup in Greece and Cyprus persisted. In particular, the communist party on 
the island, AKEL, argued that there were still pro-junta sympathisers in Cyprus 
among the Greek officers of the Greek Cypriot National Guard forces. Nevertheless, 
Makarios did not seem to be affected by these rumours. According to him, ‘so long 
as there was no coup in Greece, there was no danger of a coup in Cyprus.’930 
While Clerides and Denktash were preparing for the meeting in Vienna on 5 June, 
Kissinger told Callaghan that the Americans were trying to push the Turkish Prime 
Minister Demirel to give up some territory in Cyprus in order to reach an agreement 
with the Greeks. Demirel’s reply was that taking such an action without achieving 
any diplomatic success would put him very difficult situation in Turkey politically. It 
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seemed that Demirel thought that if he gave up some territory, it would be regarded 
by the public in Turkey as losing what had been gained from the Turkish military 
operations at the time of Ecevit’s government. Callaghan said to Kissinger that the 
evacuation of the Greek forces from the island could be used by Demirel as a 
diplomatic success of the government. Kissinger was thinking differently. According 
to him, the Turks needed the American embargo to be lifted before ‘they could begin 
to move.’931 
Meanwhile, before the beginning of the second round of the talks, Denktash stated on 
that the constitutional sub-committee, which was established at the first Vienna talks, 
needed to present its report on ‘the subject of powers and functions of the central 
government’932 to start the second round of the negotiation in Vienna.  He also told 
Olver that there was no point to the UN Secretary-General’s efforts to begin the talks 
on 5 June because, he said, there would be no achievement without a report from the 
sub-committee.
933
 Nevertheless, he added that ‘if the Secretary-General insisted on 
going ahead, then he would attend the meeting.
934
 
The second round of the Vienna talks started on 5 June and lasted two days until 7 
June.
935
 When the second round of the talks started, there was no much hope that it 
would be productive. Furthermore, there seemed danger of an early breakdown 
because of the parties’ pessimistic statements about each other’s approach. However, 
Waldheim was happy with the atmosphere in the second round because, contrary to 
the expectation both side’s attitude appeared to be positive and there was not an early 
breakdown.
936
 In this meeting, Denktash offered a joint transitional government 
which would administer the country’s foreign policy, health and finance. There was 
no certain answer from Clerides, but they have agreed to examine the proposal in 
detail in Nicosia.
937
 On the issue of the adjustment the Turkish-controlled area on the 
island, Denktash again gave an explanation that because of the restraints imposed by 
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the internal political situation in Turkey, ‘he was not in a position to put forward 
territorial proposals.’938 Archbishop Makarios was pessimistic about the prospect of 
the talks.  In his meeting with the High Commissioner, Olver, he indicated that it was 
not possible to make arrangements over the central government without ‘some 
knowledge of what the Turks would offer over territory and refuges.’939 
The third round of the Vienna talks was held on 31 July-2 August.
940
 There were 
some discussion on the transitional joint government but the parties could not make a 
progress on this matter.
941
 The most important result of these meetings was the 
acceptance of voluntary exchange of the population between the two communities 
‘under the organised programme and with the assistance of UNFICYP.’942 On 1 
August, Denktash told that agreement had been reached in the talks that nine 
thousand Turkish Cypriots were going to move the north Cyprus while eight hundred 
Greek Cypriots could return back to the Turkish-controlled north of the island and 
‘ten thousand Greeks already in the north would be allowed to stay.’943 The United 
Nations Secretary-General stated that: ‘there was an important step forward in the 
talks of representatives of the Greek and Turkish population groups of the 
Mediterranean island.’944 
The fourth round of the talks was held in New York on 8-10 September
945
 which 
resulted in complete failure. On the first day of the meetings, it was announced that 
the talks was delayed to provide more preparatory discussions between the both 
sides. Waldheim was going to meet Clerides and Denktash and it was expected that 
the talks would start on the next day.
946
 On 9 September, the negotiations again could 
not be started because of the different approach between the two communities’ 
representatives. It was stated by the UN officials that the talks would begin on the 
next day but ‘there was little optimism about the chances of progress.’947 It appeared 
that the main problem was that lack of the Turkish proposal on ‘territorial 
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withdrawals as expected by the Greek Cypriots.’948 As mentioned before, it seemed 
that American embargo and the political situation in Turkey was making the Turkish 
government reluctant to made new solution offers in the negotiations.
949
 On 10 
September, there was a brief meeting between the two sides. The disagreement 
continued and the Cyprus peace talks were suspended in deadlock. After the meeting, 
in his statement to reporters, the Greek Cypriot negotiator, Clerides accused the 
Turkish side of not submitting a proposal for the Turkish soldiers’ withdrawal. He 
also stated that ‘the fault was not with the Turkish Cypriot leader, Denktash, but with 
the Turkish government.’950 According to him, without the proposals, there would be 
no discussion of the substance of the Cyprus issue. Therefore, the Greek Cypriots did 
not see any point to attend the further round of the talks whose possibility was left 
uncertain.
951
  
 
 Denktash-Makarios meetings and “the Four-Guideline” agreement 
‘A solution would take at least weeks or months.’
952
 
The failure of the meeting in New York had increased tension in the Cyprus problem. 
Denktash told press that a unilateral declaration of independence would be declared 
by the Turkish Cypriots without making any territorial concessions in the Turkish 
position on the island if he was not allowed to speak at the United Nations and any 
resolution passed from the General Assembly against the Turkish Federated State of 
Cyprus.
953
 Later, Denktash continued his argument and stated that the independence 
of the Turkish administration on the island was ‘seriously under review.’954 
Apart from the Greek side, the announcements of Denktash also worried the British. 
The Secretary of State, James Callaghan, sent a telegram to the British Embassy in 
Ankara and instructed them to contact with the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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to have an interview with the Turkish Foreign Minister, Çağlayangil, or in his 
absence at the highest possible level and say that Callaghan ‘was deeply concerned 
over the statement of Denktash on the unilateral declaration of independence.’955 He 
also wanted the Turkish government to be informed that he regretted the breakdown 
of the inter-communal talks without an appointed day for resumption between the 
two communities. According to him, a declaration of the independence of the north 
of the island would ‘render negotiation process for the solution of the problem far 
more difficult.’ Therefore, the Turkish government needed to make every effort to 
prevent such an action from the Turkish Cypriots on the island.
956
 Callaghan also 
instructed the British officials in Cyprus and Athens to inform the Greeks that he 
issued a grave warning to the Turkish government.
957
 The Greek Foreign Minister, 
Bitsios, was content with Callaghan’s attitude and asked the British ambassador in 
Athens, Richard, to convey his gratitude to the Secretary of State for his ‘prompt and 
helpful response.’958 Similarly, the Greek Cypriot side also expressed ‘deep 
appreciation’959 to the British reaction to the Denktash statement. Callaghan’s 
reaction to the possibility of declaration of independence of the Turkish 
administration on the island showed that there was a huge difference between the 
British and Turkish Cypriot policies on the Cyprus issue while the British policy was 
standing closer to the Greek Cypriot arguments. 
When the British Counsellor in the British Embassy in Ankara, Lane, saw Şükrü 
Elekdağ, the Under-Secretary of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he 
conveyed Callaghan’s message to him. Elekedağ seemed to be cautious, when he 
was talking with the ambassador about the Denktash’s statement. He said that ‘there 
was no change in the Turkish government’s policy’960 which supported ‘the 
independence and territorial integrity of the island.’961 Elekdağ also expressed the 
view that Denktash was never encouraged by Ankara to make his announcement.
962
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After this conversation, Lane reported that there was ‘no sign of enthusiasm in 
Turkey at the prospect of a Turkish Cypriot unilateral declaration of 
independence.’963 
On the other hand, there were some different opinions inside the coalition 
government in Turkey. The Deputy Prime Minister and the leader of the National 
Salvation Party, Necmettin Erbakan, stated that the Turkish Cypriots needed to 
declare their independence ‘if the Greek did not accept the Turkish conditions.’964 
However, the Turkish Foreign Minister expressed the view that ‘the Turkish 
government would continue to attach great importance to the independence and 
sovereignty of Cyprus.’965 The Turkish ambassador in London also made similar 
statement to Goodison, Head of SEED, and assured him about the Turkish policy 
over Cyprus.
966
 
Eventually, after the statements of the Turkish official, Morgan, Assistant Under-
Secretary of State for superintending SEED and SWED at FCO, accepted that the 
possibility of a Turkish Cypriot unilateral declaration of independence was weak but 
he also emphasised that in the event of such a proclamation, the British government 
would ‘issue a strong public statement condemning the action.’967 
In the meantime, the uncertainty in the resumption of the talks was ended after an 
agreement was reached in Brussels between the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers 
on 12 December 1975.
968
 In a press conference, it was indicated that the both 
Ministers would support the United Nations Secretary-General’s initiatives for 
resumption of negotiations.
969
 As a result of the efforts, the fifth round of the Vienna 
talks between Clerides and Denktash started on 17 February and lasted until 21 
February.
970
 Broad discussion was made on both territorial and the constitutional 
issue during the fifth round of the Vienna talks.
971
 Clerides and Denktash agreed that 
after the meetings, both sides would exchange their written proposals through the 
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Special Representative of the United Nation Secretary-General Javier Pérez de 
Cuéllar and the Greek Cypriots were going to submit their proposal ten days before 
the proposal from Turkish Cypriots one to allow them study on the Greek proposal 
and then, submit theirs.
972
 However, after Greek Cypriots submitted their proposal, 
the Turkish Cypriot demand to see it caused a crisis. Clerides admitted that he took 
his own initiative and agreed that the Greek side was going to submit their proposal 
ten days before but he did not inform the Greek Cypriot government who thought 
that two sides were going to submit their proposal simultaneously.
973
 After this crisis, 
Clerides resigned from his post as negotiator on 7 April.
974
 After that, Tassos 
Papadapoulos was appointed as a new representative of the Greek side. Initially, the 
Turkish Cypriots did want to accept him as a negotiator because he was a former 
EOKA member and was regarded by the Turks as an extremist.
975
 However, in the 
end, the Turks accepted him as the negotiator but insisted that the Turkish Cypriots 
would be presented by a person with the same status.
976
 Later, Ümit Süleyman Onan, 
the Deputy President of the Turkish Cypriot Constituent Assembly, was appointed as 
the Turkish Cypriot interlocutor.
977
 After the fifth round of the Vienna talks, the talks 
could not be resumed and were interrupted for over a year.
978
 
The negotiation between two communities restarted after Denktash sent a letter to 
Makarios on 9 January 1977 via Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General 
in Cyprus, Perez de Cuellar, to have a direct meeting under the UN auspices to 
discuss all aspects of the Cyprus problem.
979
 Denktash also wrote a letter the UN 
Secretary General to inform him about his proposal
980
 on which he indicated that 
‘valuable time had been lost and he hoped that a way could be found to hold further 
inter-communal talks.’981 According to the United Nations Secretariat, Makarios first 
reaction to Denktash’s offer was fairly positive.982 The Archbishop told Perez de 
Cuellar that he expected that Denktash would have a full authority to take decision if 
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the talks resumed. The Special Representative expressed the view that Denktash’s 
letter ‘was drafted in close consultation with the Turkish Embassy’ 983 on the island 
which meant that the Turkish government also wanted to resume the meetings 
between the two communities. Furthermore, the Turkish ambassador in London also 
informed Reginald A. Hibbert, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, on 18 January 
that the Turkish government welcomed the prospect a meeting between the two 
communities’ leaders and ‘hoped that it would soon take place.’984 Later, it was 
announced that the both leaders were going to meet in Nicosia on 27 January at 
UNFICYP Headquarters.
985
 
In fact, in his talks with Turgut Tülümen, Director-General for both Greek and Greek 
Cypriot Affairs in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the British ambassador 
Phillips, was told that the Turkish Foreign Ministry was agreeably surprised by 
Makarios’ acceptance of meeting with Denktash.  ‘Ankara instructed Denktash to be 
as flexible as possible.’986 The reason that why Ankara was surprised by the 
Makarios’s action was because as the British High Commissioner in Cyprus, Donald 
McDonald Gordon, stated that Denktash had sent similar proposals to Makarios 
before which had not been replied by the Archbishop. However, Gordon argued that 
Makarios’ positive response to Denktash’s latest call seemed that Makarios started to 
think that ‘a reasonable compromise with the Turks would serve his own interest.’987 
Gordon pointed out that after his election victory in September 1976, Makarios 
proved that he was the unchallenged political leader of the Greek Cypriot part of the 
island. Therefore, after strengthening his position in the south, Gordon thought, the 
Archbishop accepted the invitation to meet Denktash to ‘attempt to reach a 
settlement with the other side of Cyprus.’988 
The first meeting between Denktash and Makarios took place on 27 January as 
planned before. According to Perez de Cuellar information, there was a good 
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atmosphere in the first meeting but ‘it mainly dealt mainly with generalities and 
future procedures.’989 It was also planned that a further meeting would take place on 
12 February under chairmanship of the United Nations Secretary-General 
Waldheim.
990
 After the first meeting the two leaders issued statements. Makarios’s 
explanations suggested that ‘the result of meeting justified neither excessive 
optimism nor great pessimism but there was still a considerable distance between the 
two sides.’991 Denktash indicated that ‘the discussion had been constructive in a 
sincere atmosphere.’992 In the meeting, Makarios asked Denktash about the 
percentage of territory which the Turkish side wanted to have if an agreement was to 
be reached on a bizonal base. The Turkish Cypriot demand was thirty two percent of 
the island. Makarios replied that there would be no agreement on such a percentage. 
Denktash said that this percentage could at least be taken as starting point for talks. 
Makarios also expressed the view that the Turks could have more territory in a 
solution based on a multi-regional rather than a bi-zonal one.
993
 Actually, this 
meeting was important because after a long interruption, the parties had a new 
chance to exchange their ideas on the solution of the problem. The following points 
were mainly discussed in the first meeting: 
a. On the constitution, Makarios accepted the concept of a federation, but not a 
confederation of two essentially separate states. 
b. On territory, Denktash said that Turkish Cypriot property amounted to 32.8 percent 
before 1974 and so the Turkish Cypriot region should be not less than this. Makarios 
is believed to consider 25 percent as a reasonable starting-point for bargaining. 
c. Both sides accepted the concept of package deal. 
d. Denktash accepted in principle freedom of travel, settlement and employment, as 
long as the requirements of Turkish security were met.
994
 
  
The UN Secretariat thought that the meeting of the two leaders on 27 January would 
provide an opportunity to establish future negotiation structures.
995
 Ankara was also 
content with the atmosphere in the first meeting. The Turkish Ministry of State and 
Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Seyfi Öztürk, issued a statement after the 
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meeting on which he indicated that the Turkish government was supporting 
continuation of the Denktash-Makarios talks.  It was also pointed out that the 
proclamation of the further meetings with the attendance of the UN Secretary-
General, Waldheim, was welcomed with great satisfaction by Ankara.
996
 The Turkish 
Foreign Minister, Çağlayangil, also made similar statements and he added that: ‘the 
negotiations being conducted between the two communities at the highest level, with 
no prior conditions, will provide the shortest path to reaching a positive 
settlement.’997 
The second meeting between the two leaders was held on 12 February 1977. In a 
press conference after the meeting, Waldheim stated that it had been agreed by the 
parties that the inter-communal negotiations were going to resume between the two 
communities in Vienna at the end of March under the chairmanship of the United 
Nations Secretary-General.
998
 The High Commissioner, Gordon, said that although 
Waldeim did not talk about the details of the meeting, his speech line was 
optimistic.
999
 Makarios expressed the view that after the meeting, although he 
maintained his cautious approach, he became more optimistic for a prospect for 
solution.
1000
 According to the High Commissioner, Gordon, Denktash showed less 
optimism who stated that ‘a settlement could be reached in a year or eighteen months 
if all went well.’1001 In fact, there was a difference in the parties’ meeting place 
choices. Makarios suggested New York as a meeting place and Denktash, Nicosia. 
Then, ‘Vienna had been a compromise.’1002 In his own evaluation of Denktash-
Makarios meeting on 12 February, the High Commissioner Gordon indicated that 
formalisation of brief ideas, which was discussed on 27 January, was the main 
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success of the meeting of the two leaders on 12 February. He added that this would 
allow the negotiators to move ahead.
1003
 
Both leaders had agreed on some guidelines which would be a basis for future 
negotiations between the two communities:  
1. We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, Federal Republic. 
2. The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in 
the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership. 
3. Questions of principle like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and the 
right to property and other specific matters are open for discussion taking into 
consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain 
practical difficulties, which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community. 
4. The powers and functions of the Central Federal government will be such as to 
safeguard the unity of the country having regard to the bi-communal character of the 
state.
1004
 
  
The British High Commissioner Gordon called on Candemir Önhon, the Turkish 
ambassador on the island, to discuss with him Denktash-Makarios meeting on 12 
February. Önhon expressed the view he had seen Denktash immediately after the 
meeting and ‘he had seemed to be content with the outcome.’1005 The ambassador 
also mentioned that he had urged Denktash to be ‘restrained and moderate at his 
press conference’1006 after the meeting. At the end of his conversation with the 
British High Commissioner, Candemir Önhon also again mentioned that although 
there had been some minor adverse comments, the general reaction in Turkey 
towards the outcome of the meeting ‘had been quite satisfactory.’1007 The meeting in 
Vienna between two communities would be an important occasion in terms of the 
Cyprus problem. However, Brian Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General of the United 
Nations for Special Political Affairs, told David Logan, the British diplomat in the 
UK mission at the United Nations in New York, that because of the election in 
Turkey, which would be held in June, it was unreasonable to expect major progress 
in the meeting in Vienna.
1008
 Nevertheless, the decision to hold a meeting in Vienna 
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at the end of the March could be regarded as success of the Denktash-Makarios 
meetings. 
 
The Turkish Cypriot leader, Denktash; The United Nations Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim 
and Archbishop Makarios. Picture from the High-Level Meetings in Nicosia in February 1977.  
Source: Milliyet, 14 February 1977. 
 
 
 The Denktash-Kyprianou Summit in May 1979 and the Cyprus 
problem by 1980 
‘This is a crucial moment.’1009 
The Vienna meeting started on 31 March 1977 between two communities under the 
auspices of the UN Secretary-General Waldheim. Before the meeting, on 10 March, 
Tassos Papadopoulos, the Greek interlocutor, told Perez de Cuellar that he believed 
that discussion in Vienna on Guideline four, which was about the power and function 
of central government and had been drawn in Denktash-Makarios meeting, needed to 
be made in the latter process after the parties made a significant progress in Vienna 
on the territorial issue and guideline two and three.
1010
 
On the first day of the meeting, Waldheim, stated that the talks would last until 7 
April. After this process, negotiations between two communities would continue on 
the island which would provide an opportunity to discuss the matters in greater 
details before a further meeting in Vienna.
1011
 Waldheim also pointed out that the 
importance of the Four-Guideline agreement and said that this would provide ‘a 
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sound basis for a new and determined effort’1012 for the solution of the problem. On 
the first day of discussion, the Greek negotiator, Papadopoulos, offered a map which 
was giving 20 percent of the island to the Turkish Cypriots. Papadopoulos defended 
that this was a fair proportion ‘based on the population ratio and land ownership.’1013 
The Turkish interlocutor, Onan, stated that the Greek proposal was unreasonable 
which did not agree with the four-guideline accord. He said that the offer did not 
meet the Turkish Cypriot need for ‘economic viability and security.’1014 He also 
argued that the Greek offer was designed to make Greek Cypriot domination over the 
Turkish Cypriot zone possible.
1015
 Nevertheless, the Turkish side did not want the 
talks to break down. Therefore, the Greek offer was just regarded as a starting 
bargaining position in the discussion.
1016
 The US Secretary of State, Vance, also 
thought that the territory offered by the Greeks in Vienna was inadequate
1017
 to reach 
an agreement with the Turks. 
The main discussion at the Vienna conference was to settle the problem between the 
Greek and Turkish Cypriot but in his conversation with Papadopoulos, the British 
ambassador in Vienna, Morgan, was also asked that the attitude of the United 
Kingdom towards being a Guarantor in any future settlement in Cyprus issue. The 
ambassador replied that Britain did not seek any kind of guarantorship as it had in the 
1960 Treaties. He personally expressed the view that Britain would consider being a 
guarantor ‘if this was what the Cypriots wanted or if it would contribute towards a 
settlement.’1018 
On 1 April, the Turkish side presented their constitutional proposals. Some the main 
points of the Turkish proposals were: 
a. Religion to keep out of the affairs of the Federal Republic (secular state) 
b. each federated state to have its own constitution 
c. Foreign Affairs to be a federal responsibility ‘subject to certain requirements’ 
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d. external defence forces of the Federal Republic  to be composed of separate land 
forces of each.
1019
 
  
In the session of 2 April, Papadopoulos criticised the Turkish proposals and argued 
that the function of a Federal government was not defined.
1020
 Both sides had 
difficulty in compromising with each other offers. Brian Urquhart, Under-Secretary-
General of the United Nations for Special Political Affairs, described the meeting on 
2 April as "the worst ever".
1021
 The discussion resumed on the territorial and 
constitutional issues in the other sessions. The Vienna meeting was ended on 7 April. 
The British ambassador Morgan indicated that two sides did not find a way to 
‘bridge the considerable gap between their views.’1022 As planned before, it was 
accepted that the negotiations would continue in Nicosia under the chairmanship of 
the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Perez de Cuellar, in preparation 
for a further round in Vienna.
1023
 
The Greek government in Athens was not happy with the outcome of the Vienna 
meeting. The Greek Foreign Minister, Dimitrios Bitsios, told the British ambassador 
Richards that the Greek government considered the talks a substantial failure.
1024
 He 
also admitted that an actual breakdown was prevented by his personal intervention in 
Vienna ‘when Papadopoulos had been in favour of walking out.’1025 Bitsios’ 
statement was showing that there was not much hope that the two sides would reach 
an agreement in the near future. The new Secretary of State for FCO, David Owen, 
commented that the Greek Foreign Minister’s ‘negative line was very 
discouraging.’1026 
The dialogue between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots’ representatives continued in 
Nicosia in May and June 1977. Both sides were trying to ‘overcome their differences 
                                                     
1019
 PRO: FCO 9/2542, confidential telegram from the British Ambassador in Vienna, Hugh Travers 
Morgan, to FCO, no: 95, 3 April 1977. 
1020
 PRO: FCO 9/2542, ‘Cyprus inter-communal talks’, confidential telegram from the British 
Ambassador in Vienna, Hugh Travers Morgan, to FCO, no: 94, 3 April 1977. 
1021
 Ibid. 
1022
 PRO: FCO 9/2542, unclassified telegram from the British Ambassador in Vienna, Hugh Travers 
Morgan, to FCO, no: 110, 7 April 1977. 
1023
 Ibid. 
1024
 PRO: FCO 9/2542, confidential telegram from the British Ambassador in Athens, Sir Brooks 
Richards, to FCO, no: 164, 15 April 1977. 
1025
 Ibid. 
1026
 PRO: FCO 9/2542, confidential telegram from the Secretary of State for FCO, David Owen, to the 
British Embassy in Athens, no: 87, 16 April 1977. 
201 
 
and to prepare the ground for the next round of the Vienna talks.’1027 In his 
statement, Greek Cypriot Negotiator, Tassos Papadopoulos, seemed to believe that 
he did not think that the talks would produce a solution. However, the international 
support for a continuation of the negotiations between the two communities for a 
settlement left the Greeks no choice but resume the dialogue with the Turks because 
the Greek Cypriots did not want to ‘give the impression of scuppering them.’ 
Nevertheless, the death of the Makarios on 3 August 1977 left the process of inter-
communal talks in a state of uncertainty. The British Embassy in Ankara reported 
that the Turkish government did not issue any public statement on Makarios’s death.  
Ecevit, leader of the opposition, expressed his condolences to the Greek Cypriot 
community through a short statement on 4 August.
1028
 According to the assessment 
of the British High Commissioner to Cyprus, Donald McDonald Gordon, the death 
of the Archbishop could affect adversely the possibility of a solution in the Cyprus 
issue. He argued that although Makarios could not manage to unify Cyprus before 
his death, he was ‘seriously interested in a realistic settlement with the Turks.’1029 
Gordon also believed that only Makarios, who had a prestige among the Greek 
community on the island, could sell the idea of a bi-zonal solution to the Greek 
Cypriots.
1030
 Sypros Kyprianou, who was the President of the Greek Cypriot House 
of Representatives,
1031
 became the Acting President after the death of Makarios
1032
 
and on 5 February 1978, he was elected President.
1033
 The UN Secretary-General, 
Kurt Waldheim, went to the island on 15 January 1978
1034
 to activate the negotiation 
process which had been halted by Makarios’ death. After his meeting Denktash and 
Kyprianou, before resuming talks, ‘each side agreed to submit “concrete and 
substantial” proposal on the constitutional and territorial aspect of the question.’1035 
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Furthermore, after Ecevit became Prime Minister again in January 1978, he also 
stated that the Turkish government would make an effort for the solution.
1036
 
Meanwhile, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün, met Hibbert, 
Deputy Under-Secretary of State for FCO, on 21 March 1978. In the Cyprus issue, 
Ökçün told Hibbert that Britain was expected to adopt a policy of equidistance 
towards the both communities in Cyprus and added that the West was likely to 
support the Greek Cypriots.
1037
 Hibbert replied that the United Kingdom pursued a 
policy of equidistance between Turkey and Greece.
1038
 Ökçün continued his 
argument and said that after the constitutional crisis in 1963, which had restarted the 
Cyprus problem, Britain had supported the Greek side and it did not recognise the 
Turkish administration on the island. Hibbert did not accept the accusation and he 
defended his view by stating that the Greeks had also made the same complaint when 
he was in Athens. They said that ‘the UK was supporting the Turkish side.’1039 
The Turkish Cypriot submitted their proposal to Waldheim in Vienna on 13 April 
1978.
1040
 Waldheim said that the ‘Turkish proposals would be sufficient to resume 
the inter-communal talk.’1041 As it was decided in the Denktash-Makarios meeting in 
1977, the Turkish constitutional proposals were based on principles of ‘an 
independent, non-aligned, bi-zonal and bi-communal Federal State of Cyprus’1042 
The Turks envisaged a weak central government.
1043
 Furthermore, they offered to 
‘relinquish control of seven to ten percent of the land they held.’1044 However, 
Kyprianou rejected the Turkish offer and an agreement could not be reached over the 
Turkish constitutional proposals. 
In his talks with Frank Judd, Minister of State for FCO, Necati Münir Ertekün, 
adviser to the Turkish Cypriot negotiator at the inter-communal talks, stated that the 
rejection of the Turkish proposals by the Greek side showed that the Greek Cypriots 
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did not genuinely want to resume the negotiation with the Turks.
1045
 According to 
him, the Greek Cypriots did not want the Americans to think that any progress was 
being made in talks between two communities because this would provide an excuse 
for the Americans to lift their embargo on Turkey.
1046
 At a news conference on 2 
May 1978, the Turkish Prime Minister, Ecevit, also stated that he thought that lift of 
the American embargo on Turkey would be an important step towards the solution of 
the Cyprus problem and problems between Turkey and Greece. He believed that ‘the 
Greek Cypriots would block a solution as long as the embargo factor remained.’1047 
On 15 May 1978, Ecevit told the British Prime Minster, James Callaghan that the 
Turkish proposals were ‘concrete, substantial, voluminous and timely.’ He also 
added that the proposal could be shown as a valid reason for the resumption of 
talks.
1048
 Callaghan replied that he was not sure that the proposals would lead a 
settlement and Kyprianou could accept them.
1049
 Although Ecevit said that some of 
the points in the proposals were open to negotiate, Callaghan asserted that the 
political structure which the Turks pictured was ‘too loose to be constructed as 
providing for a cohesive state.’1050 
The Greek Prime Minister, Karamanlis, wanted Callaghan to convince the Turks by 
using his influence to improve their Cyprus proposals. Callaghan replied that he 
thought that it was unlikely that the Turks would make any modification in the 
proposal before the negotiation opened.
1051
 Furthermore, while the Greek Cypriot 
leader, Kyprianou, was in the UN Headquarters in New York, he wanted to meet 
Ecevit to discuss the Cyprus issue rather than meeting Denktash.
1052
 However, Ecevit 
refused Kyprianou’s offer and told the Greek Prime Minister, Karamanlis that he 
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could accept a quadripartite meeting between Karamanlis, Kyprianou, Denktash and 
himself but Kyprianou did not agree with this.
1053
 
In his conversations with David Owen, the UN Secretary-General Waldheim 
indicated that although he accepted that a new approach was needed in the Cyprus 
peace talks, he would not restart the negotiation process without having sure that it 
would be productive.
1054
 In November 1978, America, Britain and Canada took an 
initiative and offer a plan for the solution of the problem. According to this, there 
would be upper and lower houses in the federal government. While the number of the 
Greek and Turkish deputies in the upper house would be the same, the 78:18 
population ratios would be applied in the lower chamber. ‘Both chambers would 
have to approve a law, but the lower house could overrule the upper with a two-third 
majority. At least thirty-eight percent of the deputies of each community had to 
participate in the balloting.’1055 However, the Greek Cypriots rejected the plan. 
Therefore, it failed to provide an agreement on the Cyprus problem.  
On 18 and 19 May, the UN Secretary-General Waldheim managed to arrange a 
meeting between Kyprianou and Denktash. In this meeting both sides agreed that the 
inter-communal talks would continue.  Moreover, a Ten-Point Agreement was 
reached on 19 May between the two leaders which were accepted as a basis for 
further negotiations between two communities. According to this: 
1. It was agreed to resume the inter-communal talks on 15 June 1979. 
2. The basis of the talks will be the Makarios-Denktash guidelines of 12 February 
1977 and the UN resolutions relevant to the Cyprus Question. 
3. There should be respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
citizens of the Republic. 
4. The talks will deal with all territorial and constitutional aspects. 
5. Priority will be given to reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha 
under UN auspices simultaneously with the beginning of the consideration by the 
interlocutors of the constitutional and territorial aspects of a comprehensive 
settlement. After agreement on Varosha (Maraş) has been reached it will be 
implemented without awaiting the outcome of the discussion on other aspects of the 
Cyprus problem. 
6. It was agreed to abstain from any action which might jeopardise the outcome of 
the talks, and special importance will be given to the initial practical measures by 
both sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal 
conditions. 
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7. The demilitarisation of the Republic of Cyprus is envisaged, and matters relating 
thereto will be discussed. 
8. The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the 
Republic should be adequately guaranteed against union in whole or in part with any 
other country and against any form of partition or secession. 
9. The inter-communal talks will be carried out in a continuing and sustained 
manner, avoiding any delay. 
10. The inter-communal talks will take place in Nicosia.
1056
 
  
After the Ten-Point Agreement, the talks resumed on 15 June 1979 in Nicosia but 
suspended on 22 June because of the different opinions between the two sides. Only 
four meetings were held and at these meetings, as the British High 
Commissioner, Peregrine Rhodes, stated that ‘the substance of the problem was 
hardly touched’1057 by the two sides. Rhodes also indicated that the postponement 
gave the Greek Cypriots an additional pretext to recourse to international opinion to 
get support for their case.
1058
 On the other hand, Rhodes also mentioned that 
unsuccessful negotiation attempts with the Turks had raised some criticism among 
the Greek Cypriots against Kyprianou, even if some from his own party for ‘the 
apparent failure of his policy to produce progress.’1059 
In the meantime, the economic gaps between the two communities on the island were 
growing.  The High Commissioner Rhodes stated that the Greek Cypriot economy 
continued to prosper.
1060
 It was a fact that international recognition of the Greek part 
of the island as the legitimate representative of the “Cyprus Republic” was a major 
factor in this situation. In Turkish-controlled area in the north, although there was a 
stagnant economy, Denktash was still politically strong among the Turkish 
Cypriots.
1061
 Another matter was that the constant breakdown in the inter-communal 
talks appeared to make stronger Denktash’s idea of declaring the independence of the 
Turkish administration in northern Cyprus. Rhodes mentioned that Ankara was 
restraining him from doing so. It was most likely because of the possible 
international reactions towards such a move was preventing the Turks. Rhodes also 
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emphasised that Denktash would eventually seem to convince Turkey that ‘no 
progress was possible in the Cyprus problem unless the Turkish Cypriots are treated 
as equal negotiating partners.’1062 
Through the efforts of the UN Secretary-General’s new Special Representative in 
Cyprus Hugo Gobbi, who was a former Argentinian diplomat, inter-communal 
dialogue resumed between two communities in Cyprus. There was a formal opening 
session on 9 August 1980 which was followed by the first substantive meeting held 
on 16 September.
1063
 By the winter of 1980, the UN Secretary-General introduced an 
Interim Agreement proposal.
1064
 There were some measures in the proposal to 
‘promote more positive atmosphere on the island’1065 such as ‘the lifting of the 
economic embargoes on the Turkish Cypriots, reopening of the Nicosia International 
Airport.’1066 However, as had happened in the past negotiation processes, the two 
communities did not managed to reach a settlement again. As a result of this, 
eventually the Turkish Cypriots would unilaterally declare independence of “Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC)1067 on 15 November 1983. 
Conclusion 
 
The British Government’s approach to the Turkish decision to establish a “Turkish 
Federated State of Cyprus” within Cyprus showed that Ankara did not manage to 
change the British attitude towards the Turkish case  on Cyprus problem in the time 
period 1967-1975, because when the “Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration” 
was established in 1967, Britain criticised this new Turkish formation on the island, 
and there was also no change in British opinion on the new Turkish organisation in 
1975.  
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Even so, British criticism increased when compared with its previous reaction in 
1967. Apart from the report of the British Ambassador in Ankara,
 1068
 in which he 
showed some understanding to the new Turkish administration on the island, the 
British official’s general statements heavily criticised the Turkish decision. In 
particular, the British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Roy 
Hattersley’s statements that the British government deplored the action taken by the 
Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash
1069
 showed the difference in the British and Turkish 
approach to the Cyprus question. 
This negative British attitude towards the Turkish policy on Cyprus issue continued 
in the later stage of the Cyprus problem. Britain regarded the Vienna talks 1975-
1977, and Denktash-Makarios meetings in 1977, later Denktash-Kyprianou summit 
in May 1979 as an important step for a solution, but the Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
failed to reach agreement. The general British official evaluations tended to depict 
the Turkish attitude in the peace talks as a responsible for the failure of attempts to 
settle the problem. In particular, assessments by the British High Commissioner on 
the island on the inter-communal negotiations were likely to criticise the Turkish 
attitude.
 1070 
Ankara was not happy with this British approach towards its policy on 
Cyprus which was essentially regarded as Britain favouring the Greeks. As a result 
of this situation, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün told the British 
official that Britain was expected to adopt a policy of equidistance towards the both 
communities in Cyprus.
 1071  
In general, in contrast to the year of 1974, there was no major crisis in the Anglo-
Turkish relations between the periods of 1975-1980. However, the Cyprus problem 
continued to have a negative effect on their mutual relations because of different 
approaches to its solution. 
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Conclusion 
 
The reactions from by Britain and Turkey towards the events in the Cyprus dispute 
demonstrated that there were three distinct and important stages in Anglo-Turkish 
relations through the periods 1967-1980. The first one was from 1967 to 1974. In this 
time period, Britain and Turkey were well aware that each was pursuing a different 
policy on the island.  However, despite each disapproving of the other sides’ 
approach towards the Cyprus problem on many occasions, both generally avoided 
criticising each other’s policy openly so as not to damage their diplomatic relations. 
One of the significant reasons for this situation was the Cold War. In particular, 
Britain wanted to maintain good relations with Ankara because there were two 
British military bases in Cyprus.
1072
 If their relations were to deteriorate, Turkey 
could try to establish closer relations with the Soviets which would endanger the 
functionality of the British bases
1073
 and NATO’s position in the region.  As a result 
of this, Britain kept restraining itself from heavily criticising Turkey’s policies. 
However, Britain opposed Turkey’s actions at the time of the crisis on the island.  In 
this sense, the November 1967 crisis was an important event on the island; Turkey 
was about to start military operations there but these were halted by American 
intervention. Through this event, the Turkish government clearly understood that 
Britain was against the use of force by the Turks. At the time of crisis, in the Cabinet 
discussion on 23 November 1967, statements by British Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, George Brown, also showed the British position on this issue. 
According to him ‘Britain should bring all possible pressure to bear on Turkey, seek 
to involve the United Nations as deeply as possible and take political action at every 
level to stop the fighting.’1074 His words give us an important example which 
illustrates the divergence in British and Turkish policy on the Cyprus issue. 
Actually, the United Kingdom also tried to understand the Turkish policy on Cyprus. 
According to the FCO’s assessment in 1968; the Turkish policy on Cyprus was based 
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on the following three elements. It also stated that sometimes one was uppermost in 
arguments and sometimes another: 
(a) emotional dislike of Greeks, opposition to Enosis; 
(b) determination to support and protect the Turkish-Cypriot Community, many of 
whom have relatives and friends in Turkey, often in powerful positions; 
(c) military security, and unwillingness to see one more Greek island added to the ring 
which surrounds the Turkish coast.
1075
 
  
This British effort to understand the motivations of the Turkish policy on the Cyprus 
question also showed that Britain was trying to approach the Cyprus issue without 
adversely affecting its relations with Turkey.   
Another point was that Britain’s relations with Cyprus Government, which was 
under Greek Cypriot control, had an impact on its relations with Turkey. After the 
November 1967 crisis, dialogue started between the two communities and Clerides 
and Denktash had meetings to discuss the Cyprus question in order to find a 
settlement. Apart from monitoring the inter-communal talks, Britain also focused on 
its own relations with the island. In this connection, while describing the situation on 
the island in 1970, the British High Commissioner in Nicosia Peter E. Ramsbotham 
indicated that ‘British interest had prospered.’1076 He also added that ‘United 
Kingdom was still the largest trading partner of Cyprus and British had maintained a 
satisfactorily high flow of British consultants and had created several useful openings 
for British Industry.’1077 Therefore, any crisis with the Greek Cypriot administration 
on the island, such as giving support the Turks in the Cyprus issue, could endanger 
British interests in Cyprus.   
Another British interest in the island was their military bases. The British High 
Commissioner Ramsbotham also explained that ‘relations between the Sovereign 
Base Areas and the Cyprus Republic had continued to be good.’1078 It was a fact that 
Britain gave importance to its military bases on the island. Therefore, the United 
Kingdom was following a cautious policy and did not want its military presence in 
Cyprus to be questioned by either of the communities on the island. In his assessment 
report for 1972 to FCO, Derek Day, the Acting British High Commissioner in 
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Nicosia, mentioned that ‘there had been relatively little criticism of the bases even 
from the left-wing press 
1079
 on the island. He also mentioned the inter-communal 
talks between the two communities and said that when any agreement, even if a 
provisional one, was reached in the Cyprus question, the ‘Treaty of Guarantee and 
Agreement of 1960 might well come up for discussion’1080 and, he added that, ‘this, 
in turn, could bring status of the Sovereign Base Areas into question.’ Therefore, he 
recommended that future British policy on Cyprus needed to take into account the 
situation of the SBAs in time of any agreement on the Cyprus issue. 
This British policy to protect its presence in Cyprus had had an impact its approach 
towards the Turkish stance on the Cyprus question. According to British opinion, any 
disagreements between the Greek Cypriot administration and Britain over the Cyprus 
problem and any open support of the British towards the Turks could endanger the 
British Sovereign Base Areas on the island. The British High Commissioner in 
Nicosia, Olver, stated in his report for 1973 that he did not believe that Makarios 
wanted the British to leave the island, but he also emphasised that the Archbishop 
‘was well aware that the Sovereign Base Areas depended on local goodwill for their 
effective functioning.’1081 Therefore, the High Commissioner also pointed out ‘if our 
attitude were considered to be totally negative, the Archbishop’s inevitable tactic 
would be start press and other campaigns against us.’1082 In addition, Olver remarked 
that ‘once started, campaigns of this kind against the British presence on the island 
could rapidly get out of control.’1083 As a result of this situation, Britain restrained 
itself from openly supporting any Turkish arguments on the Cyprus problem, 
because, if Makarios thought that the Turks was favoured by the British in the 
Cyprus dispute, he would take position against the presence of the British SBAs on 
the island which would be a unwanted development for Britain. 
Overall, although the British and Turkish governments knew that they would not 
cooperate with each other as had happened in the 1950s and each passing year was 
widening the gaps in their approach, the Cyprus issue had not caused major problems 
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between the two countries until 1974. When the Turkish military operation started on 
the island in July 1974, Anglo-Turkish relations entered a new stage.  
In fact, before the Turkish military operation, the British and Turkish governments’ 
attitude towards the Greek coup on the island on 15 July 1974 also showed that there 
were important differences in the British and Turkish approach towards the Cyprus 
question. After the Greek coup, the Turkish Prime Minister, Ecevit, accompanied by 
the other Turkish officials met with the British counterparts in London to act together 
with Britain against the situation in Cyprus. However, ‘Turkish and British 
governments failed to reach a consensus during the meetings.’1084 Apart from the 
British government rejection of a joint military operation with the Turks against to 
the Greek junta in Cyprus, the Secretary of State for FCO, Callaghan also did not 
take a positive approach to the Acting Foreign Minister Hasan Işık’s suggestion of 
issuing a joint declaration against the coup.
1085
 He told Işık that ‘the hope and 
expectation that the Turkish government were not contemplating resort to unilateral 
action of a military character.’1086 The Turkish government was not happy with the 
British government’s attitude. Furthermore, Britain’s continued recognition of the 
Greek Cypriot leader, Makarios, as legitimate President of the Republic
1087
 
immediately after his escape from the island following the coup on 15 July also 
disappointed the Turkish government. 
When the British government heard that the Turkish military operation had started on 
20 July, a strong reaction to the Turkish action was shown. A counter military 
operation was also contemplated by the British government to stop the Turkish 
military advance.  Later, James Callaghan said: ‘It was the most frightening moment 
of my career. We nearly went to war with Turkey. But the Americans stopped us.’1088 
Essentially, this British reaction demonstrated that the Cold War had started to be a 
less pressing issue in Anglo-Turkish relations. In particular, Soviet criticism of the 
Turkish military operation might also have encouraged the British to contemplate 
such a harsh response to the Turkish military operation since they knew that it would 
be difficult for Turkey to win Soviet support after launching an attack on Cyprus 
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which was disapproved of by the Soviet. However, America still considered Turkey 
as an important ally and member of NATO, so they did not allow Britain to take such 
an action. All these factors helped Turkey to improve its relationship with America, 
while the Anglo-Turkish relationship was negatively affected.  
In the Geneva conferences, after the first Turkish military intervention on the island, 
which were attended by British, Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, Callaghan’s 
approach towards the crisis also caused problems with the Turkish delegation. There 
were also some strong verbal exchanges between him and the Turkish Foreign 
Minister, Turan Güneş.1089 Furthermore, after the second Turkish military advance 
on the island, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office again took a position 
that was clearly against the Turkish action. Therefore, all of these situations 
significantly damaged the trust between the British and Turkish governments. 
After the end of the Turkish military operations on the island, Anglo-Turkish 
relations again entered a new stage. Although the Cyprus issue did not cause a major 
crisis between the two countries as it had done in 1974, neither country approved of 
the other’s policy towards Cyprus. Thus, an era of ‘negative stability’ in Anglo-
Turkish relations started after 1974. The FCO perpetuated and prolonged its negative 
attitude towards the Turkish policy on the Cyprus issue. As mentioned before, When 
the ‘Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’ was declared on 13 February 1975, the 
British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Hattersley, said 
that the British government deplored the action taken by Turkish Cypriot leader 
Denktash.
1090
 This showed that Britain was now more comfortable criticizing Turkey 
on the Cyprus issue, compared to the 1960s. One of the important factors in this 
situation was that international conjecture was changing. As mentioned before, after 
the Helsinki Accords in 1975, the impact of the Cold War upon international 
relations tended to decrease. This can be also regarded as one of the factors in the 
British taking this more critical stance towards the Turkish policy on Cyprus after 
1975. Furthermore, like the West, the Soviet bloc too refused to recognise the 
Turkish-controlled area on the island. Turkey never acquired international support 
for its action in Cyprus. Consequently, it became easier for Britain to continue to 
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recognise the Greek Cypriot-controlled “Cyprus Government” as the legitimate 
representative of the island.  
The British High Commissioner Olver’s description of the Turkish-held area on the 
island in 1974 could be regarded as example for how the British government saw the 
future of the Turkish Cypriot administration on the island. He said: ‘a northern third 
of Cyprus which, stagnating under the dead hand of the Turkish military, bid fair to 
degenerate into a third-rate Turkish province.’1091 In fact, this description showed 
that the British government did not have any intention of recognising the Turkish 
administration, even, in the distant future. 
The Geneva conferences were Britain’s last major involvement in the Cyprus 
question. After that, Britain applied a more passive policy and rather than actively 
being involved and just chose to express its support of inter-communal talks between 
the communities to solve the problem. It appeared that British interest on the island 
continued to focus more on protecting its SBAs and the best way to do this seemed to 
be to keep its relations with the Greek Cypriot administration at a good level. After 
the beginning of the substantial negotiations between the two communities in 1975, 
both sides started accusing each other of being an obstacle in the solution of the 
problem. Britain tended to regard the Turkish Cypriot attitude in the inter-communal 
talks as being responsible for the continuation of the Cyprus problem and its lack of 
resolution. In this connection, in his report to FCO, the British High Commissioner, 
Donald McDonald Gordon, evaluated the negotiations process in 1977 and expressed 
the view that the Turkish Cypriot leader ‘Denktash had shown no desire for a 
settlement.’1092  
On the other hand, by 1979, it was seen that the attitude of both sides in the talks was 
the responsible for the lack of solution in the Cyprus question. The British High 
Commissioner, Peregrine Rhodes, indicated that ‘there was no narrowing of the gap 
between the two sides.’1093 He also pointed out that ‘neither seemed ready to make 
the sort of concession which might produce a settlement which the other could 
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accept.’1094 Furthermore, the decision of the Greek Cypriot Communist Party 
(AKEL) to withdraw its support from the Greek Cypriot leader Kyprianou’s 
government in May 1980 because of ‘his failure to show results on the inter-
communal issue’1095 demonstrated that there was not complete satisfaction among 
the  Greeks in the inter-communal talks . 
Another point was that Britain appeared not to want to give the image that it had not 
made sufficient effort in solving the problem. Therefore, giving support to the United 
Nations’ initiatives for a settlement was regarded as an important opportunity for the 
British to show that they were still making an effort to settle the dispute. In parallel 
with this policy, the British High Commissioner, Rhodes, also stated that: ‘our 
support for the United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim’s efforts, including 
our share in preparing the basis for them, has enabled us to be seen to be both 
interested and reasonably active in working for a Cypriot solution.’ 1096 In fact, there 
was a deadlock in the inter-communal talks. Therefore, the High Commissioner also 
mentioned that he did not believe that an initiative from the United Nations would 
also be able to break the deadlock and settle the matter between the Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots because, even if the Secretary-General criticised the Greek and 
Turkish attitude and called the both sides to resume the dialogue, the High 
Commissioner claimed that ‘it looked much more likely that the aim of each would 
be build up a case to show that the other was to blame for continued deadlock.’1097 
At the end of 1970s, the solution to the Cyprus question seemed to be more 
complicated. Every attempt which was made since 1975 to reach a settlement 
through the inter-communal talks ended withfailure. Because of this, while talking 
about the Cyprus problem with the United Nations Secretary-General Waldheim, 
Foreign Secretary David Owen stated that ‘Cyprus was a mess.’1098 As a result of 
this, the British government also appeared to lose interest in the dialogue between the 
two communities and the British High Commission on the island became a more 
important instrument for the government to monitor the development in the Cyprus 
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question. The reports of the High Commissioner in Nicosia on the situation on the 
island were also effective in shaping the British government’s attitude towards the 
Turkish Cypriots. The reports also gave information about the relations between 
Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots. In his report of the assessment of 1980, British 
High Commissioner on the island, Rhodes, stated that Denktash was still a strong 
leader among the Turkish Cypriots. On the other hand, he also mentioned there was 
some pressure from Ankara on Denktash towards greater flexibility in the talks for 
the solution of the problem.
1099
 Rhodes indicated that Denktash haddifficulty in 
accepting concessions on the territorial issue.
1100
 However, after the Turkish 
Generals took over the government in Turkey by the military coup on 12 September 
1980, Rhodes thought that it was most likely that Ankara’s pressure on Denktash to 
urge him to be more flexible would decrease.
1101
 
In general, because of the British passive role in the Cyprus question after 1974, 
Anglo-Turkish relations did not face a major problem, but the significant differences 
in their respective Cyprus policy endured. Britain’s negative attitude towards 
Ankara’s policy also continued. It was difficult to ignore the impact of Callaghan, 
who was Foreign Secretary at the time of 1974 events and who became Prime 
Minister in April 1976, on the Anglo-Turkish relations. His personal position at the 
time 1974 crisis negatively had affected Ankara’s approach towards Britain. 
This negative situation between Britain and Turkey also continued after 1980. In this 
connection, when the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC)1102 was 
declared on 15 November 1983, the United Kingdom gave its support to the United 
Nations Security Council resolution which heavily criticised the Turkish decision. 
Furthermore, in his speech at the House of Commons, Foreign Secretary Geoffrey 
Howe, stated that the British government condemned the Turkish Cypriot declaration 
of independence. Furthermore British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher sent a 
message to the President of Turkey Kenan Evren, stating that she wanted the Turks 
to withdraw their decision on declaring independence in Cyprus.
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